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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation provides a reading of political power in twenty-first century Turkey 
through the lens of (energy) infrastructures. By tracing the country’s bourgeoning energy 
infrastructures along their material, legal and financial dimensions, I examine energy’s 
ability to do political work and securing societal consent in Turkey, at a time when the idea 
of development is being privatized and the challenge of climate change encounters the 
country’s growing energy deficit. Relying on ethnographic and other qualitative methods 
collected along the path of energy infrastructures—including corridors of the bureaucracy, 
investment banks, construction sites, ribbon-cutting ceremonies, energy expos, local 
courthouses as well as electricity grids and hydropower penstocks—I argue that energy has 
played an under-recognized yet influential role in the establishment and sustenance of an 
authoritarian neoliberal experience, what is being dubbed by its founders, the ‘new 
Turkey’. Rather than collapsing the power harnessed from energy resources with political 
power, I introduce energy as a form of governmental rationality in the new Turkey that 
seeps into other realms of government from urban governance to counter-terrorism. The 
prowess of this emergent rationality, which I name as energorationality, stems from 
energy’s unique qualities in bringing center and periphery, urban and countryside, capital 
and commons together, from its ability to suture a variety of unlikely actors, policies, and 
ideas to each other. By examining grassroots mobilizations struggling against energy 
infrastructures in Turkey’s rural Eastern Black Sea Region (EBSR), I also discuss the 
fragility of energorationality. Mining disasters, unexpected droughts, unreliable 
projections, unruly villagers and urban riots, put delicate project cycles into disarray. I 
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illustrate throughout the dissertation how energy infrastructures—small hydropower plants 
(small hydro, or SHP) in particular—, cause unexpected cracks as well as powerful 
sociopolitical alliances while converting uncharted rural and environmental settings into 
energy landscapes.  
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C H A P T E R – O N E 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Understanding the interconnections between using fossil fuels and making 
democratic claims requires tracing how these connections are built, the 
vulnerabilities and opportunities they create, and the narrow points of 
passage where control is particularly effective. Political possibilities were 
opened up or narrowed down by different ways of organizing the flow and 
concentration of energy, and these possibilities were enhanced or limited 
by arrangements of people, finance, expertise and violence that were 
assembled in the relationship to the distribution and control of energy. 
(Mitchell, 2011: 8-9) 
If the textbook definition of energy is ability to do work…can energy do 
political work? (Huber, 2013: xi) 
 
My dissertation centralizes energy as a novel lens through which to analyze and evaluate 
the role of political power in 21st century Turkey. I study Turkey’s aggressive energy 
program to understand how energy is (re)valued and (re)constructed at this turbulent 
conjuncture by assembling new social, political and ecological meanings and relations. 
Tracing Turkey’s bourgeoning energy infrastructures (material, legal and financial), I ask 
how energy policies have facilitated the Turkish state’s accumulation of political power 
and ability to secure consent at a time when the promise of development is eroding. 
Focusing on small hydropower plants (small hydro, or SHP) in the Eastern Black Sea 
Region (EBSR), and utilizing qualitative methods such as ethnography, archival research, 
focused groups and extended interviews, I argue that energy politics has become central to 
the establishment of an authoritarian neoliberal experience, dubbed as ‘new Turkey’ by 
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Turkey’s governing Justice and Development Party (Adelet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP, JDP 
or AK Party). 
 
I argue that energy politics, infrastructures and the politics of growth and development 
have contributed to the AKP’s 14-year-old hegemony due to energy’s unique ability to 
bridge center and periphery, urban and countryside, capital and commons. What’s more, I 
argue that electrical grids and pipelines in particular have facilitated this hegemonic 
project. As I have trailed energy along its stops–from conference halls to production sites, 
from engineering firms to courthouses, from bureaucrat’s desks to development banks—I 
maintain that it is this bridging function that is so potent for hegemonic formations. I also 
discuss, however, that this hegemony is unstable and fragile, and has provoked counter-
hegemonic contestations. Throughout the dissertation, I illustrate how energy 
infrastructures convert uncharted rural and environmental settings into energy landscapes, 
by causing unexpected disruptions as well as powerful socio-political alliances. 
 
My research illustrates that the value, urgency, priority, economic and political potential 
attributed to energy production and infrastructures have developed into an emergent form 
of rationality that influences a variety of governmental domains and that subsequently, 
produces specific political outcomes. This emergent governmental rationality—which I 
call energorationality—eases and legitimizes political action beyond the scope of the 
energy field by suturing actors, policies, and ideas together. Energoratianality does not 
mean the ultimate priority of energy concerns over other forms of government. Nor does it 
suggest a form of resource reductionism in which social and political change is reduced to 
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absence or lack of energy. Energorationality is a form of emergent rationality among other 
rationalities in which ideas, practices, and images of energy becomes a benchmark for 
political action in, a toolkit for problem solving, in variety of administrative domains. Each 
of the following chapters focuses on one such domain, such as neoliberal restructuring, 
state-capital relations, and administrative law. In the final chapter I focus on environmental 
and oppositional politics as a domain a new form of language is generated counter to 
energorationality. that has been transformed through energy infrastructures. Through an 
examination of the 30-year history of energy liberalization in Turkey, I show that energy 
has functioned as a powerful bridge between neoliberal restructuring and the 
developmental state. Energy investments provide a critical platform that allows 
entrepreneurs to enter into the AK Party’s growth-oriented, construction-based economics. 
However, by highlighting the material infrastructures of small hydropower, I draw 
attention to the vulnerabilities of how political and economic power is accumulated around 
these sites as water is converted to energy. I argue that in opening up uncharted valleys and 
villages to new forms of accumulation, SHPs have in fact destabilized the very countryside 
(and its environment) in ways that run counter to those actors who aim to dominate it. On 
the one hand, the emergence of the private energy market in Turkey has generated a legal 
logic that spills over into other domains of regulation to facilitate myriad forms of socio-
spatial intervention. These include large-scale infrastructure projects, urban and rural 
redevelopment programs, environmental governance and agricultural reform, which have 
all reconfigured the relation between nature and property. On the other hand, anti-energy 
infrastructure activism has led to the emergence of a new breed of environmentalism in 
Turkey that is grassroots, cross-class and provincial in character and anti-capitalist in its 
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language, both of which were absent from local NGO-based environmentalism prior to 
mid-2000s. This new wave of activism creates a broader oppositional politics in Turkey 
with a repertoire and tactics that articulated a form of objection in defense of life in its 
relation to space and non-humans, best exemplified in the impromptu Gezi uprising in the 
summer of 2013.   
1.1 AUTHORITARIAN NEOLIBERALISM 
Until recently, Turkey was promoted as a model country by a large spectrum of the 
international media. Often dubbed “the Turkish model,” Turkey’s exemplar status was 
predicated on its devout Muslim ruling cadre who committed to (procedural) democracy, 
was willing to cooperate with the West and was eager to undertake market reforms (Tuğal, 
2016). This was a godsend in the post-9/11 world order. Celebrated as a successful 
combination of liberal democracy and moderate Islam, Turkey’s performance over the 
course of 2002-2013 was exalted as an example that the rest of the Middle East could and 
should replicate. Hailed as “the twenty-first century’s first Muslim power”1 by Forbes, 
Turkey managed to bring together unlikely partners. As Tuğal (2016: 4) aptly puts it:  
If American neoconservatives and liberals disagreed on a range of 
burning issues, they united in their embrace of what they called the 
‘Turkish Model.’ Around the turn of the millennium, the celebration of the 
Turkish model also brought together divided American and European 
elites: investment in the Turkish model could perhaps suture the wounds 
of a disintegrating global order.  
                                                
1 Kanani, R. “The rise of Turkey: the twenty-first century's first Muslim power”, Forbes, 3 March 2014, 
URL. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rahimkanani/2014/03/05/the-rise-of-turkey-the-twenty-first-centurys-
first-muslim-power/#c0727334d939 (accessed 3 August 2016). 
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Yet by 2013, the consensus over Turkey started to crumble. Some rejected the Turkish 
model following the government’s violent suppression of the Gezi revolt in the summer of 
2013, while others began asking questions six months after an international corruption 
scandal implicated several government ministers, President Erdoğan, and his family. Yet, 
the country’s eventual fall from grace was secured once the AKP government priorities, 
projections, and objectives regarding the Arab Spring and the Syrian conflict diverged 
significantly from those of the global powers. Turkey’s ambitious yet erratic involvement 
in the Syrian Civil War and its unwillingness to close its borders to jihadi traffic exhausted 
any possibility of the government maintaining a positive reputation in the international 
community, and made it an unreliable partner. The government’s strong counter punch 
following the recent failed coup attempt2 and subsequent imprisonment of thousands 
overnight continues to raise concerns about the limits of Erdoğan’s regime.  
 
Today, eulogies to the AKP model and Erdoğan’s leadership are rapidly being replaced 
with harsh criticism and frustration. While the regime in Turkey is rightfully categorized 
as authoritarian, how the country ended up as such is not critically accounted for, or at best, 
has been sidestepped by scholars. International commentators who chastise the current 
Turkish regime seem to have forgotten their part in establishing that very same regime over 
the course of a decade. By solely implicating the regime, these commentators suggest that 
the deterioration simply occurred overnight. More often than not, the rise of 
                                                
2 The failed coup attempt on July 15th overlapped with my dissertation writing process. I was not in Turkey 
and had to follow the actions of the military, the people, and the regime second-hand: through my contacts 
and family members in the field, social media and news outlets in the USA. It is still too early to make a 
conclusive analysis about the effects of these events (and it is obviously beyond the scope of this 
dissertation). 
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authoritarianism is explained on cultural grounds, citing the AKP’s Islamist roots, the very 
thing that made the party valuable to the international community ten years ago. 
Furthermore, the regime’s authoritarianization is understood through the persona of 
Erdoğan, who is believed to be power hungry, intrinsically authoritarian or suffering from 
a Sultan complex. If Erdoğan, as suggested in a recent Huffington Post article3, managed 
to keep his ambitions under control, Turkey would have been just fine: 
Indeed, if Erdoğan had retired from politics in 2011 with all the party’s 
accomplishments, he would certainly go down in history as the greatest 
prime minister in the history of democratic Turkey. But, as with so many 
leaders, after a decade in power, corruption sets in, leaders lose their touch 
and grow isolated and power-hungry. Erdoğan is now in the process of 
destroying virtually everything his party created in the first decade of 
governance.  
My dissertation research significantly complicates these cursory readings of the rise of 
authoritarianism in Turkey. First, instead of searching for authoritarianism in personal, 
cultural, or ideological traits of political Islam and its leadership, I look at material 
infrastructures, one aspect of the AKP economics that even the most ardent opponents 
support.4 By doing so, I point to an inherent harmony between market reforms and 
authoritarianism, an unlikely link few observers are eager to explore. Second, my 
examination of energy infrastructures begins in the late 1990s and thus provides a longer 
                                                
3 Graham Fuller, “Gulen Movement is not a cult; it is one of the most encouraging faces of Islam today”, 
Huffington Post, 22 July 2016 URL. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/graham-e-fuller/gulen-movement-not-
cult_b_11116858.html (accessed 20 August 2016). 
4 As late as February 2014, just a handful of months after Gezi, where millions stood against, among others, 
the aggressive urbanization policies of the government, an article in Foreign Affairs explained Erdoğan’s 
success by stressing the construction and infrastructure boom, the very grounds that triggered Gezi in the 
first place: “A boom in infrastructure development and construction added to the good times. Since the outset 
of Erdoğan’s tenure, the country’s highway network has been expanded by more than 10,000 miles. The 
number of airports has doubled to 50, and Turkish Airlines now flies to more than 100 countries, more than 
any other in the World. New upscale housing complexes and shopping malls seem to flank every major city.” 
(Dombey, 2014, as cited by Tuğal, 2016: 16) 
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perspective for the rise of authoritarianism than other work on the subject, debunking the 
assumption that it emerged from nowhere. This contribution challenges commonplace 
assumptions that conflate the history of neoliberalism with that of the AKP and that limit 
the rise of Turkey’s neoliberal experience to the last few years. Finally, while I stress the 
growing authority of the central government, it is the work of tracing energy infrastructures 
from production facilities in the periphery to the corridors of Turkish bureaucracy in 
Ankara that allows me to present a more nuanced analysis of authoritarian tendencies: how 
they take root at different tiers of the state and in various corners of the country. This 
analysis supports my argument that the rise of authoritarianism in Turkey is not simply an 
Ankara-run operation; rather, it must be conceptualized as a broader transformation at 
different levels of the state and as the state intersects with capital, nature, and society.   
1.2 HEGEMONY AND CONSENT  
In this study I identify the AKP’s political power as hegemonic, using the term in a 
Gramscian sense (1971).5 By doing so, my intention is to highlight that the power of the 
AKP relies on winning the active consent of the masses through their self-organization, 
beginning with civil society (Buci-Glucksmann, 1982: 119). This is particularly crucial to 
keep in mind at a time when the AKP regime seems increasingly suppressive. Significantly, 
however, consent and coercion are two inseparable sides of political power. As Eagleton 
                                                
5 For Gramsci there are two ways of governance: through domination and/or through moral and intellectual 
leadership. These two forms are not mutually exclusive and can exists at the same time. Moral and 
intellectual leadership, which is very closely associated with what Gramsci understands from hegemony, 
can influence a society before the leadership formally control the government. Gramsci explains as such: 
“the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as “domination” and as “intellectual an 
moral leadership”. A social group dominates antagonistic groups... it leads kindred and allied groups. A 
social group can, and indeed must, already exercise 'leadership' before winning governmental power”. 
(1971: 57)  
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notes, hegemony is “a governing power win[ning] consent to its rule from those it 
subjugates” (Eagleton, 1991: 112). In case of AKP’s hegemony, winning consent includes 
but it is not limited to the party’s consecutive election victories since 2002. On the one 
hand, it implies a form of power that sets the contours of public discussion, what Lukes 
(2005 [1974]: 18-30) calls a “third dimension of power”.6 On the other hand, consent 
requires a cross-class coalition in which political power manufactures consensus about the 
legitimacy of its rule by (temporarily) convincing strata beyond its immediate circle. This 
is also known as a hegemonic power bloc (cf. Poulantzas, 1974; 1975). This is not 
necessarily accomplished through an ideological trick (or false-consciousness), but is 
rather a matter of political strategy and leadership (Buci-Glucksmann, 1982: 117-118). 
AKP hegemony was so successful for a decade (2012-2012) that the party was able to win 
and maintain the active consent of a variety of groups. These groups included not only the 
majority of working and middle classes who never voted for Islamist parties prior to their 
support of the AKP, but also centrists, liberals and even certain socialist factions. 
 
Other significant factors characterize the AKP’s particular brand of hegemony. One critical 
factor was its promotion as a model that should be replicated by the rest of the Middle East, 
suggesting an overlap between the domestic project and larger international hegemonic 
formations that aimed to tame and incorporate the Middle East into the international 
system. It is also crucial to note that the AKP’s hegemony was able to establish stronger 
roots because it was a response to a decade long “organic crises,” in Gramsci’s formulation, 
                                                
6 This agenda-setting type of political power, Swartz notes, is also manifested through “power to/power 
over” distinction in writings of many political sociologists (Swartz 2013: 43; see Giddens, 1976; Mann, 
1986; Nueman, 2005; Lukes, 2005 [1974]).   
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which was triggered by cyclical economic crisis and a violent domestic war in the Kurdish 
region. In other words, the AKP was supposed to present an answer to a series of problems 
created by a previous hegemonic project that, in the end, fell apart. This brings us to a 
related issue regarding the limits of a hegemony. Hegemony must not be conflated with 
absolute power. In fact, Tuğal (2009) notes that the formation of AKP hegemony must not 
be considered an unmediated imposition of Islamism but rather as a passive revolution in 
which the Islamic challenge that influenced the civil society for decades was finally 
absorbed into capitalism.  
 
This dissertation, however, is not about the formation of AKP hegemony per se.7 However, 
by tracing the role of energy infrastructures in contemporary Turkey, I hope to shed some 
light on the mechanics of the AKP’s hegemony, the blocs that have been foundational to 
its success, and how the party manufactures consent, as well as its fragilities. Given that no 
hegemonic project is complete without a spatial component (Jessop, 2005; Kipfer, 2002), 
this study’s key contribution to the field is its examination of the role energy infrastructures 
and a construction-led growth model, which the AKP’s hegemony heavily relies on.  It is 
important to clarify, however, that the argument developed here is less about evaluating a 
party and its ideologies, and instead focuses on the possibilities and limits of infrastructure-
based economics in generating consent and causing dissent in the formation and 
maintenance of a capitalist hegemony.  
 
 
                                                
7 See Öztan, 2014; Akça, 2014; Tuğal, 2009, 2016 for more detailed discussions dedicated to hegemonic 
struggles in Turkey and the formation of the AKP’s hegemony. 
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1.3 ENERGY AS A FIELD   
Throughout the dissertation, I make use of the Bourdieuian notion of field to denote 
specific socio-political spheres of struggle such as the energy field or the anti-hydro 
activism field. For Bourdieu, a field is a relatively autonomous subdivision of the social 
world in which agents (individuals, networks, institutions) and their positions are located 
vis-à-vis each other (Bourdieu, 1984: 223-253; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 94-144).  
What I find particularly useful in this approach is that it prioritizes competition and struggle 
as much as structure and continuity. I understand that a field is not the manifestation of an 
a priori power distribution; it is a setting where power is being shaped as a result of actors’ 
changing positions. The field of energy in Turkey, to give an example from this study, was 
not destined for a liberalization as aggressive as it was in late 2000s. However, for other 
factors (such as global neoliberalization and IMF conditionality) the pace, content and 
intensity of the opening up of the energy market were shaped by the competition between 
its actors (the judiciary, private sector, political parties and labor) throughout the 1990s. 
As such, at its core, field analysis assumes relationality:  
To think in terms of field is to think relationally…What exists in the social 
world are relations—not interactions between agents or intersubjective 
ties between individuals, but objective relations which exist 
“independently of individual consciousness and will” as Marx said 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 96-97).  
By emphasizing relationality and competition in the fields in question, I avoid reifying 
often taken-for-granted concepts, including neoliberalization, development and 
environmentalism. I complicate these concepts by highlighting dislocations and 
reconfigurations in each field, paying particular attention to energy (see Figure 1.1 for a 
sketch of the energy field). Similarly, acknowledging actors and their competition within 
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a field is a fertile way to counter deterministic readings of global hierarchy and a capitalist 
order.  
Figure 1.1: The Energy Field and Accompanying Processes 
 
 
For Bourdieu, the state must be understood from a field analysis perspective. In fact, the 
field of state is a meta-field in his sociology. It is central to, if not synonymous with, the 
field of power, the broadest possible plane that all fields are located on and on which they 
compete (Swartz, 2013: 36). Yet the field of state’s special status does not make it a stable 
unitary body representative of a single view, class and/or ideology (although Bourdieu 
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admits the dominance of economy capital over the state field). The struggle in the field of 
state is largely an instituted struggle of “partially overlapping various bureaucratic 
fields…over the functions of social regulation in a society” (Ibid.: 130). Bourdieu and 
Wacquant defines state as:  
An ensemble of administrative or bureaucratic fields (they often take the 
empirical form of commissions, bureaus and boards) within which agents 
and categories of agents, governmental and nongovernmental, struggle 
over this peculiar form of authority consisting of the power to rule via 
legislation, regulations, administrative measures in short, everything that 
we normally put under the rubric of state policy as particular spheres of 
practices (1992: 111). 
I find this description of state useful, as the time period across which I trace the 
transformation of Turkey’s energy field also contained a significant reshuffling of 
bureaucratic cadres, the advent of new governmental institutions, the privatization of others 
and the emergence of a new political tradition in administrative ranks. Struggles between 
new and old agents and related reconfigurations signal a dynamic field in the making, 
attuned to the political implications of shifting bureaucratic terrains as well as changing 
laws and regulations.  
1.4 AN EMERGENT RATIONALITY: ENERGORATIONALITY 
Social scientists have engaged energy as a field of inquiry for some time. The first 
systematic studies of the social, economical and environmental dimension of energy 
production and consumption can be traced back to the late 1970s and early 1980s.8 
Motivated by global waves of environmentalism and concerned by the energy crises of the 
                                                
8 For an exceptional early example, see Cottrell, 1955.  
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1970s and the risks of nuclear energy, scholars such as Laura Nader forwarded the idea 
that energy is a social problematic, not merely a technical or economical one (Adams, 
1975; Lovins, 1976; Nader and Beckermann, 1978; Nader, 1981a; 1981b; Schnaiberg, 
1980). While this early research was of critical significance in emphasizing the limits to 
growth, it had significant shortcomings, overlooking the production cycle as well as the 
importance of democratic debate and participation in making of energy related decisions; 
the micro-politics of energy infrastructures were not studied with an ethnographic 
curiosity.   
 
Faced with the challenges of the Anthropocene—the contemporary epoch in which the 
human condition is increasingly inseparable from the non-human, and the social from the 
natural—energy has appeared once again as a lens through which many social science 
scholars strive to understand the conditions of modernity (Swyngedouw, 2015), democracy 
(Mitchell, 2011), uneven development (McNeish et al. 2015), capitalist consumerism 
(Huber, 2013; Jacob, 2016), everyday cultural practices (Strauss et al., 2013)  and post-
coloniality. Studying energy does not simply mean collapsing forms and energy 
availability into political outcomes as if the former automatically yields to the latter 
(Mitchell, 2011). What often matters more is the social and cultural relations and practices 
that are formed in the production, transmission and consumption of energy. In this sense, 
what differentiates this current wave of energy engagement from earlier examples is its 
simultaneous emphasis on the material and spatial, as well as the discursive and economic 
qualities of energy. To capture the multiple scales and facets of energy, new approaches 
examine energy closer to its infrastructures as they are transmitted along mines, turbines, 
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grids, plants and pipelines, simultaneously as they are codified in parliaments, challenged 
in courthouses, and funded by financial institutions (Star, 1999; Dennis and O'Neill, 2012; 
Anand, 2012; Simone, 2012; Larkin, 2013). While this new wave of research is inspired 
by a sharp critique of capitalist extraction and the role of natural resources in state-making, 
as in critical oil studies (Coronil, 1997; Watts, 2001; 2004), it also treats energy as a form 
of modern power, a form of bio-power (energopower) that is capable of setting in motion 
ideas and imaginaries, promising prosperity and development, even offering solutions to 
environmental catastrophes (Boyer 2014).  
 
While influenced by the conceptualization of energopower, I prefer to use another term, 
energorationality, to first and foremost, emphasize the ability of energy to do political work 
in the 21st century as a form of rationality that can be transferred to (or can seep into) other 
fields of power. Throughout the dissertation, I illustrate how the discourse, tools and 
practices of energy are utilized to achieve political outcomes in economic policy, judicial 
and bureaucratic reform, urban renewal, natural resource and environmental management. 
The ways in which energy problems are solved become a benchmark for political action, 
producing, to borrow from Foucault, a regime of truth for governance (Foucault, 2010; 
Rabinow, 1991).     
 
Importantly, energorationality is inspired by Foucault’s notion of the rationality of 
government and his emphasis on the diffusion of power in modern societies (Foucault, 
1991). A rationality of government is best described as “a way or system of thinking about 
the nature of practice of government, capable of making some form of that activity 
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thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was practiced” 
(Gordon, 1991: 3). The dissertation not only illustrates the increasing relevance of energy 
thinking and its role in Turkish policy making, but also argues that energorationality has 
helped create new subjectivities such as the bureaucrat-cum-investor or the rural 
entrepreneur. Such subjectivities find in the extraction economy the opportunity to become 
articulated to the world and thereby achieve a sense of an economic self (see Figure 1.2). 
 
Figure 1.2: Rural Entrepreneurship 
 
Grandpa: Is that fella Ali Ağaoğlu ( a famous real estate developer, energy investor—the Turkish Donald Trump)? 
Heidi: No Grandpa! That’s Peter, He is taking a walk through the meadow. You see Ali Ağaoğlu wherever you look! 
Grandpa thought bubble: When the hell is this place’s value going to appreciate? 
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In his most recent study, which focuses on the role of water in Spain’s political-ecological 
modernization, Erik Swyngedouw similarly borrows from Foucault when he describes the 
hydromodernization campaign in 20th century Spain as a “biopolitical national regime, 
centered on transforming people’s lives” (Swyngedouw 2015: 4). Through dams, inter-
river basin transfers, large scale irrigation and desalinization facilities, Spain, Swyngedouw 
argues, sought to achieve a modern state and a more prosperous population. While a 
governmental desire to create and distribute national wealth through large-scale socio-
ecological engineering interventions is not absent in Turkey, what I suggest by 
energorationality is not limited to hydromodernization, which has been a powerful guiding 
principle behind large-scale energy/irrigation projects.  
  
As a host to the Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, or GAP)—a 
multi-sector development project that consists of 22 dams, 19 power-plants and irrigation 
of 17,000 square kilometers—the idea of improving lives through hydromodernization is 
not new to Turkey. While GAP reveals much about the country’s developmental ambitions 
and their limits9, the type of rationality I point to is relatively newer compared to 
hydromodernization and assumes a different path for the prosperity of the population. The 
Turkish energorationality that I describe not only promises to transform people’s lives 
through electricity but also signals what is acceptable and valuable in an economy that is 
driven by growth based on extraction and construction.   
                                                
9 The work of Leila Harris (2008a; 2008b; 2009a; 2009b; 2012) on the changing geographies of Turkish 
Kurdistan under GAP is instructive in this respect. 
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1.5 ETHNOGRAPHY OF (ENERGY) INFRASTRUCTURES 
Following Susan Leigh Star’s influential article (1999), I describe the foundational 
methodology of this dissertation as an infrastructure ethnography in which I trace a 
particular form of infrastructure, namely small hydro power plants, as they interact with a 
variety of actors, institutions, political discourses, cultural norms and geographical settings. 
Contrary to commonly held assumptions, infrastructures are not simply technical structures 
void of social and cultural dimensions. In fact, in their materiality intangible sociological 
categories (such as class, state and environment) and in their manifestations (power, 
violence, waiting), infrastructures become ethnographically graspable (Ferguson, 2012). 
As such, infrastructures emerge, as Rodgers and O’Neill argue, “as ideal ethnographic sites 
for theorizing how broad and abstract social orderings such as the state, citizenship, 
criminality, ethnicity and class play out concretely at the level of everyday practice, 
revealing how such relationships of power and hierarchy translate into palpable forms of 
physical and emotional harm” (2012: 402).  
 
While infrastructures are ideal sites for ethnographic study, infrastructure ethnography 
cannot be limited to the examination of a single site in the strict sense of the word. The 
ethnography of an infrastructure requires a research design that traces it at all possible 
stages, “one in which ethnography might need to be conducted in government centers far 
from where the actual roads are constructed and might take into account politicians, 
technocrats, economists, engineers, and road builders, as well as road users themselves” 
(Larkin, 2013: 328). Following this line of thought, the field research that this dissertation 
relies on traces small hydropower plants not only through their projected sites of 
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construction, but also through the planning, licensing, funding and construction processes 
as well as the legal proceedings that centralize hydropower plants. Yet, infrastructures do 
not operate in a bubble; they are contingent on a variety of factors that often have little to 
do with the material conditions of the infrastructures. Therefore, “to maintain its focus on 
contingency, the ways in which forms of infrastructure can offer insights into other 
domains such as practices of government, religion, or sociality” (ibid). To this end, my 
fieldwork has been in close conversation with the broader discourses, desires and anxieties 
of the AKP’s hegemony and is supplemented by empirical data on events (such as the Gezi 
Revolt) that, while outside the immediate scope of energy infrastructures to have a causal 
effect, are conjuncturally influential. 
 Figure 1.3: Fieldwork Locations 
  
 
Spanning 30 months between 2010 and 2015, my dissertation fieldwork is composed of 
three pillars extending across three separate geographies in Turkey, tracing energy as it  
travels across scales (see Figure 1.3). The first pillar includes project site ethnographies 
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that I conducted in the EBSR, home to over 200 ongoing and future SHP projects. I traveled 
across the Artvin, Rize, and Trabzon valleys several times and spent five months in the 
region to observe how social, political and ecological frictions unfold as rural livelihoods 
and landscapes are turned into new energy geographies. The second pillar is my 
examination of the energy industry (energy bureaucracy and private energy sector),10 
which allows me to illustrate the kinds of coalitions and conflicts a thriving market 
produces. I reviewed policy documents, observed administrative litigations, attended 
sectoral panels, trade fairs, conferences11 and interviewed fifty-five actors12 working in the 
energy industry including bureaucrats, engineers, businesspeople, bankers and journalists. 
The majority of these interviews took place in Ankara and Istanbul. For the third pillar of 
my research, I undertook participatory action research, observing and participating in the 
anti-SHP movement. I have attended demonstrations, occupations, activist field trips, court 
hearings, expert explorations, and conducted in-depth interviews with key activists. I also 
conducted a detailed focus group interview with five environmentalist lawyers to better 
grasp the forms of objection, narratives, and representations emerging from this movement. 
  
                                                
10 The institutions my interviews are affiliated with includes but are not limited to (1) State Hydraulic 
Works, (2) Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, (3) Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, (4) 
Ministry of Water and Forestry, (5) Energy Markets Regulatory Authority, (6) General Directorate of 
Renewable Energy, (7) Turkish Electricity Transmission Company, (8) Electricity Producers Association, 
(9) Hydro Energy Industry and Businessmen Association, (10) Turkish Energy Foundation, (11) The 
Turkish National Committee of the World Energy Council, (12) Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers 
and Architects (13) Industrial Development Bank of Turkey.  
11 Here is a list of panels, fairs and conferences I attended as a participant observer throughout my 
fieldwork: (1) International Water Congress, May 22-24 May, 2013, Istanbul (2) International Congress on 
Environmental Impact Assessment, 8-10 November, 2013, Istanbul (3) 2nd Congress on Dams, February 
13-15, 2014 - Istanbul (4) 23th International Energy and Environment Fair & Congress, April 22-26, 2014, 
Istanbul (5) Hydroenergia 2014, May 21-23, 2014, Istanbul (6) 9th Union of Chambers of Turkish 
Engineers and Architects (UCTEA) Energy Symposium 12-14 December, 2014, Ankara (7) Energy 
Markets Summit January, 2015, Ankara (8) 1st Hydropower and Dams Expo, January 22-14, 2015, Ankara.  
12 Twenty-five of these interviews were structured and lasted around an hour on average. The rest were 
semi-structured, conducted “on the go”, and lasted around 30 minutes on average.   
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The first phase of my research, which included ethnographic fieldwork in the new energy 
geographies of EBSR, requires further elaboration. Trabzon, Rize and Artvin are the 
northeastern-most provinces along the Turkish Black Sea. While Trabzon is a mid-size 
province13 with a population of 758,237, Rize and Artvin are two of the smallest provinces 
with populations 328,776 and 169,674 respectively, according to 2012 Population Data.14 
Around 230 small hydropower plants are expected to be operational in the region by 2023, 
making the region Turkey’s new hydro geography. All three provinces share a borderline 
tropical climate that delivers record precipitation rates (a sharp contrast to arid Anatolia 
plaıns, the heathland of the country) and a rapid rise in elevation from the town centers by 
the seashore to approximately 3,000 meters in the Pontic Mountains. This combination of 
climate and geography has created a region where rivers and streams are relatively short, 
fast running and seasonal, only exploitable by small hydro solutions. This is why the region 
is over-targeted by hydropower projects and has become a hotbed for anti-small hydro 
activism. 
 
In the EBSR, locals live around streams and valleys. Cities and towns are mostly located 
by a tiny band of flat land along the shoreline where a major stream meets the Black Sea. 
As one of the regions with the highest ratio of rural populations in Turkey, however,  the 
Pontic Mountains host as much population as the cities along the shoreline do. The rural 
population is concentrated along the parallel valleys that rise up to the summits of the 
                                                
13 A province is an administrative unit in Turkey. There are 81 provinces in Turkey, each headed by a 
governor appointed by the central government in Ankara. A province is almost always named after its 
center city (or province center) which is governed by a municipality headed by a major. 81 provinces are 
divided into 957 districts. Districts are governed by appointed sub-governors, while the district center and 
towns are governed by municipalities.  
14 Turkish Statistics Institute, Population Data. 
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Pontics. Over the course of five-years, I regularly visited eight valleys15 that were exposed 
to small hydro developments in varying degrees (planning, construction and operation) to 
provide an opportunity for comparison. My visits to the region lasted around one to three 
weeks and gave me the opportunity to spend a few days in each valley. My ethnographic 
focus included an examination of the anti-small hydro mobilization, logging narratives 
about locality, history and activism, observaing rural life and living arrangements as well 
as the the kinds of relationships residents have with streams and nature in general.  
1.6 DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
1.6.1 Chapter One - A Genealogy for Turkish Energy: From National 
Energy to Energy Hub 
Chapter one traces key transformations in energy discourse, priories and policies in Turkey 
throughout the industry’s one-hundred-year history, with a particular focus on its 
piecemeal liberalization in the last three decades. I argue that it is only possible to establish 
a better grasp on the role of energy infrastructures in contemporary Turkey—as well as the 
formation and maintenance of the the AKP’s hegemony—by examining Turkish energy 
within its historical genealogy. While this genealogy highlights major breaking points in 
the history of Turkish energy, I avoid reducing energy politics to a single logic. I dispute 
the notion that Turkey’s contemporary energy rush (and subsequent socio-spatial conflicts) 
can either simply be universalized as yet-another inevitable result of neoliberalization, or 
localized and framed squarely within the developmentalist tradition. While I do not deny 
that both neoliberalization and developmentalism are at play in the development of 
                                                
15 The valleys of my ethnographic focus were Tonya and Solaklı in Trabzon; İkizdere, Çağlayan and Arılı 
in Rize; Kamilet, Çoruh and Hopa valleys in Artvin.  
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Turkey’s energy discourse, this chapter points to a variety of conjunctural factors—
invariably imbricated by the power of energy—that bring neoliberal restructuring and the 
developmental state together to make them operational. Due to these conjunctural factors, 
energy has become a powerful assemblage, an influential rationality that seeps into other 
realms of government thanks to its ability to build coalitions, establish networks and foster 
subjectivities and that produces consent at different scales.  
 
This chapter offers a periodization of energy politics in Turkey: Under early liberal 
experimentation (1902-1929) I remind the reader that energy was exclusively a private, 
and to a large degree, foreign-led industry when it was originally introduced during the late 
Ottoman Early Republican Era. The National planning paradigm (1930-1982) nationalized 
energy production and established key institutions of energy bureaucracy, which 
immensely impacted the country’s economy and politics for decades to come. Turkey’s 
neoliberalization is a long and convoluted story characterized by several ups and downs. I 
differentiate early neoliberalization (1923-2001) from deep neoliberalization (2001-2013) 
and trace the failures of the former, the eventual triumph of the latter, and the transition 
between the two by examining the piecemeal transformation of the energy sector. While I 
refrain from forwarding a narrative that explains Turkey’s volatile and contested 
experience with neoliberalism on the basis of energy choices and policies, I point to a series 
of debates and breaking points in energy that have given meaning and momentum to the 
course of neoliberalization in Turkey.  
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The AKP’s reign overlaps with the period in which Turkey’s neoliberalization deepened 
and the energy sector almost completely opened up to foreign investment and capital. 
Writing against the tendency to automatically equate neoliberalization with the AKP, I 
offer a more nuanced picture, questioning how these processes—the AKP’s success in 
building hegemony and neoliberalism’s eventual intensification and spread in Turkey—
might benefit from each other. Building upon a literature that insists on understanding 
neoliberalization in its irregularities—the unexpected coalitions it forms and the diverse 
rationalities it brings together—I trace the shortcomings and achievements of the energy 
industry to understand political power in the AKP era. 
 
I allocate a separate section of this chapter to examining and evaluating the most recent 
(post-2013) developments in the energy industry under the title post-neoliberalism. By 
examining the distortions present in the open-market structure of the new energy regime 
during the past few years—to the advantage of a strong executive branch—I ask if 
neoliberalization has reached its limits in Turkey and further, what post-neoliberalism 
might look like. Unlike those who have high hopes for a post-neoliberal future, by 
examining the institutional grab in the energy sector and the heavy handed treatment of 
energy-related disputes in Turkey, I conclude that post-neoliberalism may as well be a new 
name for authoritarian neoliberalism, disguised as a state controlled economy.  
1.6.2 Chapter Three - A New Infrastructure for an Old Energy: 
Understanding Turkey’s Hydropower Renaissance  
This chapter examines Turkey’s hydropower renaissance as the central pillar of its energy 
rush, that is an under-regulated rush of capital to invest in energy infrastructures. In the 
24 
 
context of this rush and renaissance, I single out a particular form of infrastructure—small 
hydropower plants—that has contributed little to the total energy production capacity of 
the country. However, small hydropower plants have been central to the transformation of 
not only the energy industry, but also state-capital relations. While, my intention is by no 
means to reduce the transformation of the state and capital under the AKP’s reign to a 
single infrastructure, the chapter offers a critical approach to articulating how political 
economical work energorationality is complicit in these transformations by tracing the 
bureaucratic, financial and spatial dimensions of small hydropower plants. 
 
Chapter three begins with a discussion of the analytical and methodological value of 
studying infrastructures. Building upon the emerging literature on infrastructures, I remind 
the reader that far from being mere backdrops to more critical fields, infrastructures are 
themselves assemblages of multiple pieces, an amalgamation of technological, political 
and financial techniques (Larkin, 2013: 330). In this sense, I emphasize that studying 
infrastructures is also about studying relationships, not necessarily individual structures or 
things (Star, 1999: 379). I describe a key tension inherent in private infrastructures by 
parsing the role public infrastructures play in generating national pride and keeping the 
desire to develop alive (especially in the global South). Accordingly, I argue that state 
authority and the publicness of infrastructures become matters of negotiation once 
infrastructural politics are registered to market conditions. 
 
Drawing attention to the surprising contrast in the perception of large dams and small 
hydro, I propose to take seriously the technical, material and geographic qualities of the 
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boom. I conceptualize small hydro as a form of infrastructure that holds diverse ideas, 
actors, locations and trends together around the notion of energy independence. By 
comparing and contrasting the general characteristics of the small hydro explosion in 
Turkey with global examples, I emphasize the unique conjuncture in which the Turkish 
boom took place. Despite its reputation as a renewable, low-impact local-friendly 
infrastructure, the popularization of small hydro has, first and foremost, been key to 
Turkey’s energy liberalization efforts. I also assert that as space-making, landscape 
forming infrastructures, small hydro projects have been instrumental in the spread of 
neoliberalism across a vast territory while contributing a particular restructuring in state, 
society and market relations. 
 
The highly deregulated shortcomings of the energy liberalization and problems with the 
sudden inflation of private hydropower plants are now widely acknowledged by energy 
bureaucrats and entrepreneurs, but to varying degrees. Officials tend to blame 
entrepreneurs’ greed while investors complain about red tape. My objective in this chapter 
is neither to provide yet another apologetic explanation that ‘privatization could have done 
better’ or to point to some legislative areas that could have been regulated for an equitable 
energy policy. Rather, I am interested in illustrating how capital, state and society are 
intertwined through not just legislation, but also through nature and infrastructures, as a 
new market is constructed and experimented with. Precisely due to their infrastructural 
qualities, their small size, low-tech requirements, their spread across the Turkish 
countryside and their affordability, small hydropower plants have been instrumental in 
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constructing this market and have supported the establishment of a valuable information 
network between investors and the bureaucracy.  
 
Here, I focus on Turkey’s State Hydraulic Works, which is an important aspect of energy 
bureaucracy as well as one of the pioneer public institutions for development. I argue that 
the institution has undergone significant transformations parallel to the liberalization of the 
energy industry. As SHW continues to lose personnel and a monopoly over hydropower, 
its expertise has been reduced to a consultant position, catering to the needs of the newly 
emerging private energy sector. Public interest and the institution’s regulatory roles have 
been downplayed, if not completely neglected. Yet this transformation should not be read 
as the ultimate triumph of the private sector over the state. Instead, I suggest that while the 
state’s formal regulatory reach diminishes, the authority of the central government and its 
arbitrary power over both capital and the provincial state apparatuses tests new limits.  
1.6.3 Chapter Four - Energizing Legality: Energy Infrastructures, Law 
and Temporality 
This chapter focuses on the influence of energorationality on administrative law. Never-
ending lawsuits initiated by local residents have stagnated and stalled many energy 
projects; given this reality, I argue that temporal uncertainty has become an unbearable 
liability for energy capital. To overcome the delays in capitalist time, the government has 
chosen to protect energy infrastructures in a special regime of urgency, which I argue not 
only impacts administrative law but also influences other domains of administration and 
provides a useful framework for governmental action. 
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Moving away from the series of failed and successful legislations made possible by 
energy’s liberalization (covered in detail in chapter two), this chapter examines how energy 
infrastructures are contested in courthouses. Administrative law has become a battlefield 
on which local residents sue a branch of administration over a permit, license or a decision 
that makes a given energy company’s infrastructural project possible. While litigation often 
revolves around procedural details and rarely set jurisprudence regarding the essence of 
land-use and environmental conflicts, it often delays a project for the duration of the 
litigation, providing valuable time for local activists to organize while causing a crucial 
disruption in capital’s time. Trapped between engineering priorities, the repayment of 
green energy loans, endless court cases and a series of local entanglements, uncertainty 
becomes a source of anxiety in energy infrastructure disputes while providing a strategic 
tool for those parties that can afford to take advantage of waiting. Beyond its function as 
an arbiter, the administrative law matters a great deal to the temporal politics of energy 
infrastructure disputes.  
 
To accelerate this politics of temporality, the government has deemed energy worthy of 
urgent treatment and offers fast track solutions to mediate infrastructural projects’ legal 
processes.  This chapter carefully examines the emergence and implementation of two 
particular legal mechanisms: the urgent expropriation (UE) procedure and urgent judicial 
proceedings (UJP). While the former expedites land-grabs, the latter speeds-up litigations 
that delay the progress or completion of energy infrastructures. These legal tools are central 
to the regime of urgency, allowing energy companies to circumvent the judiciary’s capacity 
to regulate energy infrastructures and the privatization of the energy sector.  
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Despite their extraordinary power, urgency tools have failed to create a seamless 
accumulation climate for the energy sector. The impact of the regime of urgency lies 
elsewhere. I argue that the emergence of the private energy market in Turkey both created 
its legal reasoning and framework and has seeped into other domains of regulation to 
facilitate myriad forms of socio-spatial interventions such large-scale infrastructure 
projects, urban renewal programs, earthquake preparedness, environmental governance 
and national security in relation to the Kurdish problem. While legal tools and arguments 
designed to assure fast and secure private energy production have become the new legal 
standard—redefining the relations between nature and society, productive and idle, urgent 
and mundane alongside private and public property—ethey give the executive branch a 
level of authority that the government has otherwise lacked.  
 
The chapter dedıcates a section to the political repercussions of the urgency imposed upon 
certain aspects of the administrative law. I argue that behind the scenes of this intervention 
to the administrative law lies a strong critique of the judiciary as a source of oversight16 
over democratic politics and the liberal economy. According to this critique, the court’s 
insistence on cancelling privatization decisions is a manifestation of a particular 
bureaucratic rationality that disrespects and distrusts the elected executive. In this line of 
thought, legal bureaucracies have been portrayed as the representatives of the old Turkey 
to the extent that they put up legal obstacles against the AKP’s desires. What’s more, 
intervention into administrative law emerged as a requirement of a larger political 
                                                
16 Often referred to as military and/or bureaucratic tutelage (vesayet in Turkish). See Mango, 1983; White, 
2007; Akça and Balta-Peker, 2012. 
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transformation. As such, the seepage of energorationality into the judiciary realm 
strengthens the AKP’s hegemony at the expense of a weak judiciary branch.   
1.6.4 Chapter Five: An Unexpected Objection: On The Scope of Anti-
Energy Politics  
This chapter examines the public opposition against small hydro projects in Turkey, in 
tandem with the country’s hydropower renaissance from the late 2000s to now. I illustrate 
that anti-small hydro activism has triggered an upsurge in environmental mobilization 
thanks to its geographical reach, participant demographics, group tactics and oppositional 
language. This upsurge in environmental mobilization is unprecedented in that it is 
grassroots-level, provincial, happens across class and has been influential throughout 
Turkey for its authentic critique of the AKP’s neoliberal developmentalism. Indeed, this 
new wave of activism has provided broader oppositional politics in Turkey with a 
repertoire, tactics and a perspective that was best exemplified in the impromptu Gezi 
uprising in the summer of 2013 and its aftermath.  
 
I refer to anti-small hydro activism as an ‘unexpected objection.’ Over the past decade, 
hundreds of grassroots environmental collectives popped up across Turkey, even in its 
remotest corners, with no prior experience in political activism. Each movement has been 
named after a town, a village or an entire valley. Because of the sheer number of small 
hydro projects, the majority of these collectives were founded to protect streams and rivers 
in their wake. It is surprising how significant this opposition against renewable and 
relatively low impact infrastructures is to Turkey’s contemporary environmental 
awakening. This chapter asks how small hydro projects have been so contentious in the 
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geographies where they are being built, and what this means for Turkey’s hydropower 
renaissance. By addressing the many socio-environmental tensions hydropower plants 
instigate, I focus on the diverse forms of dispossessions they elicit across the Turkish 
countryside: dispossessions of land, irrigation, drinking water and subsistence farming. By 
focusing on the Eastern Black Sea Region where water is abundant, the cultivation of tea, 
its largest cash crop, does not require irrigation and private land-grabs are limited, I contend 
that the source of dispossession in environmental conflicts is not always as clearly defined 
as one would expect.  
 
I turn to the movement itself to answer a challenging question: how have the people of the 
Eastern Black Sea Region (EBSR) become pioneers in the anti-small hydro mobilization 
(especially considering the region’s water-rich status). My fieldwork reveals that 
underneath the dynamism of environmental struggles in the region lays a particularly 
vibrant urban-rural connectivity that stretches from isolate villages of the Pontic 
Mountains, to the cities and the towns of the region by the Black Sea, and from there all 
the way to the metropoles hosting high number of immigrants from the region. Building 
upon a series of discussions on the history and sociology of internal migration in Turkey 
and the contemporary rural living conditions in the EBSR that enables dual residency  
(Öztürk et al. 2013), I aim to spatial explanations to both the discontent with the 
infrastructure boom and the dynamism underlying mobilization. By emphasizing the living 
arrangements of most activists, which give them the luxury to claim both the urbanite and 
villager positions, I argue that, among others, energy infrastructure projects along the 
Eastern Black Sea coast threaten a particular type of lifestyle pursued along the urban-rural 
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continuum. Although I do not deny that crude forms of land and water grabbing directly 
threatens substance economies in certain regions, by stressing on the urban-rural 
continuum as a factor, I point to the role social reproduction in infrastructure fueled 
disputes.    
 
To understand the relationship between rural and urban, provincial and state, it is important 
to interrogate exactly who and what Turkey’s environmental awakening currently 
threatens. President Erdoğan and his surrogates dismiss it as being ill-intentioned, 
ideological, or A conspiracy of foreign powers. Critical observers (Arsel et al., 2015; 
Adaman et al., 2016) understand that the environmental awakening does not fall neatly 
under a scheme of environmentalism of poor vs. rich, drawing attention to activists’ 
political motivations. They argue that the bourgeoning grassroots activism in Turkey is 
best defined as “the environmentalism of the malcontent,” providing mobilization for those 
left with no outlet under an Erdoğan authoritarian neoliberalism regime. 
 
I find that both explanations relegate environmental movements to the sidelines, rendering 
them mere derivatives of politics. To the contrary, I argue that these emergent forms of 
environmental activism have influenced politics. In the final section of this chapter, I 
discuss the surprising ways in which grassroots environmental mobilizations have 
impacted larger oppositional politics in Turkey.  To do this, I focus on one humble yet 
powerful phrase from the new oppositional lexicon: yaşam alanı (life space). Prior to Gezi, 
this catchphrase had been circulating among urban activists against privatization and 
renewal projects, and rural activists against extraction, construction and energy production 
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projects. Closely associated yet different from the increasingly popular concept of the 
“commons,” yaşam alanı connotes spaces of refuge that have maintained a high level of 
autonomy from the value circuits of capital accumulation. It also connotes a safe space to 
breathe, enjoy and express oneself. The notion of yaşam alanı allows for articulations both 
between myriad grievances against various spatial interventions and across alternative 
political horizons. Activists’ common goal of defending yaşam alanı(s) allowed them to 
successfully articulate various political agendas during the Gezi Resistance, which in turn 
enabled the revolt’s delocalization in the aftermath of the month-long occupation. The 
phrase was uttered countless times by the occupiers of the Gezi Park.17 Influenced by 
grassroots mobilization in the country, the Gezi occupation was not simply in defense of 
an existing life space, but entailed a claim over a shared space in the making signaling the 
political horizon of Turkey’s environmental awakening (cf. Karaman, 2013a; Erensü 2013, 
Erensü and Karaman, forthcoming).  
  
                                                
17 The first of the four demands announced by Taksim Solidarity on the first day of the occupation was: 
“Gezi Park will remain as a park. We will allow neither [the] Topçu Barracks [the proposed hotel + mall 
complex] project, nor anything else that would violate nature and our life spaces” (Bianet, 2013, emphasis 
ours). 
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C H A P T E R – T W O 
2 A GENEALOGY FOR TURKISH ENERGY: 
FROM NATIONAL ENERGY TO ENERGY HUB 
Turkey’s hydropower renaissance—the unprecedented increase in the country’s 
hydropower capacity and number of plants—owes its existence to a series of market 
friendly legislations pass in the early 2000s. However, the liberalization of Turkey’s energy 
sector is itself a long story. Parallel to Turkey’s overall experience with neoliberalism, the 
opening-up of Turkey’s energy markets was initiated quite early, yet took decades to be 
realized. The first systematic efforts to liberalize the sector started in the first quarter of the 
1980s. The process progressed piecemeal on a highly tortuous path, and was met with 
bureaucratic and judicial resistance throughout the 1990s until it was framed as an 
inescapable necessity to recover from economic downturns (and meet an IMF assistance 
package condition) by the turn of the century. This long process was eventually 
operationalized and implemented in the early 2000s by consecutive AKP governments. 
The current state of Turkish energy is shaped not only by a neoliberal blueprint, but carries 
the marks of its unique and elongated history and is shaped by the political economic 
preferences of the AKP term. For this reason, the hydropower renaissance, particularly the 
inflation of small hydropower plants, can be best understood at this knotty juncture, where 
AKP politics and Turkey’s energy history meets the country’s meandering relationship 
with neoliberalism. 
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This chapter traces the transformation of energy discourse, priories and policies in Turkey 
throughout the industry’s -hundred-year history, with a particular focus on its piecemeal 
liberalization in the last three decades. To better grasp the role of energy infrastructures in 
the formation of the AKP hegemony and its recent authoritarian turn, the chapter seeks to 
locate contemporary Turkish energy within its historical genealogy. Unlike other critiques, 
I dispute the notion that the current energy boom (and subsequent socio-spatial conflicts) 
in Turkey can either be simply universalized as yet-another inevitable result of 
neoliberalization, or can be localized and framed squarely within the developmentalist 
tradition of the Turkish state. While I do not deny that both neolibelization and 
developmentalism are at play in the development of Turkey’s energy discourse, this chapter 
points to a variety of conjunctural factors—glued to each other by the power of energy—
that bring neoliberal restructuring and the developmental state together to make them 
operational. Due to these conjunctural factors, energy has become a powerful assemblage, 
a mighty rationality that builds coalitions and produces consent at different scales. I argue 
that, especially in the last decade, addressing energy needs has generated a particularly 
formidable rationality, a powerful yet fragile tool for political power. 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section reviews the literature on 
neoliberalism and discusses how it should be best conceptualized to account for local 
iterations and variations in time, such as the ebbs and flows in Turkey’s energy policies. 
The second section provides an overview of the general contours of the Turkish energy 
field, discusses how it is predicated upon its lack, and lists its shortcomings as they are 
reflected in official documents and international reports. My third section is the longest 
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one, and it periodizes the history of energy infrastructures in Turkey using five categories: 
early liberal, national planning, early neoliberal, deep neoliberal, and finally, post-
neoliberal. I pay particular attention to the recent authoritarian turn in Turkish politics its 
political-economical meaning as it is revealed by energy infrastructures. The chapter 
concludes with a brief discussion of the emergent rationality that has intensified around the 
increased weight of energy in Turkey’s political economy, foreshadowing how the impact 
of this rationality will be unpacked in the following chapters.   
2.1 TRACING NEOLIBERAL REFORMS 
Market friendly de/re-regulatory reforms are easy to come by, yet many times, it is a 
challenge to conceptualize them under a single seamless umbrella of neoliberalism. 
Implementations often unfold in hybrid forms, the way neoliberalism is operationalized 
diverges significantly from the teaching, and its particularities may seem to overshadow 
the paradigm. The fundamental challenge is that despite its ambitious “utopian vision for 
a free society and economy,” neoliberalism almost always appears in “impure” forms 
(Peck, 2010: 7) and therefore deserves to be called a “perplexing amorphous political 
economic phenomenon” (Peck, 2004: 394).18 This is precisely why “defining neoliberalism 
is no straightforward task,” as McCarthy and Prudham unapologetically confess (2004: 
276). Neoliberalism, Saad-Filho and Johnson (2005: 1) agree, is impossible to theoretically 
define because it “straddles a wide range of social, political and economic phenomenon at 
                                                
18 For a more systematical attempt to define neoliberalism’s different levels of operation as (a) an 
ideological hegemonic project, (b) a policy and program, (c) a state form, and (d) governmentality see, 
England and Ward, 2007. Also see Springer 2012 as an attempt to reconcile the Marxian political 
economical approaches to neoliberalism with neoliberalism readings inspired by Foucauldian post-
structuralist inclinations.  
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different levels of complexity.” Likewise, Jessop defines neoliberalism as a “polyvalent 
conceptual assemblage… with many disputes over its scope, application and limits” (2002: 
453). But if all of these definitions suggest that neoliberalism is so pervasive, encompassing 
and omnipresent, would that also mean that, in a sense, everything is neoliberal; nothing 
can escape it? Disillusioned with the vague “buzzword” status of the term, some scholars 
even argue that neoliberalism in fact does not exist, in the sense that its theoretical 
conceptualization does not serve much value (Barnett, 2005).19  
 
No matter how rascal (Brenner et al., 2010: 184) and elusive (Wacquant, 2009: 306) the 
term may sound today and how fatigued scholars might get from conceptualizing it 
(Springer, 2016), tracing neoliberal transformations in their peculiar iterations continue to 
reveal much about the contemporary world, its politics and economics. In fact, one of the 
strong suits of recent massive critical neoliberalism studies has been its capacity to account 
for neoliberalism’s ability to take a root in a variety of geographies in coalition with 
unexpected social, political and ideological allies. Neoliberalism’s unexpected coalitions 
include, but are not limited to, neo-conservatism in the USA (Brown, 2006); the populist 
left turn in Latin America (Saad-Filho, 2013), state-socialism in China (Ong, 2006; Rofel, 
2007; Zhang and Ong, 2008), post-Apartheid politics in South Africa (Bond, 2004; 
Miraftab, 2004); and Islamism in Turkey (Tugal, 2009; Karaman, 2013b). Tracing 
neoliberalism highlights the unique circumstances of distant geographies as they co-mingle 
with a variety of local factors. This has enhanced our understanding of both individual 
                                                
19 For a critique different variant of neoliberalism skeptics, see Springer, 2009.     
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locations under scrutiny and neoliberalism itself, as long as the policy transfers triggered 
by neoliberalism are not taken for granted and assumed automatic. 
 
Despite the diversity of inclinations in the literature regarding how to approach 
neoliberalism, there seems to be an agreement on a series of conceptual caveats that help 
us fine-tune our understanding of the phenomenon. Inspirited by the “variegated” character 
of neoliberalism that unfolds unevenly at different localities, these caveats may not 
constitute a seamless theory. However, they guide researchers to trace neoliberal 
transformations, particularly in the context of the global South, without necessarily reifying 
the concept (Brenner et al., 2010). In fact, the fundamental assumption is that despite its 
hegemonic qualities, neoliberalism is best understood in its local peculiarities, 
contradictions, unexpected outcomes and the surprising coalitions it manages to form.  
 
The first conceptual caveat emerging from the literature is the notion that neoliberalism is 
not necessarily a noun, but rather a process better captured by the verb neoliberalization 
(Springer, 2015: 6; also Peck, 2002). Neoliberalization admits that neoliberal 
transformation is not static and monolithic, but is rather highly dynamic, malleable and 
does not necessarily point to an end-state (Peck, 2002: 383). Neoliberalization, therefore, 
indicates that the shape, format and intensity of any form of neoliberal transformation takes 
its eventual shape at the local level and is contingent upon modifications over time. This 
means that as important as the original teachings of neoliberalism may be, “actually 
existing neoliberalism(s)” are bound to be divergent as “national, regional, and local 
contexts defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, 
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regulatory practices, and political struggles” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 349). This is 
not merely an acknowledgment of path-dependency, but also points to an awareness that 
neoliberalization is a mobile technology that could be utilized anywhere for “governing 
free subjects with other political rationalities” (Ong, 2007: 4; also see Brown, 2006).   
 
One explanation for why neoliberalization looks for “strategic entanglements with politics” 
(Ong, 2007: 3) is its desire to remedy the socio-economic deprivation that market solutions 
might cause. To borrow Polanyi’s terminology, neoliberalization seeks to re-embed 
economy into society through certain alliances. Neoliberalization thus includes episodes of 
roll-out, in which the consolidation of state apparatuses and introduction of new forms of 
regulation accompany and supplement the initial episodes of roll-backs, or the destruction 
of the welfare state, the cornering of organized labor, the privatization of public assets etc. 
The fact that roll-out neoliberalism is integral, in fact intrinsic, to its better-known twin, 
roll-back neoliberalism, reminds us that it can be defined as a creative destruction. 
Accordingly, the social structures that a given economy is embedded in cannot be entirely 
obliterated; rather, they are at best replaced by fixes that do not conflict with the market’s 
fundamentalist principles while still managing to provide a feeling of security for 
disenfranchised groups. Although the theory implies a series of subtractions from the 
system (i.e. smaller roles for the state, labor, safety nets), it is crucial to note that 
neoliberalization requires a new set of regulatory forms and guarantees first to flourish and 
then to survive.     
Finally, despite the legal and technical language of market-friendly reforms, it is a mistake 
to confine neoliberalization to the realm of economy, treat it as a bundle of trendy policy 
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options, or worse, limit it to legislation. Changes in public policy react to—sometimes 
complementing, other times lagging behind—discursive formations and governmental 
techniques that influence what is sayable and thinkable, if not directly legislation itself. 
Neoliberal reforms in the global South may appear as sudden unexpected interruptions, as 
they are usually propelled by economic and political crisis and/or imposed by powerful 
international actors. However, neoliberal reforms gain traction and find legitimacy thanks 
to a climate already sympathetic to neoliberal ethics. The aim of the following section is to 
provide an historical background for Turkey’s energy sector to understand and appreciate 
the path dependent, piecemeal, hybrid and contradictory character of its neoliberal 
transformation alongside the discursive climate that produced it. 
2.2 THE PROBLEM WITH TURKEY’S ENERGY     
Executive summaries on Turkey have traditionally begun by celebrating its impressive 
growth potential with a cautionary hint on its chronic energy bottleneck. As an emergent 
market, the Turkish economy is expected to grow steadily and it actually has by, for 
example, doubling the size of its economy in the last decade.20 Yet, any growth, including 
GDP growth, requires energy. Demand for energy grows as the economy grows and 
urbanization advances. Turkey is no exception to this rule. During the time the country’s 
GDP doubled in the last decade, electricity consumption grew by 70 percent while natural 
                                                
20 Between 2004 and 2014, Turkey’s GDP grew by 104 percent. The twelve years under AKP governments 
(2003-2014) average annual GDP growth rate has been 4.7 percent. Although these impressive figures help 
Turkey to perform better then many emerging markets (average annual growth rates is 3.34 percent for 
South Africa, 3.4 percent for Brazil, 4.2 percent for Chile and 2.5 percent for Mexico for the same period), 
some critics question the buzz around Turkey’s growth rates (World Bank, 2016). Among others, they 
particularly remind that the annual growth rate average since the foundation of the republic is no different 
the AKP years (Eğilmez, 2013). See Chapter 3 more on the role of growth oriented economics in 
contemporary Turkey. 
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gas demand doubled.21 The pressure to meet increasing demand made Turkey’s electricity 
sector the fastest growing in the world in 2010 and 2011, with an average of 9 percent 
annually (Deloitte, 2013: 8). Experts believe that growth potential in Turkey’s energy 
sector is far from realized; energy demand is expected to continue to surge in the next few 
decades as the country is “still lagging behind the per capita energy consumption” 
compared to the OECD average (Ibid).22 Official projections predict that energy demand 
will reach 620 TWh by 2030, almost 2.5 fold of contemporary levels (WWF, 2014: 10).23  
 
The problem with rising energy demand as paralleled to economic growth is that it puts an 
increasingly alarming burden on the country’s energy dependency, as Turkey lacks 
traditional primary energy resources. “One of [Turkey’s] most pressing macroeconomic 
concerns,” as one business outlet succinctly puts it, is “the dual challenge of possessing 
one of the world’s most rapidly growing energy markets while containing little known 
hydrocarbon resources” (GBR, 2015: 1). Turkey’s oil dependency is around 90 percent, 
while it is almost fully dependent regarding natural gas. Roughly since the mid-1980s, 
Turkey has imported more energy than it produces domestically, as far as primary energy 
supply is concerned (see Figure 2.1). In 2014, Turkey’s energy imports were as three times 
large as its own production. Turkey’s annual energy bill paid to its neighboring countries, 
which amounted roughly around $50 billion until oil price plummeted in 201424, is 
                                                
21 MENR, Table of Balances. 
22 By 62.8 BTU per capita Turkish citizen consumes one third of the OECD citizen who consumes 182 
million BTU per capita OECD average (Deloitte, 2003: 8). 
23 Projections do vary and they are often exaggerated to encourage local and international investors as well 
as legitimize controversial policy choices through a sense of urgency.  
24 Daily Sabah, “Turkey energy import costs $50 billion on average”, 2 October 2014 URL: http://www 
.dailysabah.com/energy/2014/10/02/turkeys-energy-import-costs-50-billion-per-year-on-average (accessed 
on 5 June 2016). 
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considered to be the main reason for its greatest weakness: its current account deficit (the 
gap between spending and income).25  
Figure 2.1: Primary Supply in Turkey (million tep) 
Source: MENR - Tables of Balance 
 
The purpose of this chapter, however, is not to illustrate how badly Turkey needs energy 
and how serious its energy dependency is. From an historical standpoint, Turkey was never 
energy independent, although it is difficult to deny how radically its dependency on foreign 
energy resources has amplified over time, particularly compared to the OECD average (see 
Figure 2.2). Rather than being carried away by the alarming figures that quantify Turkey’s 
                                                
25 For the last decade, Turkey consistently holds the worst (largest negative) current account balance as a 
percentage of GDP indicator among the OECD countries as well as emerging market. In 2010-2015 period, 
the indicator fluctuated between -9.8 percent and -5.8 percent (World Bank, 2016). See chapter X for more 
on what a large current accounts deficit tells about Turkish economics under AKP.  
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energy dependency, this chapter is more interested in the different ways in which the need 
to fuel the Turkish economy and national development have manifested in the country’s 
energy policy. Instead of taking Turkey’s energy deficit for granted, the chapter aims to 
understand the kind of political rationalities that the energy deficit has mobilized over time 
and how those rationalities have travelled and interacted with other forms of rationalities.   
Figure 2.2: Energy Dependency (energy production/TPES) 
 
                  Source: MENR – Tables of Balance, World Bank  
2.3 FOUR WAVES OF TURKISH ENERGY POLICY 
2.3.1 Early Liberal Experimentation (1902-1929) 
What is often forgotten amidst the heated discussion on the privatization of state-run public 
services is the existence of a laissez-faire period proceeding the emergence of the welfare 
state. When they were first introduced to the urban masses in the 19th century, many public 
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services (such as water, electricity, sewage, public transportation, etc.) were provided by 
private companies.26 The Ottoman Empire was no exception. In the Ottoman state, the 
nineteenth century was marked by the integration of the Empire into the capitalist world 
economy (Kasaba, 1988). One of the key characteristics of this period was the direct 
foreign investments the Empire attracted to modernize its industrial and urban 
infrastructure. Foreign companies were required to secure individual permits—referred to 
as concessions in the literature—from the Ottoman state to operate in a particular industry 
or work on a specific project.27 The concessions, however, were highly political in nature; 
this stemmed from the Empire’s vulnerable status in world capitalism, simultaneously in 
decline and in search for modernization (Kasaba, 1988). Consequently, the concessions 
obtained by the leading companies of the imperial powers were often in return for 
temporary financial support or military protection (Pamuk, 1987: 7). Ottoman concessions 
were so attractive that they stirred fierce competition among European companies 
(Shahvar, 2002). The charm of the Ottoman concessions were twofold: on the one hand, 
concessions often provided the privileged company with the monopoly status over a sector 
in a given city or region. On the other hand, and more importantly, the trading privileges 
that come with concessions were guaranteed by Ottoman capitulations, or “extra-territorial 
privileges enjoyed by foreigners residing in the Empire” (Ahmed, 1998: 19). Capitulations, 
which were initially offered as gifts to European states by the Sultan beginning in the mid-
                                                
26 By looking the role of private governance of urban water services in early 20th century, for example, 
Harris (2013: 120-121) urges us to acknowledge debates over private vs. public ownership of public 
services go far back to late 19th century.  
27 The sectors that foreign concession companies operated includes, but not limited to, telegram networks 
(Bektas, 2000; Shahvar, 2002), railway (McMeekin, 2010), electricity, mining, and port management. For 
foreign companies’ role in İstanbul’s transformation in late 19th century see Dinckal (2002). 
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sixteenth century, became an economic liability and weakened the sovereignty of the 
Empire (Pamuk, 1987, also see Ahmad, 1998). 
 
The Empire’s first electric generator was a small water mill in the southern city of Tarsus. 
Completed in 1902, the generator had a 2 kW dynamo and could only power a limited 
number of streetlights (Hepbaşlı, 2005). The Ottoman’s first major power plant was 
Silahtaraga Power Plant built in central Istanbul in 1913 by Hungarian Graz Electric 
Company in partnership with Banque de Bruxelles. A year after its completion, Graz 
Electric Company sold the plant and the concession of providing electricity to Istanbul to 
a Belgian company called Sofina (Akçura, 2007). Fired by coal from Zonguldak and 
Northern Istanbul, the plant had an installed capacity of a little over 13 MW and 
singlehandedly powered the city until 1952. The plant was closed down in 1983and 
gentrified into a university campus in 2007.  
 
After the First World War and following the Turkish War of Independence fought against 
the proxies of the Allies, excising the shame of Ottoman capitulations was of utmost 
priority for the victorious Ankara government.28 In 1923 the capitulations were all 
abolished by the Treaty of Lausanne, which heralded the birth of the new Republic. 
However, the young Republic continued to adhere to a relatively liberal economy until the 
Great Depression while, at the same time, fostering a national bourgeoisie from scratch 
where and when possible.29 Therefore the early Republic years welcomed foreign investors 
                                                
28 On the public perception of Ottoman capitulations at the turn of the century, see Ahmed, 2000. 
29 The liberal economic tendency of the early Republican era is subject to heated debates amongst 
economic historians. While some recite the manifesto of the first Economy Congress held in İzmir in 1923 
as the proof of the early Republic’s genuine interest in liberal principles, others point to government led 
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and showed a cautious interest in cooperating with European markets (Pamuk, 2012: 180-
183). The reflection of this preference was new coal-powered plants built and run by mostly 
German, Belgium, Italian and Hungarian capital (Hepbaşlı, 2005: 317). The first power 
plant in Ankara, the new capital, was a diesel generator jointly built by German MAN and 
AEG (Ibid). The first Turkish electricity company, Kayseri ve Civarı Türk Elektrik Inc, 
was founded in 1926 (Ibid).30  
 
It could be argued that late Ottoman and early Republican experience with liberalism 
between the mid-nineteenth century and the Great Depression might have eased the 
neoliberal transformation (particularly in public services) that started in the early 1980s. 
Yet the early liberal experience was mostly haphazard, leaving behind few long-lasting 
institutions. Most importantly, both late Ottoman and early Republican approaches to the 
liberal economy had been highly pragmatic and geared towards reforming the weakened 
state structure. Local entrepreneurs neither demanded nor established collaboration with 
foreign capital and institutions largely remained top-down initiatives. Ottoman and Young 
Republican interest in liberalism was less motivated by economic principles than by 
increasing the central government’s reach, capacity and power (Pamuk, 2012: 158-159). In 
the absence of local bourgeoisie and significant treasury reserves, the governing elite 
showed little hesitation opening up to the world economy, with the hopes to modernize the 
state. This state-led, top-down, highly pragmatic style of the first acquaintance with 
                                                
agriculture and banking decisions designed towards self sufficiency (Pamuk, 2012: 180-184; Finefrock, 
1981). This unique state-led liberalism experiment came to an abrupt end with the Great Depression yet left 
lost-landing marks on the collective memory of the country’s political economy.     
30 It is worthwhile to note that Kayseri ve Civarı Türk Elektrik Inc. is still an active in producing and 
distributing electricity in interior Anatolia and have never been nationalized and remained as one of the 
exceptions of the state planed era.  
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liberalism is as noteworthy as the experience itself. The reflection of this centrally 
supervised liberalism by 1930 in the electricity sector was 48 power plants with installed 
capacity equal to 74.8 MW. Each plant was a private (and mostly foreign) enterprise, 
completed either with the initiation or permission of the central government, first the 
Sublime Porte in Istanbul until the collapse of the Empire and then the new government  in 
Ankara. 
2.3.2 National Planning Paradigm (1930-1982) 
The young Republic had to conclude its experimentation with liberalism rather abruptly. 
The Lausanne Treaty had deterred Turkey’s repayment of Ottoman debts and in return, had 
maintained Ottoman tariff rates until 1929 (Ibid: 176). 1929’s signficance was further 
accentuated by the Great Depression, which depressed agricultural prices and hampered 
the emergence of a national bourgeoisie. These developments forced the Ankara 
government to embark on a new approach to managing the economy. First, tariffs on 
agricultural products and cotton were raised. Follow this, the first five-year industrial plan 
envisioning an increased state role in national economy was passed in 1934. The plan was 
prepared with the assistance of economy advisors from the USSR. The young Republic’s 
governing elites coined the term devletçilik (statism) to differentiate the centrally planned 
and run economy from liberalism. However, it largely applied to communism. Post-
Depression governments preferred a more controlled economy, initiating a wave of 
nationalizing a number of foreign-owned factories and let the state be active in production 
of goods and services through state-run enterprises. Statism, accompanied by a mixed 
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model of planned industrialization and fostering domestic production through import 
substitution mechanisms, finally created a new cadre of national industrialists.  
 
It would be misleading, however, to suggest that statism and planning ruled all aspects of 
the economy consistently for the fifty-year period following the Great Depression (Millor, 
1990). From the 1950s onwards, with the transition to a multi-party system, there were 
periods during which government loosened the state’s grip on its planned economy. The 
1960s witnessed steadily high growth numbers as local capital blossomed under the 
protectionist economy, averaging 6 percent in GDP and 10 percent in manufacturing per 
annum (Pamuk, 2014: 238). In the 1960s, economic priorities drastically shifted from 
agricultural substances and modernization to industrialization and urbanization, both of 
which not only increased energy demands, but also created a desire for electricity (Ibid, 
2014: 245).31 Nevertheless, industrialization was not completely left to the invisible hand. 
An untold division of labor emerged wherein the textile, home appliance, pharmaceutical, 
and automotive industries were left to the private sector while the state maintained its 
monopoly over strategic and capital-intensive sectors such as mining, steel, petro-
chemical, and energy (Ibid: 237). The curious case of the dirigisme-style division of labor 
between state and capital, along with a bourgeoning national bourgeoisie under state 
supervision and protection, not only characterized the 1960s and 1970s, but also constituted 
a precedence in the country’s political economical culture that would have long-lasting 
                                                
31 Mass internal migration from the countryside to cities was one of the key characteristics of 1970s. 
Coupled with the specialization of Turkish capital in home appliances demand for electricity, at one level, 
was a yearning for modernity and welfare. Quintessential consumption good of this yearning was 
refrigerator: Number of households with a refrigerator almost tripled jumping from 25 percent in 1970 to 
72 percent in 1980 (Pamuk, 2014: 241). 
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effects.32 Despite the seemingly paternalistic relationship between the state and capital, the 
establishment of the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TÜSİAD) in 
1971 and its increased political weight in the following decades suggest that the Turkish 
bourgeoisie’s dependence on the state is neither absolute nor unconditional (Yalman, 2009, 
Buğra, 1994).    
 
In terms of energy infrastructures, this period (1930-1982) was represented by two major 
shifts, the first dominated by nationalizations, and the second by the emergence of energy 
bureaucracy and planning. Between the Great Depression and the end of the WWII, all 
privately owned and operated energy infrastructures were nationalized (Hepbaşlı, 2004: 
317).33 Completed in 1948, Çatalağzı Coal-Power Plant was the biggest accomplishment 
of the new energy paradigm. The Plant, which was commissioned to a British consortium, 
was owned and run as a kamu iktisadi teşebbüsü (Public Economic Enterprise)34 and 
powered the entire Marmara Region, which would soon become the country’s industrial 
epicenter. With its 300 MW capacity, Çatalağzı still operates as one of the few remaining 
power plants owned and operated by the state. 
 
Alongside operationalizing energy infrastructure, real impact of the national planning era 
on the energy field was the establishment of a series of energy-related institutions and the 
                                                
32 In fact, the nature of state-capital relations and the actual legacy of import-substation based protectionism 
of national bourgeoisie generates the most heated debated for those who study the political economy of 
Turkey. (cf. Yalman 2009; Buğra, 1994; Keyder, 1987; Boratav, 1983, Isık, 2014) 
33 With the exception of Kayseri ve Civarı Türk Elektrik Inc. Pamuk, (2002: 185-196) reminds that 
purchase of foreign energy companies went rather hassle free due to the shrinking global economy and 
uncertainties caused by the Great Depression. 
34 The first CEO of the plant, Salim Eken, for example, was concomitantly acting as a vice president of 
Etibank, a state-owned bank specialized to finance mining exploration and infrastructures. URL: 
http://www.cates.gov.tr/tarihce/tarihce.html (accessed 08 June 2016). 
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emergence of a new engineer-cum-bureaucrat cadre that came to administer them. Most of 
these organizations (see Table 2.1), designed according to the planned economy principle, 
soon became the most prestigious posts for bureaucrats to occupy. On the one hand, energy 
bureaucracy was one of few on-job training opportunities young engineers (and 
economists) could find in the absence of a fully-fledged domestic industry.35 On the other 
hand, as icracı (line) institutions, state-run energy organizations were in charge of the 
distribution and expenditure of a sizable portion of the government spending. Organized at 
the local level through regional branches across the country, they provided an unmatched 
networking opportunity for career bureaucrats. As a consequence, state-planning era 
energy bureaucracy not only trained competent engineers, economists and administrators, 
but also produced seasoned politicians. Süleyman Demirel, seven-time Prime Minister and 
Turkey’s 9th President (1993-2000), started his career in ESRA and was Director General 
of SHW in the late 1950s. He was hailed as the King of Dams as his name was associated 
with the ambitious Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), a multi-sector development 
project centered around seventeen hydropower plants. Turgut Özal, the Prime Minister of 
the neoliberalizing 1980s and the 8th President of Turkey (1989-1993), was vice-Director 
General to ESRA in late 1950s. 
 
Turkey’s planned economy managed to trigger large-scale industrialization in big cities in 
the 1960s and produced subsequent large-scale urbanization in the following decade. On 
the energy front, the outcome of this transformation was drastic: energy consumption 
increased by three fold in two decades, jumping from 11.21 mtoe in 1960 to 33.47 mtoe 
                                                
35 It is illustrative that SHW was referred as okul (school) for young engineers and recruited very 
competitive university graduates.  
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1980s (Yılmaz et al., 2005: 261). However, despite state-led efforts and the first of large 
dam campaign of 1970s36, primary energy production only doubled from 9.54 mtoe in 1960 
to 18.85 mtoe in 1980 worsening the country’s energy deficit (see Figure 2.2).     
Table 2.1: Emergence of The Energy Bureaucracy 
 
Abbreviation 
Turkish/English 
Institution Date Purpose Status 
 
 
Etibank 1935 
Raising capital to fund costly energy 
exploration and production efforts. 
Privatized 
(1998), now 
defunct 
MTA MREI 
Mineral 
Research and 
Exploration 
Institution 1935 
Exploration of natural resources, 
utilization of existing reserves, 
particularly coal and oil. Active 
EIE ERSA 
Electric 
Resources 
Survey 
Administration 1935 
Research on the country’s electricity 
potential and planning of its 
development. 
Renewable 
Energy 
Administration 
(since 2011) 
DSI SHW 
State Hydraulic 
Works 1953 
Administration of watersheds and 
infrastructures; 
building/administration of 
hydropower plants with EIE. Active 
TPAO TP 
Turkish 
Petroleum Inc. 1954 
State-run conglomerate responsible 
of exploration, extraction and 
distribution of domestic and imported 
oil and oil products. 
Split into 
multiple 
companies 
(1990s), 
partially 
privatized  
ETKB MENR 
Ministry of 
Energy and 
Natural 
Resources 1963 
Long term planning of the country’s 
energy policy, supervision of energy 
bureaucracy. Active 
TEK EIT 
Electrical 
Institution of 
Turkey 1970 
Distribution, transmission of 
electricity, maintenance of the 
national grid. 
Split into three 
(1994), mostly 
privatized 
 
The most impactful energy-related development of the 1970s was the OPEC oil crises of 
1973 and 1979. As a net oil importer, Turkey was significantly hurt by each crisis. 
                                                
36 Keban Dam, located in Eastern province Elazığ, was the highlight of Turkish dam building in 1970s. 
1330 MW in installed capacity, Keban Dam was completed in ten years (1965-1975). When completed its 
reservoir became the third largest lake in the country relocating of 25.000 villagers (Kolars, 1986). 
Originally a self-standing project, Keban is now integrated with the GAP project. 
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However, the latter crisis’ impact was intensified by political instability and a foreign 
exchange crisis in 1979 (Rodnik, 1990). Negative growth and hyperinflation were 
accompanied by shortages of basic goods, particularly energy. Despite the new hydropower 
plants, energy consumption breakdown by primary source of energy was 47.8 percent 
petroleum, 23.8 percent wood and dung, 19 percent hard coal and lignite, and 7.5 percent 
hydropower (Ibid). Coal and oil shortages were so severe, it was alleged that even the office 
of the Prime Minister could not be heated for a short period.37 Fuel and coal shortages, as 
well as price fluctuations, impacted virtually every aspect of life from transportation to 
home cooking.38 Routine power outages and long lines in front of LPG retail stores 
continue to visually define the late 1970s and the planned economy’s failure. Throughout 
the 1980s, energy shortages and never-ending LPG lines were used as powerful rhetorical 
tools to legitimize opening up the economy, enacting neoliberal reforms and privatizing 
the energy sector. 
2.3.3 Early Neoliberal (1983-2001) 
The eventual response to the deep crises of late 1970s a neoliberal shock therapy that would 
be globally ubiquitous for years to come (Klein, 2007). The economic program presented 
on January 24th, 1980 (referred to as the January 24th Decisions) by Demirel’s minority 
government devaluated Turkish Lira against US Dollar, lifted barriers against imports, 
ended a set of agricultural subsidies, proposed measures to suppress wages, and introduced 
                                                
37 Upon seizing the office in 1979, Demirel responded to the crisis with his infamous “the state is in need of 
70 cents” remark, and blamed the social democratic government preceding his for the nation’s energy 
predicament (Özel, 2014: 34). 
38 Liquid Propane Gas (LPG) was, and still is, the most common energy source for cooking in Turkey. LPG 
cylinders are sold at neighborhood level, require refilling often and provide a first hand contact with 
petroleum-based energy even for those who do not own an automobile. Its tangible ubiquity can only be 
compared with self-service fuel filling experience in the US. 
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a stimulus program to encourage an export-led growth model (Boratav et al, 1996; Arıcanlı 
and Rodrik, 1990). Although the Demirel government was soon toppled by a military 
intervention (allegedly to end street-level violence between political factions), the junta 
embraced the economic program sketched on January 24th and appointed one of the authors 
of the program, Turgut Özal, as the Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey’s interim government 
(Pamuk, 2014). Three years later, Özal’s newly launched Anavatan Partisi (Motherland 
Party, also known as ANAP) secured a majority government at the first post-1980 general 
election, providing the opportunity to intensify the neoliberalization program Özal helped 
launch.     
 
Opening up the energy sector was one of the first priorities of the early neoliberal agenda, 
particularly because statist energy policies were seen as one of the fundamental catalysts 
of the economic crises of late 1970s. Law no. 3096 was enacted in 1984. Entitled 
Authorization of Enterprises Other Than the Turkish Electricity Administration to 
Produce, Transmit, Distribute and Trade Electricity, it was the neoliberal government’s 
first attempt to encourage private actors to partake in the energy industry. The purpose of 
the law was to create a framework in which private entities could build and/or operate 
power plants without completely leaving the energy sector to market forces. Accordingly, 
independent power producers (IPPs) would be able to produce electricity under three 
different schemes: (a) for self consumption (auto-producer), (b) by leasing existing state 
facilities (transfer of operating rights - TOOR), by building new facilities with the 
condition to transfer them to the state after a set period (build-own-transfer - BOT).  Under 
Law no. 3096, energy ceased to be an exclusively state sector, but this did not extinguish 
53 
 
the state authority over the market. However, by including transmission, distribution, and 
trade alongside production in their approach to opening up the market, the new government 
sent a signal that their ultimate goal was the sector’s complete liberalization as early as 
1984.39 
 
This first step towards market liberalization did not come to fruition anytime soon. There 
were only a limited number of investors willing to gamble on the energy sector’s unclear 
future. By the end of the century, only twenty-two new privately operated power plants 
were opened under the BOT scheme with a capacity totaling around 2275 MW, which 
corresponded to less than 10 percent of the country’s entire electricity generation portfolio 
at the time (Özkıvrak, 2005: 1343). Scholars have argued that one reason for the lack of 
investor enthusiasm was judicial resistance against the sector’s liberalization (Gülen, 1998; 
Çakarel and House, 2004; Hepbaşlı, 2004; Özkıvrak, 2005; Yılmaz and Uslu, 2005; Çetin 
and Oguz, 2007; Erdoğdu, 2007). In a series of legal battles, the details of which are 
discussed in the next section, high courts effectively halted the industry by annulling 
several key clauses in the new energy laws and establishing regulations that made the 
sector’s liberalization possible. For this reason, the 1984 framework law was followed by 
a series of new laws, supplementary bylaws and executive orders, each of which sought to 
make it more appealing for the domestic and foreign entrepreneurs to invest in the sector 
(See Table 2.2).  
                                                
39 To put the Turkey’s eagerness towards energy sector liberalization into perspective it is worthwhile to 
energy liberalization efforts did not start in the world before early/mid 1990s with the with the notable early 
exception of Chile which embarked upon its liberalization program in 1982, just two years before Turkey 
(Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001). 
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Table 2.2: Legal Restructuring of Energy Industry in Turkey 
Date	 Legal	#	 Law	(L)	/	Bylaw	(B)	/	
Executive	Order	(E)	/	
Constitutional	Amendment	(C)	
Content	/	Importance	
1984	 3096	 Authorization	of	Enterprises	Other	Than	the	Turkish	Electricity	Administration	to	Produce,	Transmit,	Distribute	and	Trade	Electricity	(L)	
As	a	first	step	towards	the	liberalization	of	the	energy	sector,	this	framework	law	recognizes	that	Ministry	of	Energy	and	Natural	Resources,	(and	upon	affirmation	of	State	Planning	Organization),	may	grant	permission	to	the	investors	to	construct	and	operate	electricity	production	facilities.	To	this	end,	three	methods	are	defined.	Build	Operate	Transfer	(BOT)	allowed	private	enterprises	operate	energy	production	facilities	that	they	build	with	the	condition	of	their	eventual	transfer	to	the	state	in	99	years	(later	revised	as	49).	Transfer	of	Operational	Rights	(TOR),	on	the	other	hand,	enabled	investors	to	operate	(and	collect	revenues	of)	existing	state	owned	energy	facilities	through	lease	like	contracts	for	set	periods	of	time.	Energy	produced	has	to	be	sold	to	Turkish	Electric	Administration.	The	third	method	is	the	Auto-producer	that	allows	the	consumption	of	the	produced	energy	in	the	owner’s	own	facilities.	
1993	 3974	 Turkish	Electricity	Authority	(TEK)	Privatization	(L)	 TEK,	the	main	authority	in	the	electricity	industry	as	the	publically	owned	vertically	integrated	entity,	was	separated	into	two	corporatized	entities	(Turkish	Electricity	Generation	and	Transmission	Company	–	TEAŞ	and	Turkish	Electricity	Distribution	Company	–	TEDAŞ)	with	the	perspective	of	privatization.	The	law	attempted	to	privatize	the	two	entities	through	sale	of	ownership	rights	yet	this	clause	was	canceled	by	the	Constitutional	Court	(Atiya	et	al.	2012:	20).			
1994	 3996	 Build-Own-Transfer	(BOT)	Law	
(L)	 To	encourage	private	investment	into	the	energy	sector,	the	law	aimed	increasing	the	attractiveness	of	BOT	contracts	by	offering	treasury	guarantees	and	tax	exemptions.	Specified	particular	certain	arrangement	as	anon-concessionary,	thus	could	be	subjected	to	prıvate	law.	The	Constitutional	Court	found	the	law	unconstitutional	and	annulled	it	in	March	2016	(Cakarel	and	House,	2004;	Gürcan,	1998;	Atiyas).				
1996	 96/8269	 Build-Operate-Own	(BOO)	
(E)	 Introduced	BOO	method,	which	-unlike	BOT-	allowed	investors	to	own	the	generators	they	built	and	operate.	BOO	contacts	were	subjected	to	international	arbitration.	Annulled	by	the	Council	of	State.	
1997		 4283	 Build-Own-Operate	Law	(L)	 Provided	legal	framework	and	offered	treasury	guarantees	for	BOO	contracts	as	the	executive	order	96.8269	was	struck	down	by	Danıştay	(Council	of	State)	on	the	basis	that	the	decree	requires	parliamentary	mandate.	
1997	 97/9853	 Build-Own-Operate	By-Law	(B)	 Complements	Law	no.	4283.	
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1999	 4446	 Privatization	Amendment	(C)		 One	of	the	series	of	constitutional	amendments	passed	in	1999	was	an	addition	to	item	47	that	define	the	conditions	of	nationalization.	Originally	the	item	47	of	the	constitution	defined	only	
Nationalization	and	was	titled	as	such.	1999	amendment	was	revised	the	title	as	Nationalization	
and	Privatization,	provided	legal	basis	for	the	liberalization	of	energy	sector	(among	others)	and,	to	a	large	degree,	prevented	the	high	courts’	annulment	of	privatization	contracts.	
2001	 4628	
(now	
6446)	 Electricity	Market	Law	(L)		 Unlike	Law	No.	3096	this	framework	law	envisioned	complete	liberal	restructuring	of	the	energy	sector	and	eventual	withering	away	of	the	state	involvement.	Introduced	Energy	Market	Regulatory	Body	as	an	autonomous	institution	to	supervise	the	emergence	and	heathy	sustenance	of	a	competitive	energy	market.	Adopted	licensing	of	energy	production	rights	instead	of	multi-piece	BOT,	BOO	and	TOR	methods.		
2003	 25150	 Water	Usage	Rights	Regulation	
(B)	 Regulation	about	Procedures	and	Principles	for	Contract	Agreements	in	Water	Usage	Rights	for	Production	in	Electricity	Market.	Requires	for	all	existing	and	future	hydroelectricity	producers	(license	holders)	to	sign	a	water	usage	rights	agreement	with	State	Hydraulic	Works	(SHW)	that	would	allow	them	to	lease	river	sections	on	which	the	plants	will	operate.	Increased	legal	legitimacy	of	private	Hydropower	Plants.			
2005	 5346	 Renewable	Energy	Law	(L)	 Aims	at	encouraging	investments	in	renewable	energy	generation	facilities.	Defines	support	mechanisms,	purchase	guarantees	and	prices.	
2008	 26939	 Environmental	Impact	Assessment	(EIA)	Bylaw	(B)	 One	of	the	seventeen	amendments/changes	in	Environmental	Impact	Assessment	(EIA)	Bylaw.	Until	2000	hydroelectric	power	plants	(HEPPs)	with	50	MW	installed	capacity	or	below	were	exempt	from	EIA.	Upon	public	opposition	threshold	was	lowered	first	to	10	MW	and	then	to	0.5	MW	in	2008	and	2011	changes,	respectively.	Yet,	it	should	be	noted	that	many	HEPPs	with	installed	capacity	10	MW	and	below	had	secured	licenses	prior	to	2008	EIA	Bylaw	change.				
2013	 6446	 (New)	Electricity	Market	Law	(L)	 Replaces	Law	No.	4628	and	introduces	pre-license	procedure.	Aimed	at	hindering	a	black	market	for	licenses,	defines	a	series	of	and	somehow	costly	procedures	to	be	fulfilled	prior	to	acquiring	production	licenses	for	Energy	Market	Regulatory	Authority	(EMRA).	Indirectly	acknowledges	speculative	license	transfer	under	Law	No.	4638,	aka	çantacılık	(the	briefcase	trade).		
2014	 6545	 Urgent	Judicial	Proceeding	(L)	 Aims	at	shortening	proceeding	period	and	alleviate	judicial	work	load	in	administrative	cases.	Urban	and	environmental	conflicts	are	particularly	targeted	as	permits	and	EIA	reports	that	authorize	disputed	projected	are	tried	under	administrative	law.	Shortens	law	suit	filing	period,	curtails	suspension	of	execution	orders	and	appeal	procedures.			
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Out of desperation, TOOR and BOT contracts were made highly attractive through treasury 
guarantees and tax exemptions while a new method called Build-Own-Operate (BOO) was 
introduced in 1997. BOO contracts allowed IPPs to own the property rights of the 
electricity facilities that they built and operated. 
 
The failure of the early liberalization had significant repercussions, each with long-lasting 
consequences. First, the installed capacity expansion’s pace drastically slowed in light of 
uncertainties regarding the future of the market. By 1996, thirteen years after the enactment 
of Law no. 3096, only six IPPs were in operation (Çakarel and House, 2004). Between 
1993 and 1998 the total installed capacity in electricity production rose from 20,337 MW 
to 23,354 MW (TEIAS, 2016), while the energy demand in the 1990s increased by a record 
7 percent per annum (Atiyas et al., 2014). Thanks to the completion of large dams that had 
been planned in the 1970s and undertaken by SHW in the following decade, improvements 
in hydropower installed capacity were important additions to the energy portfolio. 
However, they were not enough to shrink the deficit.40 Secondly, the vicious cycle of 
underinvestment, wherein the private sector shies away from investments due to legal 
uncertainties and the state divests with the expectation of private entry, put Turkey’s energy 
balance in a dire financial situation. The limited number of foreign investors entering the 
market were motivated by long-term take-or-pay guarantees and above- market prices, 
which put an immense fiscal burden on the national budget for years to come (Çakarel and 
House, 2004). A third outcome (and cause) of the energy deficit in the 1990s was the 
                                                
40 Ironically enough, two decades between 1980 and 1990 are not only marked by early neoliberalization 
but the same period is also the golden age of hydropower –or the pinnacle state-hydraulic paradigm 
(Bakker, 2010)– as many large-dam projects were completed in this era such as,  
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introduction of natural gas to the energy portfolio, which was intended to diversify primary 
energy sources. Although natural gas significantly diminished national dependency on oil, 
it increased Turkey’s overall energy dependency, as its natural gas reserves are next to nil. 
As a result, the majority of IPP additions to the electricity generation portfolio were natural 
gas power plants (Ibid.). Finally, the increased burden of the energy bill on the budget made 
a series of corruption allegations visible. Turkish High Courts of Accounts litigations on 
the irregularities in the design and implementation of IPP contracts as well as bidding 
processes (or lack thereof) illustrated the significance of the energy field as a site where 
the government could engage in nepotism and the distribution of public rents (Atiyas et al. 
2012: 22). In an uncommon trial by Turkish standards, the Constitutional Court tried two 
Ministers of Energy and Natural Resources along with a number of energy bureaucrats, 
and ex-Minister Cumhur Ersümer was found guilty on corruption charges.41 
 
The transition of the Turkish economy from an inward looking import-subsidizing model 
to an export-oriented one open to global markets was hailed by the international finance 
community as one of the early examples of neoliberalism (Özel, 2012: 120). During the 
first several years of this new experience, economic growth as well as relatively controlled 
inflation were seen as an affirmation that neoliberal principles could effectively work in 
developing contexts (Akyüz and Boratav, 2003). However, the winds changed rapidly in 
the early 1990s, often dubbed the economy’s “lost decade” (Öniş and Şenses, 2009: 3). 
Anxious to attract foreign capital, the economy of the early neoliberal Republic relied on 
                                                
41 Three year long trial ends former minister acquitted, Hurriyet Daily News, 28 June 2007, URL: 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/three-year-long-trial-ends-former-ministers-acquitted.aspx?pageID 
=438&n=three-year-long-trial-ends-former-ministers-acquitted-2007-07-28 (accessed 15 June 2016) 
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high levels of domestic and foreign debt, short-term capital flow and a rentier class that 
was dependent on the government for high interest rates (Öniş and Şenses, 2009 :2 citing 
Cizre and Yeldan, 2005). The return of fiscal deficits (deteriorated partially by the energy 
deficit) and high inflation accompanied by political instability and the war fought against 
the Kurdish insurgency accentuated the vulnerabilities of Turkey’s early neoliberalization 
attempt. Within the span of eleven years, the country was struck by four major episodes of 
economic crises, in 1990-1991, 1994, 1999, and 2000-2001, respectively (Pamuk, 2012: 
281). The last and deepest crisis brought a landslide transformation in party politics and 
notable shifts in accumulation patterns. 
2.3.4 Deep Neoliberalization (2001-2013) 
2.3.4.1 Crisis, Energy and Conditionality 
Chronic stagnation in the real sector, lingering payment disparity, disequilibrium in the 
banking sectors and massive outflows of foreign capital culminated in the 2000-2001 
crises, the worst meltdown of the crisis-ridden early neoliberal experience (Akyüz and 
Boratav, 2003; Cizre and Yeldan, 2005). The 2000-2001 economic crises had devastating 
social, political as well as economic consequences. Within a matter of days $3.5 billion 
foreign currency left the stock exchange.42 GDP contracted by 7.4 percent in real terms, 
while wholesale inflation soared to 61 percent (Yeldan, 2016: 12;). Turkish Lira lost half 
of its value; overnight, interest skyrocketed 6000 percent (Pamuk, 2012: 285). The crisis 
                                                
42 “MGK’da anayasa firlatma krizinin 10. yılı” [10th anniversary of the crisis] NTV, 17 January 2011, 
URL:http://www.ntv.com.tr/galeri/turkiye/mgkda-anayasa-firlatma-krizinin-10-yili,1BMjiPUws0S1BrB8 
UVAp9Q/lMoFrr_OpkGuwOWLSzkup  (Accessed 15 June 20016). 
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led to a severe contraction in real wages as they fell 20 percent abruptly in 2001, while 
unemployment rose 2 percent in 2000 and then 3 percent in 2001 (Yeldan, 2016).  
 
Despite the fact that Turkey had been in close cooperation with international finance 
institutions (IFIs) since the early 1980s, that pre-crisis economic programs had been 
designed and monitored by the IMF, the country’s post-crises recovery formula did not 
depart from neoliberal principles (Cizre and Yeldan, 2005). The arguments that put the 
blame on corrupt bureaucracy, nepotism, weak coalition governments, lack of political will 
and half-hearted implementation of the reforms prevailed as best explanations of the crises 
(Ibid). Social frustration with the economic downturn did not explicitly target the IMF, nor 
were there mass demonstrations posing a systemic critique comparable to those 
experienced in Latin America.43 Consequently, Turkey’s recovery remedy was predicated 
on deepening preexisting neoliberal reforms through the assistance of yet another IMF 
stand-by agreement.44 The new assistance program aimed to secure fiscal austerity, 
complete structural adjustments, accelerate privatizations, and discipline public 
expenditures, as well as reform the banking system (Cizre and Yekdan, 2005; Öniş and 
Rubin, 2003). However, this time, the program tacitly acknowledged the possible 
shortcomings of leaving the market on its own: the new IMF program devised autonomous 
regulatory institutions to supposedly minimize vulnerability, arbitrariness and volatility of 
the market (Pamuk, 2014: 286).   
                                                
43 Explanations regarding the absence of radical street level opposition in post-2000/2001 crises vary. 
Presence of informal social networks, family ties and the vibrant urban-rural connection that offers the 
ability to take refuge in the countryside in case of bankruptcy are cited factors that differentiate the Turkish 
case from its counterparts, such as the contemporaneous economic crisis in Argentina (see Öniş, 2009). 
44 2000/2001 economic crises hit in the middle of a two year-long IMF stand-by package. That was the 18th 
assistant program Turkey signed with the IMF. After the interruption of the crises 19th package was signed 
in 2002.  
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The electricity sector, whose early opening-up failed to generate the expected outcome, 
was key to this new approach. The Electricity Market Law (EML – Law No. 4628) was 
passed in 2001 with the aim of creating a truly private market from scratch. The EML 
focused on unbundling industry activities (state monopoly), privatizing public assets 
(power plants), and establishing a “financially strong, competitive, efficient and 
transparent” market, one subject to private law and overseen by an autonomous body called 
Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA).45 Inspired by the UK model, designed with 
the assistance of the World Bank and Deloitte, the new law was seen as “a text-book” 
electricity reform (Erdoğdu, 2005). EML instituted MRA as an independent body, 
governed by its own board composed of ten members, all of whom were appointed by the 
Cabinet for six years of service with the condition of not working for the sector for two 
years after their term. Although it is a public institution, like many examples of independent 
regulatory agencies (IRAs), EMRA was not dependent on a ministry. The primary role of 
EMRA was to implement the licensing regime that replaced previous IPP schemes. Thus, 
one of the primary functions of EMRA was to protect the market from political influence 
and distribute valuable energy production permits in an impartial manner. EMRA was also 
responsible for monitoring the IPPs compliance with the conditions of licensing, and 
imposing fines in case of noncompliance. Moreover, EMRA was responsible for writing 
and implementing secondary legislation, and provides retail services to non-eligible 
consumers. EML also disintegrated the electricity sector by unbundling generation, 
wholesale, and transmission into three separate public companies, introduced (and defined 
                                                
45 The institution was first named as Electricity Market Regulatory Authority, yet soon revised as Energy 
Market Regulatory Authority as its area of jurisdiction was expanded.  
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restrictions to) competition in non-monopoly segments, allowed open access to networks, 
outlined how to proceed with the privatization of state plants, and monitor costs in 
generation and wholesale.46  
 
The 2000/2001 crises not only led to deepening neoliberalism with the help of regulatory 
(roll-out) measures, but also triggered a sea change in electoral politics. The general 
election held on November 3rd, 2002 was a major blow to almost all establishment parties. 
Four parties who shared 75 percent of the legislative seats prior to the election were pushed 
out of the parliament as they failed to gather enough votes to pass the 10 percent national 
threshold. AKP was allowed to form a single party government by securing 66 percent of 
the seats via 34 percent of the popular vote, first step of a sea change in Turkish politics.  
2.3.4.2 Energy and the Birth of AKP hegemony 
Founded only fifteen months before the election, AKP was an outcome of a split in the 
political Islamist lineage that had achieved remarkable electoral successes throughout the 
1990s led by the Refah (Welfare) Party. Energizing the masses with its populist adil düzen 
(just order) motto, Refah had carried Istanbul with 21 other cities in the 1994 local elections 
and won the 1995 general elections in an unprecedented victory. Refah was first removed 
from office via a swift intervention by the military and then banned by the constitutional 
court for being the epicentre of anti-secular activities.47 AKP was founded by a reformist 
cadre from the Fazilet (Felicity) Party, a successor of Refah and yet another banned party 
of political Islam in Turkey. Coming from a tradition of banned parties, AKP, from the 
                                                
46 On the details of Electricity Market Reform, see Atiyas and Dutz, 2003; Özkıvrak, 2005; Hepbaşlı, 2005; 
Atiyas et al., 2012. 
47 For more on rise and fall of Refah, see Gülalp, 1999. 
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very first day, took the utmost care to distance itself from political Islam. This included 
embracing the EU membership perspective, norms and the authority of the Western 
alliance, and most importantly, the superiority of global capitalism, all of which had been 
criticized veraciously by the representatives of political Islam prior to the birth of AKP. 
These sharp changes in their platform did not alienate the base of political Islam. In fact, 
by taming radical elements and reconciling with capitalism, AKP expanded its base and it 
comfortably clinched election victories in a series of elections following its first term. In a 
subtle process of what Tuğal (2009) calls passive revolution with reference to the Italian 
thinker Antonio Gramsci (1971), political Islam, led by AKP, managed to exert a long-
lasting hegemony thanks to its absorption into global capitalism.    
 
The hegemonic formation of AKP was multi-layered, rising on to the top with the help of 
several unexpected alliances. In terms of the economy, AKP’s first term (2002-2007) was 
a honeymoon: a remarkable success story. With the help of the IMF program, Turkey 
returned to positive growth rates, averaging 5.8 percent GDP expansion from 2003 to 2009. 
Inflation was tamed and brought down to single digits. Turkey achieved fiscal discipline 
and public debt was lowered significantly. Predicated upon this rapid recovery from the 
2000/2001 crisis, the AKP government was hailed with admiration by Turkish and 
international business circles traditionally suspicious of political Islam. Business-friendly 
government policies led to the re-entry of foreign capital, which had left the country 
without looking back in 2001. Loyal to its founding principles, AKP not only stuck to the 
IMF program, but also took a proactive role in its execution. In fact, AKP has proven itself 
to be much more successful in implementing neoliberalization than its counterparts in the 
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1980s and 90s. AKP’s privatization performance is a case in point. Despite the fuss, 
between 1985 and 2000—roughly throughout the early neoliberalization period—the 
revenue generated from privatization was around $8.4 billion. The pace of privatization, a 
routine complaint of IMF regarding Turkey’s performance, accelerated beyond 
expectations under AKP, amounting to $62 billion over the period between 2003 and 2013 
(Öniş, 2011; Eğilmez, 2014). A wide range of business owners (big and small, metropolitan 
and provincial, domestic and international) plundered public assets, bestowing upon AKP 
a broad-based support within the bourgeoisie that few governments had enjoyed before 
(Öniş, 2011).  
 
The most remarkable accomplishment of AKP has been its maintenance of strong ties with 
the urban working middle/lower classes while showing no hesitation in catering to the 
capital. Through an elaborate neoliberal social policy regime (social assistance and 
workfare programs) AKP has been quite successful in garnering the consent of 
unorganized, informal or unemployed social classes (Akça et al. 2014: 31). Under its 
governance, most social assistance has been channeled through Islamic grassroots 
organizations and municipalities, providing a unique power to the giving hand to know, 
hand-pick and establish long-term ties with recipients and blurring the divide between right 
and charity. With its preference for haphazard charity distribution (i.e. random coal 
assistance) over universal subsidy programs, AKP established a personal relationship with 
some segments of the urban poor.   
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In the international arena, the first AKP term also heralded the birth of the so-called Turkish 
Model. The security paradigm of the post-9/11 world order accentuated the AKP’s initial 
success as a conservative Muslim government willing to partake in capitalism and 
globalization without making much fuss about secularism. Pointed to by Western leaders 
and the international press as an example for the rest of the Islamic world, the Turkish 
Model was essentially the “marriage of formal democracy, free market capitalism, and (a 
toned down) conservative Islam” (Tuğal, 2016: 4). Alongside the cross-class support AKP 
managed to garner domestically, its international legitimacy and model status have been 
critical for the formation of its hegemony.  
 
To return to energy, it should be noted that as it came to power in November 2002, AKP 
certainly did not have a significant role either in the energy controversies of the 1990s or 
in enacting the EML in 2001. In fact, the Felicity Party, the political Islamist party in 2001 
prior to the AKP split, had not voted for the Electricity Market Law and appealed to the 
Constitutional Court for its repeal. However, AKP not only embraced the precedent set by 
the EML, it has been unapologetically proactive in its execution. Although AKP was not 
the architect of the new energy regime, it became its diligent implementer by passing 
complementary legislation, encouraging businesspeople to invest in the energy sector and 
standing behind controversial projects.  
 
Under AKP, the energy sector, which had been stagnating by the turn of the century, has 
developed into one of the most attractive sectors in Turkey. Investments picked up speed 
particularly in the second half of the 2000s upon the completion of supplementary 
 65 
regulations. Both the privatization of state assets (plants and electricity distribution 
companies) and new electricity generation licenses attracted considerable attention. The 
Turkish energy sector became one of the world’s fastest growing by reaching above 9 
percent growth rate in 2010 and 2011. From 2008 to 2015, the total investment volume in 
the energy industry surpassed $50 billion.48 The country expects to attract $120 billion in 
investments to meet its 2023 centennial of the republic goals.49 The dynamism of the sector 
was such that it alone carried 32 percent of all privatization and private sector transactions 
in 2012. In terms of foreign direct investment, electricity and gas sectors helped to 
significantly improve these numbers, amounting to $19.3 billion over the period between 
2006 and 2015. Since 2009, Turkey’s energy sector has consistently made the top three 
FDI attracting sectors, switching positions with manufacturing and finance and insurance. 
However, the lion’s share of the distribution licenses	are shared by domestic players. An 
average of $6 billion has poured into new electricity production infrastructures annually 
since 2008.50 The advent of the liberalized energy sector as a new unexplored lucrative 
market was one of the catalysts of the post-2000/2001 crises recovery, particularly as it 
absorbed the exodus from shrinking sectors such as textile (Eberliköse, 2013). While 
energy emerged as a new accumulation model, Forbes magazine reported that 82 of 100 
richest people of Turkey had active operations in the energy sector in 2013, making the 
sector the country’s most profitable alongside real estate.  
 
                                                
48 ‘Enerji sektöründe iflas kaygısı’ [Bankruptcy anxiety in the energy sector], Enerji Panorama, 25, July 
2015, pp.33-35, p. 33. 
49 ‘Turkey needs to invest 120 billion in energy until 2013 says Erdogan’, Hurriyet Daily News, 20 January 
2015. URL http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-needs-to-invest-120-billion-in-energy-until-2023-
says-erdogan.aspx?pageID=238&nID=77197&NewsCatID=348 (accessed 10 June 2016). 
50 Ibid. 
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The unprecedented eagerness to invest in energy boosted the installed capacity in 
electricity supply. From 2002 to 2014, installed capacity in hydropower and thermal power 
more than doubled, leading to a surge in total capacity by 117 percent, from 31,845 MW 
to 69,519. As government officials proudly advertise every now and then, under AKP, 
more installed capacity was operationalized in the course of 2002-2014 than it had been in 
the first 80 years of the Republic. Total electricity generated also jumped from 129,400 
GWh to 251,964 GWh. Wind energy, almost non-existent a decade ago, now accounts for 
6 percent of the total installed capacity.51 Despite a considerable delay, the first set of solar 
farm licenses were distributed in 2015. Additionally, in 2010 the country’s first nuclear 
power plant deal was sealed with Russia’s state-owned corporation Rosatom, only to be 
followed by a second agreement in 2013 with a Japanese-French consortium. The next 
significant item on Turkey’s energy agenda is to utilize the country’s entire coal potential 
by 2023. To this end, a new coal extraction campaign is underway, opening new mines and 
expanding existing ones. Additionally, Turkey is planning to add a jaw-dropping 80 new 
coal power plants to its portfolio, one of which will allegedly become the world’s biggest.52  
2.4 A NEW WAVE? POST-NELIBERALISM (2013 ONWARDS) 
2.4.1 Dark side of the Energy Frenzy 
Turkey’s energy frenzy however is not entirely impressive and marketable, although the 
numbers cited above suggest otherwise. In fact, it is those numbers that have been stirring 
                                                
51 Turkish Electricity Transmission Co. (TEIAS). URL. http://www.teias.gov.tr  (accessed 20 May 2016). 
52 “Is it too late to stop Turkey’s coal rush?”, Guardian, 06 August 2015. URL: https://www. 
theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/06/is-it-too-late-to-stop-turkeys-coal-rush (access 15 June 2016).  
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a bankruptcy anxiety across the sector for some time.53 Many energy companies are 
reportedly struggling to keep up with loan repayments for a variety of reasons (see chapter 
X for details). A recent study examining energy projects’ realization speeds confirms that 
the fears are not entirely baseless. Accordingly, projects with project realization ratio over 
35 percent, amount to a mere 26 percent of all projects. Half of all projects have 10 percent 
or below completion ratio (Türkyılmaz, 2015: 27).  
 
At the heart of this bankruptcy anxiety, on the one hand, lies the untold weaknesses of AKP 
economics. Despite all the glamour, the impressive growth rates in AKP years were 
achieved in spite of two major shortcomings: the growth has been a jobless growth, one 
that is unable to generate employment, and it was speculation-led, relying heavily on the 
foreign credit that was globally available in the 2000s that targeted emerging markets like 
Turkey in a quest for quick returns (Yeldan and Ünüvar, 2016; Adaman and Akbulut, 
2013). Despite AKP’s critically acclaimed economic success, unemployment, which rose 
to double digit numbers with the 2000/2001 economic crises, never fell to single digits, let 
alone 6 percent, of the pre-crisis level.54 More pertinent to energy infrastructure 
investments is the soaring indebtedness of the private sector; while public finances were 
relative restrained in the post-2000/2001 crises, in the five years between 2008 and 2013, 
short-term external debt stock of the private sector almost doubled, jumping from $55.5 
billion to $100.9 billion (Yeldan and Ünüvar, 2016: 22). What makes debt (and growth) 
speculative is the very short-term character of these loans. Short-term debt accounts for 87 
                                                
53 “Enerji sektöründe iflas kaygısı” [Bankruptcy anxiety in the energy sector], Enerji Panorama, 25, July 
2015, pp.33-35, p. 33. 
54 Non-agriculture unemployment was 9.3 percent in 2000, rose to 12.4 percent in 2001 escalated between 
17.4 and 12.0 percent in the next 12 years. (Yeldan and Ünivar, 2016: 18)  
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percent of the total debt stock of the private sector (Ibid). Concerned with the mutually 
reinforcing impact of the dual fallacies of joblessness and speculative money flows, Yeldan 
and Ünüvar (2016: 19) summarize the post-2001 growth pattern as follows: 
A major distinct feature of the Turkish economic scene in the post-2001 
crisis era was its relatively high interest rates and costs of credit. 
Operating under an environment of global financial expansion, this fact 
has led to a rapid expansion of foreign capital inflows, especially in the 
form of short-term speculative ‘hot’ finance. The underlying speculative 
nature of such flows was a witness to the fact that they were not necessarily 
part of ‘green field investments’ that could expand labor demand by 
creating new jobs and bringing new advanced technologies.  
The energy sector suffers from—or rather, was built upon—both of these weaknesses. 
Turkey’s debt-ridden accumulation pattern (ibid) fueled growth and facilitated an 
unprecedented level of investment in sectors that promised guaranteed returns. Real estate 
in urban centers and extractive industries, as well as infrastructure projects in rural areas, 
emerged as the best possible destinations for foreign loans to be channeled into. Yet, as 
Turkish currency began to significantly depreciate beginning in 2013, the energy sector’s 
debt has become the sword of Democles hanging over the private sector. Droughts, 
optimistic investment projections, rising electricity prices, and the energy license black 
market also feed into the speculative character of the business, parallel to the general 
growth pattern of AKP economics.55  
 
On the other hand, the energy sector’s vulnerability is not simply a product of certain 
economic trends and miscalculations. Another reason underlying the hardship currently 
faced by some energy investments is the societal dissent against them. Investing in energy 
                                                
55 For all of these factors that hinder the ability of energy companies to pay pack their loans, see chapter 3.  
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infrastructures at such a high rate and intensity corresponds to an aggressive spatial 
transformation in which (often rural) residential settings are transformed into energy 
landscapes in a rather abrupt fashion. One of the most dynamic and effective social 
movements that emerged throughout Turkey’s AKP years is the grassroots activism that 
opposes the intrusion of coal mines as well as thermal and hydro power plants into rural 
livelihoods. Starting around late 2000s, the opposition has matured in scope, reach and 
political language, emerging from individual land use conflicts (initially mostly around 
small hydropower plant developments), and now can be framed within the energy justice 
movement framework. Discussed in detail in chapter Y, the opposition, along with the 
litigations they have initiated, exerts formidable pressure on the spotless image of the 
energy world by causing significant delays in projects’ completion, if not halting them 
altogether. Nowadays, it is almost a rarity for an energy infrastructure to be built without 
facing litigation. The sheer number of energy infrastructure-related environmental conflicts 
has forced the government to find innovative, unorthodox and often heavy-handedly 
executed solutions to circumvent regulations without completely alienating rural residents, 
some of whom are staunch AKP supporters. Below, I discuss how AKP responded to some 
of the bottlenecks in the energy sector and ask whether the contemporary comeback of state 
authority in energy policy corresponds to a new era that goes beyond neoliberalism as we 
know it.  
2.4.2 Reading Authoritarian Neoliberalism Through Energy 
On May 13th, 2014 an underground fire in Soma coalmines took 301 lives, earning it the 
embarrassing title of the deadliest mining disaster of the 21st century. Located in the small 
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town of Soma in Western Turkey (in the Aegean Region), Soma mining operations were 
publicly owned until 2005 when its royalties were given to Soma Holding to boost 
production and efficiency as part of the governments policy to maximize the utilization 
of domestic coal resources for energy production. In return for a fixed royalty, the coal 
extracted by the private contractor in Soma was guaranteed to be purchased by the state to 
be burned in the still state-owned Soma coal-power plant. More coal was extracted in Soma 
mines under the new management while the cost of extraction plummeted significantly. 
The company's CEO stated in a 2012 interview that the coal in Soma used to cost US$130
140 per ton when mined by the state, and they were committed to maintain a price of 
US$23.80 per ton, including royalties. This was of course only possible at the expense of 
diminishing salaries, worsening job security and workplace safety, and disrespect for labor 
rights. When aggressive cost-cutting measures including mining, long-working hours and 
lay-offs of experienced workers conjoin with absence of rescue chambers56, the death toll 
in Soma multiplied.  
 
It soon became apparent that Soma was more than a simple failure of regulation or an 
unfortunate byproduct of privatization. Soma was the quintessential neoliberal disaster and 
a horrible reminder of both the catastrophic consequences of privatizing public services 
and the seemingly benign adherence to the motto of efficiency. Importantly, then-Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s approach to handling the tragedy suggested that a new 
chapter in neoliberalism might be in the making. Against critiques, Erdoğan dismissed the 
disaster as “faith” (will of god), and referred to deadly mining explosions from 19th century 
                                                
56 Rescue chambers are emergency shelters used in underground facilities, mostly in mines. 
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England calling it the “usual” outcome of mining business57. When he visited Soma a few 
days after the disaster, the small town welcomed him with widespread protests that 
Erdoğan and his entourage responded with violence and intimidation. One of his aides was 
photographed kicking a protestor laying on the ground in the fetal position. The victim, a 
miner, was taken under custody and forced to publicly apologize.58 Erdoğan, too, 
physically harassed a Soma resident and yelled at another: “if you boo the Prime Minister 
of this country, you get a slap.” Why did Erdoğan lose his decorum so spectacularly and 
take the Soma incident so personally?   
 
It was later revealed that Soma Holding had close connections with the government. In 
addition to the coalmine royalties, the company had enjoyed some questionable tender bids 
in Istanbul’s urban transformation campaign. But beyond cronyism, which is not unheard 
of in Turkish politics, the details of the connection between the government and the 
company insinuated a rather organic relationship that goes beyond business as usual. Based 
on miner testimonies she collected in Soma, journalist Suzy Hansen (2014) captures the 
depth of the relationship: 
A.K.P., which has been in power for more than a decade now, needed the 
coal for electricity, for construction projects and, as the miners saw, for 
gifts to dole out at election time. The country’s prime minister and now 
president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had bags of coal delivered to poor 
Turks during his last three campaigns. Most miners supported the A.K.P. 
If the party didn’t win, their bosses told them, you won’t have jobs. 
Sometimes, the miners said, they were paid their daily wage to take a bus 
to the A.K.P.'s famous, techno-thumping rallies, which often gave the 
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impression that the entire nation had gathered in impromptu parties of 
collective joy. The miners, too, waved their hands in the air and screamed. 
The question of how the people of Soma, who only ten years prior were mostly small-scale 
but self-sufficient olive producers, were convinced to work in such terrible conditions was 
answered a few months following the disaster thanks to yet another energy-related dispute. 
On November 7th, 2014 a six-acre olive grove including 6,000 mature olive trees was 
bulldozed in Yırca, a village only a twenty-minute drive away from Soma. The bulldozing 
ended a months-long confrontation during which the villagers of Yırca were intimidated, 
threatened and beaten by private security guards of the Kolin Group—another 
conglomerate that developed a stronghold in the country’s infrastructure and energy fields 
during the AKP era. The reason behind the grab and clearance of the Yırca Grove, which 
was the sole income source of some 120 households, was to build a second coal power 
plant in order to absorb the Soma mines’ overproduction. The license holder of the future 
plant, the Kolin Group, would have never acquired the Yırca Grove without the help of the 
AKP government. The Cabinet expropriated the grove only three days before the Soma 
disaster, and land use rights were leased to Kolin for 49 years for energy production 
purposes. The violent appropriation of the land was made possible by emergency 
expropriation, which will be discussed in detail in chapter 4, a procedure AKP has 
reinvented to boost infrastructure investments and that has led to the violent displacement 
of citizens with limited means. The new expropriation techniques are secured and 
supported by a series of changes in administrative law to obstruct citizens’ ability to appeal 
and to minimize court intervention, expanding AKP’s mandate over energy.  
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To be fair, the recent revival of heavy-handed state involvement in the energy field is not 
limited to the authoritarian handling of land allocations and violent suppression of energy 
disputes. For some time, AKP has been determined to assert its influence in energy, not 
only to suppress societal dissent for the market, but also to exert its authority in the market, 
a market liberalized in 2001. It is now difficult to argue that EMRA is still an independent 
regulatory agency (just like other IRAs) as envisioned by the 2001 Electricity Market Law 
(Özel, 2012: 124-125). The first signals of the regulatory capture were given by Ali 
Babacan, then-Deputy Prime Minister, when he declared that “it is time for the independent 
agencies to delegate their authority” (Bekmen, 2014: 69). True to the spirit of this position, 
AKP passed a decree in 2011 that allows relevant ministries to inspect IRAs (Ibid). My 
contacts at EMRA confirmed that the government influence in EMRA is undeniable: as 
one high-ranking expert put it “even the janitor hires need the approval of the government” 
(interview with the author, February 2014). As the government’s influence on EMRA 
grew, complaints from the sector became more visible on a variety of issues ranging from 
price mechanisms to licensing, from tendering cost and procedures to abrupt alterations in 
energy regulations.     
 
The government not only exerts its authority by increasing its grip on the market but also 
establishes alliances, demanding recognition of its authority in return for business 
opportunities. To address the slowing down of project completion in the sector and prevent 
the black market from functioning, on May 2nd, 2014 EMRA decided to seize the electricity 
production licenses of projects that do not progress in a timely manner. Initially, some 30 
companies, including pioneers in the sector, lost licenses and faced debarment from 
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operating in the energy sector for three years. Coined “May 2nd syndrome,” the decision 
threw the energy sector into disarray and led many investors into questioning the market’s 
health.59 A few months later, EMRA revised its decision and added a clause to offer 
amnesty to the barred companies if they provide evidence that would prove the delays were 
induced by factors beyond the will of the investor. Although the vacillations in energy 
policy are often resolved in a way that benefits the investor, in the final analysis, what they 
generate is the reaffirmation of the central authority over the sector. The investors I 
interviewed see these frequent changes in regulation as arbitrary and believe the 
government is influenced by societal factors such as land use disputes and price concerns. 
Yet, the sector’s disarray forces investors to lobby hard for revisions, seek government 
intervention on behalf of business and, when those demands are met, prompts them to 
establish close ties between the party and the sector.  
2.4.3 The Problem with Post-neoliberalism  
What comes after neoliberalism? Following the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 there 
has been signficant interest in the possible defeat (or retreat) of neoliberal hegemony and 
what the socio-economic order after neoliberalism would look like. For instance, 
“neoliberalism,” Cecena argued, “met its definitive end with the crisis that erupted in 2008” 
(2009: 33). Citing Karl Polanyi, Altaver added that “the inherent tendency of disembedding 
markets from society and nature has halted” as failures of capitalism became apparent in 
the financial meltdown (2009: 82). 
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2014: 18-20. 
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The interest in the end of neoliberalism stems from two primary sources: the popularization 
of critiquing neoliberalism and the spread of anti-neoliberal, anti-capitalist and anti-
austerity movements, as well as the re-appearance of state in planning post-crisis 
restructuring, either through reinstituting redistributive welfare policies or via organized 
corporate bailouts (Springer, 2015). Obviously, the two factors are closely related. 
Growing distress and resentment about the ills of capitalism has forced governments across 
the world to take Keynesian-like measures at least to alleviate the burden of the crises, 
some populist, some technocratic.   
 
While the blow to neoliberal capitalism after the global economic crisis at the discursive 
level is less questionable, whether or not it is a deathly one is debatable (see, Springer, 
2005; Peck et al., 2010). Springer (2015) reminds us that the eagerness to call the end of 
neoliberalism drives from its misconceptualization as a static set of policies. If understood 
as a process in its verb form, neoliberalization, it is already highly malleable—including 
haphazard state intervention—in its implementation. Hence, what is perceived as post-
neoliberalism could well be conceptualized as a variation of neoliberalism. 
 
Although I agree with Springer (2015, also Brand and Sekler, 2009) that the hasty 
celebration of the end of neoliberalism risks us losing sight of the continuities and 
variations in neoliberalism, I want to draw attention to the rather surprising optimism of 
post-neoliberal imaginaries. Most of these optimistic accounts, no matter how cautious or 
eager they are to announce the death of neoliberalism, associate post-neoliberalism with a 
more democratic future. Accordingly, post-neoliberalism, which heralded discontent with 
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contemporary capitalism and the state’s return to the realm of economic activity in the 
name of the public, is expected to inevitably open up more egalitarian and participatory 
opportunities rather than close them off. One of the best examples of this optimism is found 
in Grugel and Riggirozzi’s (2012) analysis of the post-crises policies undertaken by left-
leaning Latin American governments and social movements. Although they rightfully 
acknowledge that the progressive policies they choose to review operate “within the 
confines of the market-oriented export-led growth,” Grugel and Riggirozzi understand 
post-neoliberalism as “an attempt to deliver a democratic and inclusive social contract” 
(2012: 15). But what if the state’s comeback as post-neoliberal lends itself to 
authoritarianism rather than an inclusive democracy (cf. Bruff, 2014)? Is it possible that a 
potential path out of neoliberalism is to re-embed economy into society not through 
alternative economies or collective rights and welfare allowances but through a mighty 
central power that does not hesitate to use arbitrary force to address the instabilities of 
capitalism?  
 
Whether Turkey has switched gears in neoliberalism or chosen to adhere to an entirely 
different vehicle in the post-Gezi uprising period is a curious question. Particularly at a 
time when the celebrated Turkish model is in shambles (Tuğal, 2016), making sense of 
Turkey’s authoritarian turn could enhance our understanding of the contemporary nature 
of neoliberalism (or capitalism in general). There are two main problems with declaring 
the birth of authoritarian neoliberalism in Turkey via a politics of energy infrastructures. 
Scholars have already argued that authoritarianism is not exogenous to neoliberalism (Hall, 
1985, Harvey, 2005; Springer, 2009): privatizations, displacements, dispossessions all 
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require some degree of heavy-handed state involvement if not all-out violence. The very 
fact that early neoliberal experience was made possible by silencing of the political left and 
labor unions in the 1980 military intervention attests to how neoliberalism could and has 
benefitted from authoritarianism. Cronyism, on the other hand, has always played a role in 
different episodes in Turkish economic history, as mentioned above. What is qualitatively 
distinctive about the late AKP era, however, is the narrowing gap between the state, the 
government and certain factions of capital that support and finance the party (cf. Buğra and 
Savaşkan, 2014).  
 
The corruption scandal that broke out in December 2013 was unique, providing valuable 
insight regarding the nature of this new form of authoritarian cronyism in Turkey. Dubbed 
as the “mother of all corruption scandals,”60 it was based on a two-year long intelligence 
gathering activity initiated by a criminal investigation that was only possible thanks to a 
fracture in the government bloc. On the surface, the investigation was about Reza Zarrab, 
a businessman who reportedly engaged in illegal trade activity to by-pass US sanctions to 
Iran. The trade was made possible by a high-end bribe scheme in which four ministers were 
also implicated. The investigation’s cunningness was in its method. As the money and the 
relationships were traced, the probe snowballed until Erdoğan and his family members’ 
phones were tapped. After an initial panic, AKP managed to prevent the investigation from 
progressing; however, the recordings had already been leaked on YouTube in their entirety, 
making hours of audio and video surveillance available to the public.  
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The recordings were dismissed by Erdoğan as fabrication. The long list of accusations 
pointing to high-ranking AKP members, including bribery, corruption, fraud and money 
laundering, were disqualified and never taken to the courts, as AKP successfully purged 
the cadre behind the investigation. However, the hours-long private conversations available 
online (genuine or fake) provided revealing details on how the tenders for big real-estate 
and infrastructure projects were arranged, how bankrupt newspapers were distributed 
among a loyal group of businessmen and funded by a financial pool subsidized by 
infrastructure moguls, how commentaries on surrogate news channels were closely 
monitored by Erdoğan himself and how energy tycoons were expected to pay tributes to 
Erdoğan’s son (Eroğlu, 2016).  
 
Despite the detailed revelations of the leaks, AKP was not harmed by the scandal in terms 
of electoral success. Rather, the scandal alleviated the party’s deterioration following the 
Gezi Uprising that took place in the summer of 2013. AKP won the March 2014 local 
election by a safe margin and Erdoğan was elected the 12th President of Turkey in August 
2014 by gaining 52 percent of the popular vote. Although many observers explained the 
public’s indifference on the grounds of the historical ubiquity of corruption in Turkey, I 
disagree that AKP’s constituency did not care about the scandal. To the contrary, for many, 
those recordings illustrated the prowess of Erdoğan and his government in restraining the 
capital by levying, in a sense, secret taxes that could not be enforced in an open market. 
“Erdoğan” as one AKP supporter in Rize (who was also an avid proponent of HEPPs in 
the region) told me, “is so cunning, he is getting all these HEPPs done for free, generat[ing] 
 79 
energy for the country and then forc[ing] the rich to pay their fair share for the cause” 
(personal interview, March 2014). Whether “the cause” refers to the party, the government, 
the state, the people or devout Muslims is in the eye of the beholder and secondary in 
importance.  
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has traced the Turkish energy industry’s history and its transformation over 
the last hundred years. By examining how energy policies reacted to some of the 
fundamental turning points in Turkish economic history as well as how crises in energy 
triggered those transitions, the chapter clarified the continuities as well as the ruptures in 
the sector. By expanding on the remarkable development of the sector in the last decade, I 
have also argued that energy played an exceptional role in the formation of AKP’s 
hegemony and its political economy. Yet, going beyond the simple allegory that energy 
“fuels” the economy, the aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate that different energy 
policies engender different institutions, form different class coalitions and open-up and 
close down different political possibilities amounting to an influential rationality with 
repercussions beyond the field of energy (Mitchell, 2011). This emergent rationality, which 
I prefer to call energorationality, however cannot be reducible to energy alone—or its 
absence, in the case of Turkey—as it interacts with, and is fed by, diverse fields, social 
anxieties and hegemonic projects. I argue that beyond providing a lens to the last decade 
or so of Turkish economic and social policy, energy, understood as a form of rationality, 
has been instrumental first in selling the image of AKP hegemony and then helping 
legitimize its growing authoritarianism. I contend that the rising importance of energy in 
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Turkey, particularly under AKP rule, cannot be read as an automatic and inevitable 
outcome of Turkey’s energy deficit or merely as a matter of economic reality, as many 
natural resources specialists and economists prefer to theorize. In fact, throughout this 
chapter we have touched upon a number of fields that have impacted the emergent 
energorationality throughout its historical development. I have explicated that the 
historical shifts between liberal, planned and neoliberal approaches to energy governance 
not only reflects economic needs of the Republic but also ideological shifts in the ruling 
bloc, as well as global developments and altering inter and intra class positions. The 
following chapter will expand on the class dimension touched on here by focusing more 
on how energy infrastructures under particular conditions foster, or hinder, new forms of 
accumulation opportunities. My fourth chapter will examine the legal aspect of the energy 
frenzy, focusing on how legality was subjected to rationalities of energy under the disguise 
of fighting against bureaucratic tutelage.  
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C H A P T E R – T H R E E 
3 A NEW INFRASTRUCTURE FOR AN OLD 
ENERGY: UNDERSTANDING TURKEY’S 
HYDROPOWER RENAISSANCE  
 
Müjdat was my ride to one of the more accessible villages of Artvin, the 
easternmost province of Turkey, neighboring Georgia. A stream was 
running through the village, as is common in all villages in the 
Mountainous province. And like all streams of Artvin, it was targeted by a 
small hydro power plant with less than 5 MW installed capacity. We were 
supposed to meet with the village elders to hear their experiences with the 
company that holds the small hydro license. We knew that they were 
particularly eager to talk about a somewhat heated encounter with the 
subcontractors who started initial construction of the SHP. The 
subcontractors eventually had to leave, first because of local resistance 
and then thanks to a court order based on an ill-prepared environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) report. Although faith in the SHP was still 
unclear and the company’s return with better crafted paperwork was 
highly probable, this was one of many successful resistance stories in 
Artvin, and Müjdat was personally involved and excited to share it with 
me.  
We spent a couple of hours in the village, listening to the elders’ 
environmental struggle and how they attributed it to the region’s left-wing 
political heritage. We were amazed by how vigilantly the villagers 
defended their stream and were inspired by how every village in Artvin 
was collectively resisting small hydro in solidarity and in close 
cooperation with the Green Artvin Association, of which Müjdat is also a 
member. We were also surprised by the level of political argumentation 
presented by the villagers and the connections they established between 
the SHP project in their village and the state of the Turkish economy. As 
we returned to Artvin City, an administrative centre of the province, 
Müjdat  and I both felt a ghost in the car. Travelling along the once mighty 
Çoruh River one of the fastest running rivers in the world and whose deep 
valley cuts the province in half, we saw that it was no longer running as a 
result of a series of large dams erected on its course.   
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Artvin, the anti-small hydro opposition stronghold of the country is also 
host to some of the nation’s largest dams in operation (or under 
construction). Curiously, these dams receive with little objection from the 
people of Artvin, most of whom are aware of the environmental sacrifice 
zone status. Müjdat did not wait for my prompt and addressed the ghost 
of Çoruh: “[if] we had acted earlier”, he told me in sighs, “both the river 
and the stream could have been recued easily.” When he realized I was 
not satisfied by the kind of apologetic answers that characterized his point, 
he shifted to a more intimate mode. “Well, if you want me to be honest 
with you, here is my answer!” he started to whisper as if he was ready to 
reveal the secret. Some fifty years ago, he explained, every single 
household had a relative lost in the rapids of the Çoruh. “It is simply too 
big, too strong” he reminded me. “No one could imagine those dams, 
which have been rumoured about for decades, could ever be built one day. 
And when they started to build them it was too late. I mean, after all, who 
could ever stop the dam that stops Çoruh the Great?” (Personal interview, 
August 2013). 
 
Pipes, airports, wires, sewage, dams, ports, highways, bridges, railroads and cables—
Infrastructures matter. And not only in a narrow and rather dull techno-policy sense; they 
matter politically, economically, materially, discursively and affectively. Infrastructures 
are enablers. They are built networks that enable other networks to work by facilitating the 
flow of goods, services, people, ideas and resources (cf. Larkin, 2013). Access to urban 
infrastructure designates the worth of a neighborhood. The distribution of infrastructures 
across regions, cities and districts reflect socio-economics inequalities and further reinforce 
them. Populations are governed from afar thanks to the efficient penetration of 
infrastructures or their selective and differential utilization. The absence of infrastructure 
defines underdevelopment and a place’s distance from modernity. Infrastructures often 
draw the perceived line between nature and society and exemplify humankind's so-called 
dominance over nature. It is infrastructures that help us to compress time and space. Some 
infrastructures fail spectacularly, producing unwanted byproducts which are expected to 
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be addressed by yet another set of infrastructures. Certain infrastructures are sources of 
awe and desire, while many are considered uninteresting and rendered invisible as the 
environmental justice literature has illustrated. And in some cases, like Müjdat’s 
explication of human perception of, and interaction with, infrastructures, they can never be 
taken for granted. They are outcomes of complex entanglements of magnitude, and are 
shaped by both geography and history. 
 
My dissertation research takes its cue from an ostensibly simple yet curious question that 
dispels the taken for grantedness of infrastructures as predictable edifices: what is it that 
makes small hydropower plants (aka small hydro or SHP) so central to both Turkey’s 
recent energy drive and its counter environmental mobilization, given that the country is 
already a global frontrunner in large dams? Based on a close reading of the small hydro 
boom and an analysis of project sites, investors, infrastructure contractors, hydropower 
bureaucrats, energy fairs and panels, this chapter (and the next) illustrates the kind of power 
infrastructural networks generate at the intersection of the state, markets and nature. It is 
important to note that I am not interested in small hydro for small hydro’s sake. Yet, it is 
only by interrogating the technical qualities of an infrastructure like small hydro that one 
can fully grasp the social, economic and political tensions triggered by the emergence and 
spread of energorationality.   
 
This chapter is composed of four sections. In the first section, I will overview some 
contemporary approaches to the study of infrastructure to better elucidate the analytical 
importance of focusing on small hydro. The next section introduces small hydro technology 
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and expands on the underlying reasons for the infrastructure’s popularization across the 
global South. The third section traces the general characteristics of the small hydro boom 
in Turkey and locates it in the country’s hydropower renaissance. Section four discusses 
the spatial role small hydro has played in the geographical expansion of Turkey’s energy 
politics as well as neoliberal authoritarianism. The next chapter will further elaborate the 
role small hydro played in the emergence of the private energy sector.  
3.1 WHY STUDY INFRASTRUCTURES? 
In recent years, infrastructures have captured the attention of researchers from diverse 
social science disciplines. Many anthropologists, architects, geographers, sociologists, 
environmental studies scholars and urban researchers have begun to take infrastructures 
“more seriously,” either by directly focusing on them or designing research that is heavy 
informed by built structures otherwise neglected in their mundane invisibility. It is certainly 
not the first time that dams, roads and airports are highlighted in research articles, 
dissertations and books written by social scientists. What distinguishes the contemporary 
interest from earlier examples is an analytical effort to bring infrastructures to the 
foreground rather than treating them as background information or not ‘a given’. 
Influenced by science and technology studies, the current focus on infrastructures seeks to 
find fresh and revealing perspectives in the “imbrication of infrastructures and human 
organization” (Star, 1999: 379). Studying infrastructures should not be a naïve involvement 
in empiricism; it is an interest in the “complex and contingent contractedness of techno-
systems” (Ferguson, 2012: 558).  More than being mere backdrops, or systems of substrates 
performing an assigned function (Ibid: 380), infrastructures are assemblages of multiples 
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pieces, an amalgamation of technological, political and financial techniques (Larkin, 2013: 
330). In this sense, what is studied through an inquiry into infrastructures is not a thing; it 
is always a relationship (Star, 1999: 379, citing Bateson, 1978: 249). While energy is 
central to my research as an emergent form of rationality, the real potent of techniques of 
governance become discernable in the concreteness of physical structures. My emphasis 
on small hydro is motivated precisely by the unexpected ability of this infrastructure to 
bring together divergent and often conflicting relations, ideas, actors and geographies.  
 
This is not to suggest, however, that small hydro developments (or infrastructures in 
general) are a seamless fabric embracing and concealing difference and conflict in 
perfection. To the contrary, infrastructures eventually (sometimes expectedly) fail. When 
they perform, more often than not they perform selectively, rendering certain populations 
and geographies worthwhile while marginalizing others in disconnection and abjection 
(Anand, 2012; Rodger and O’Neill, 2012).  
 
Similar to their socially stratifying effect, some infrastructures serve certain communities 
at the expense of others. As Star aptly puts it “one person’s infrastructure is other person’s 
difficulty” (1999: 380). This is particularly valid for infrastructures that heavily depend on 
extractive techniques. The provision end of an infrastructure rarely resembles its extractive 
end. Energy infrastructures in particular expand over multiple locations and perform 
diverging functions at different scales. The immanent threat of climate change and the 
technologies proposed to mitigate its effects attest to the scalar challenges of energy 
infrastructures. Howe et al. point to the paradox of infrastructures in that they “both 
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mitigate and magnify precarity in the Anthropocene” (2016: 555). Significantly, this 
paradox is not between different and competing forms of infrastructures; the same 
infrastructure could produce different environmental outcomes at different scales. While 
renewable energy infrastructures offer solutions to alleviate some of the problems caused 
by more conventional carbon-based energy infrastructures, their success at the global scale 
will eventually be based on how and to what extent they are implemented on a local scale 
(Boyer, 2012). Given that small hydropower plants contribute to global climate mitigation 
perspectives and implementations as a carbon-free renewable alternative, we must 
interrogate whether they are perceived as such in the valleys and villages in which they are 
being built.  
 
Fortunately, the contemporary literature on infrastructures is increasingly cognizant of 
uneven geographical development and the utilization of built technologies. While they 
share a great deal in common, scholars acknowledge that infrastructures in the global South 
perform differently than their counterparts in the global North, if they perform or exist at 
all (Howe et al., 2016). The better-life promise of infrastructures, for the most part, is still 
captivating in the global South.  The affective allure, or what Harvey and Knox call the 
“enchantment” of infrastructures, is alive and well in the parts of the world yet to enjoy the 
benefits of development. What is interesting about the infrastructures in the global South, 
however, is not their lack (in fact, some metropoles of the global South use top-notch 
technological systems, infrastructure in many parts of the post-industrial world are prone 
to decay). Rather, the variations in infrastructural implementation are characterized by 
innovative forms of translation (adaptation of infrastructures to local culture and 
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geography) and doubling (utilization of infrastructures for alternative functions) (Latour, 
1993; Larkin, 2013). Comparing Turkey’s small hydro boom with theır counterparts 
throughout the world illustrates that the real significance of infrastructures unfolds in their 
local context as they often fulfill different functions than they are built to serve. 
 
Another aspect of infrastructures regularly emphasized in the literature is the ideological 
load they carry. In his work on contemporary Soviet urban infrastructure and architecture, 
Humphrey (2005) reminds us that ideology is a form of political practice manifested in 
material objects as much as it is inscribed in texts and speeches. Infrastructures—the way 
they are constructed, distributed, function—reveal a great deal about state formation and 
power. In fact, more than being a mere material embodiment of state authority, some 
infrastructures construct state spaces by drawing new landscapes and transforming the old 
(Brenner and Elden, 2009; Harvey and Knox, 2012; Rodgers and O’Neill, 2012). While 
the ideological messages infrastructures convey rarely disseminate without becoming lost 
in translation—meaning that their ideological massages have certain limits— (Harvey and 
Knox, 2012), as collectively experienced commonly shared spaces, infrastructures often 
reflect a sense of publicness despite their socio-ecological failures.  
 
The field of public infrastructures is changing at an alarming pace undermining their public 
value. Emerging markets invest in large scale projects at an unprecedented rate while 
infrastructure is undergoing a revival in the global North as a part of post-crisis stimulus 
efforts. Dubbed as “the biggest investment boom in human history,” approximately $ 6-9 
trillion is spent on large-scale infrastructure projects annually, amounting to 8 percent of 
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total global GDP (Lyvbjerg, 2014). While some projects are funded, constructed and 
owned by the public, many of today’s infrastructures are private, complicating the public 
qualities of them. This chapter specifically addresses this tension embedded in private 
infrastructures and questions how state authority and the publicness of infrastructures 
become a matter of negotiation under particular market conditions and in light of 
speculation.  
3.2 SMALL IS THE NEW LARGE: REVIVAL OF SMALL 
HYDROPOWER PLANTS 
 
Up until the late 2000s, there was only one word in the Turkish vernacular to describe the 
infrastructures of hydropower. Baraj (adapted from French le barrage, or “dam” in 
English) was used to indiscriminately refer to a large variety of hydraulic structures 
whether used for irrigation, consumption or energy. In the last decade, however, Turkey 
has witnessed the penetration of a new term in everyday parlance. HES, short for 
hidroelektrik santrali (hydroelectric power plant), is now the term used most frequently to 
refer to majority of hydropower structures. One notable exception to this timeline is State 
Hydraulic Works (SHW), for which HES has always been the technically preferred way of 
indexing hydroelectric power plants. The adoption of the term HES by the general public, 
for whom linguistic abbreviations are uncommon, is new and unexpected.   
 
This seemingly trivial change in terminology, in fact, shows a great deal about Turkey’s 
hydropower renaissance. In the last decade and a half, with the liberalization of the energy 
sector, the country’s hydropower portfolio has been dominated by a new form of 
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infrastructure technically know as small hydropower plants in principle, small hydro is not 
much different from large hydro. Each harnesses the power of a river by letting water pass 
through the blades of a turbine. As the turbine rotates under the pressure of moving water, 
a generator attached to the turbine creates electrical power. However, small hydropower 
plants require a new name as they look nothing like a baraj, which has a well established 
image in the collective memory, indeed it is featured on the now defunct one billion lira 
bill.61  
3.2.1 Small vs. Large Hydro: A Matter of MWs? 
The primary difference between large and small hydro is that the latter does not require a 
large reservoir—the hydrologic feature that makes a hydropower plant a baraj—to operate. 
Instead, a typical small hydro exploits the vertical distance between two sections of a river 
by directly capturing its kinetic energy without collecting and elevating river water in a 
reservoir, although it might make a small foray to regulate the water’s intake (see Figure 
3.1). (1) The highest point of the system becomes the intake; (2) from the intake, the stream 
is diverted into a channel or a tunnel that follows the counter of a hillside to bypass the 
riverbed; (3) when optimal vertical distance is reached, the stream in the channel is left to 
free flow inside a pressurized penstock pipe; (4) and is finally released  back to the river 
bed after going through turbines inside a powerhouse. 
                                                
61 TL 1,000,000 banknote, which features Ataturk Hydropower Plant on its back side, was in circulation 
between 1995 and 2004 until Turkish Lira redenomination by the removal of six zeros from the currency.    
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Figure 3.1: A Typical Small Hydro Plan 
 
Courtesy by Deniz Erk and Bertan  Kılıçcıoğlu 
Despite the dissimilarity in physical infrastructure, the differences between small hydro 
and large hydro are not always officially recognized. Small hydro is rarely acknowledged 
as a separate energy infrastructure category. Data of small hydro, for example, is rarely 
parsed out and usually falls into a generic hydropower category. The European Small 
Hydropower Association (ESHA) defines small hydropower as “a plant with an installed 
capacity of up to 10 MW.”62 However, 10 MW is not a mutually agreed upon metric for 
identifying small hydro. The threshold for small hydro is as low as 1.5 MW in Sweden, as 
high as 30 MW in Brazil, and even 50 MW in China and Canada (IPCC, 2015: 450).SHW 
                                                
62 ESHA brochure. Available at http://www.esha.be/fileadmin/esha_files/documents/Policy/ESHA-Policy_ 
sheets_-_new.pdf (accessed 20 May 2016). 
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of Turkey does not differentiate HEPPs according to their size, but according to the facility 
type. SHW recognizes two categories: HEPPs with dams and run-of-the-river HEPPs. This 
classification however does not tell us much about the size of the plant. This is because 
while almost all SHPs are run-of-the-river, not all run-of-the-river HEPPs are small. The 
MW yardstick in the Turkish case is regulated by the EIA Bylaw, which requires an EIA 
review for HEPPs with an installed capacity larger than 10 MW. However, until 2000, that 
threshold was as high as 50 MW. In 2002, it was lowered to 10 MW from 25 MW thanks 
to a revision in EIA bylaw. Prior to 2011, many sizable projects were built without ever 
being subjected to an environmental assessment.   
3.2.2 Something Old, Something New 
In a world where states desperately seek new methods to harness utilizable power, small 
hydro is an old technology, despite the interest it is currently attracting. It is, in fact, the 
oldest mode of generating electricity for mass consumption and certainly proceeds the 
advent of large dams.63 The first small hydropower plants were water mills which were 
readily available across the world for hundreds of years as a power source for grinding, 
rolling and hammering. Beginning in the mid-19th century, mills were replaced by water 
turbines  (Paish, 2002: 538). With the improvements in dam engineering and the political 
and financial support of the state-hydraulic paradigm (Bakker, 2005; Linton, 2010), more 
power could be harnessed at once by blocking rivers with concrete and rock to store more 
water. The fırst half of the 20th century, thus, was the advent of large-scale hydropower in 
                                                
63 The first ever urban street electrification was achieved in Surrey Town of Godalming in 1881 thanks to 
hydropower. An alternator was attached to a watermill located on River Wey, a tributary of Thames 
(Tulker, 1977: 126).   
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which small hydro was gradually sidelined with a few exceptional geographies (Paish, 
2002: 539). 
 
Contemporary small hydro is not significantly different from the primitive models of the 
early 19th century. The main difference is that while the watermills were as powerful as the 
natural flow of the river, now that we are able to manipulate the fall, volume, and speed of 
the stream by letting water pass through a tunnel system, contemporary models can harness 
more power. In fact, even rerouting a stream is not a new technology altogether. Ancient 
engineers were aware that watermills worked more efficiently when a stream was directed 
to the mill in a more controlled fashion. Nevertheless, developments in tunneling 
technology and the plummeting cost of tunneling equipment have made the most ambitious 
small hydro projects—which basically require rerouting streams within a closed tunnel 
system for miles to exploit a higher head (vertical distance between two river sections)—
possible and affordable.  
 
Despite questions about whether differentiating hydropower plants by size scientifically 
makes sense64, there has been a concerted effort in the last two and a half decades to 
recognize small hydro as a distinct energy infrastructure. The European Small Hydro 
Association (ESHA) was established in 1989 as a founding member of the European 
Renewable Energy Council. The International Center on Small Hydro Power (ICSHP) was 
                                                
64 An IPCC report entitled “Renewable Energy Resources and Climate Change Mitigation” (2012) that 
provides facts and figures on small hydro and lists its advantages nevertheless states that “Classification 
according to size, while both common and administratively simple, is –to a degree– arbitrary: concepts like 
‘small’ or ‘large hydro’ are not technically or scientifically rigorous indicators of impacts, economics or 
characteristics” (441). 
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founded in 1996 as a non-profit institution under the auspices of United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization. 
3.2.3 The Anti-Large Dam Momentum 
The discovery of small hydro as a distinct category, unsurprisingly, corresponds to an era 
in which large dams, particularly in the global South, received heavy criticism and were 
widely protested due to their social and environmental impacts. The resentment toward  
large dams culminated in the commissioning of the World Commission on Dams, which 
was initiated by the World Bank and the World Conservation Union (IUCN). In its final 
report the World Commission on Dams seriously questioned the social, environmental and 
economic worth of large dams, concluding that “an unacceptable and often unnecessary 
price has been paid to secure those benefits, especially in social and environmental terms, 
by people displaced, by communities downstream, by taxpayers, and by the natural 
environment” (WCD, 2000: xviii). As large dams fell from grace and large-scale 
developmental projects started to be criticized severely, small hydro emerged as the safer 
investment model in the hydro world. International environmental organizations such as 
Rivers Internatıonal and Greenpeace also pointed out the untapped potential of small hydro 
as cheap, sustainable, locally designed, financed, and executed solutions that could help 
tackle growing energy problems in the global South65. To their credit, small hydro solutions 
                                                
65 Rivers International, the pioneer of international river conservation and ardent opponent of large dams, is 
known for its support for small hydro as an alternative to large dams. In a 2010 report the organization 
express an optimism for small hydro as such: “it became clear that smaller primarily locally financed, built 
and managed projects could help meet Nepal’s electricity needs in a more affordable way. Today, many 
smaller hydro projects have been built throughout the country, increasing generation capacity by 294 MW. 
These alternatives, which took less time to develop and were primarily locally designed and built, provide 
electricity at about half the cost of the original Arun III proposal” (Rivers International, 2010). Greenpeace, 
too, pointed to small hydro as a viable alternative—for example, as a response to Brazil’s aggressive dam 
campaign along the Amazon. Greenpeace suggested that instead of damming the Amazon, Brazil should 
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have provided some social benefits in Asia and Africa by contributing to rural 
electrification efforts (ICSHP, 2013).  
 
The unexpected hit that large dams took from a well-organized coalition of grassroots and 
environmental activists from the global South and North triggered a small scale chain 
reaction in the world of water management. Coupled with concerns over the quality and 
price of the water, the opposition against the large dams challenged “modern water,” or the 
idea that water can be managed uniformly and effectively by keeping ecological, cultural 
and political factors at a distance (Linton, 2010: 8). The challenge reverberated at  World 
Bank headquarters–the primary financier of the large dams–forcing the bank to reconsider 
its funding and evolutions schemes (Goldman, 2006). Although, it is difficult to argue that 
the global anti-large movement marked an end to large-dam construction, finding financial 
resources for controversial projects has been quite challenging since the 1990s. Anti-large 
dam struggles are now more visible at the global scale, which has led to delays and even 
the cancelation of many large scale projects although the reputation loss fail to threaten 
government funded large scale projects such as the Three Gorges Dam in China.  
3.2.4 Small Hydro as the Infrastructure of Self-Reliance? The Chinese 
Experience 
The Chinese experience with small hydro deserves special attention, as more than one third 
of world small hydro capacity is located in China. Thanks to different waves of anti-poverty 
campaigns, China managed to electrify 95 percent of its countryside between the 1960s 
                                                
launch a renewables campaign which could be “complemented with… retrofitting or repowering ageing 
dams [and] building small hydro plants…” (Greenpeace, 2014). 
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and 1990s (Zhang and Kumar, 2011: 774). This was achieved through a variety of small 
sized power plants, first and foremost small hydro. Small hydro has helped local 
electrification, as establishing new local grids was cheaper than expanding existing central 
grid in a country like China where a large rural population is dispersed across a vast 
territory. Chinese electrification efforts picked up speed in late 1970s. As the central 
government handed over the management of local electricity system to the local 
governments, municipalities, and village communities their number, diffusion, popularity 
and effectiveness grew (Peng and Pan, 2006). In 2002, China accounted for 15 GW of the 
world’s then-small hydro capacity of 40 GW (Paish, 2002: 540). The last phase of China’s 
rural electrification campaign started in 2001 and was called the China Renewable Energy 
Rural Electrification Program. Around 8 million people in 2000 townships benefitted from 
the program, which relied on 377 new small hydropower plants and mini grids (Zang and 
Kumar, 2011: 774).  
 
What is noteworthy about China’s utilization of small hydro in rural electrification is that 
the entire program was originally promoted as a collectivist self-reliance campaign under 
the motto “self-construction, self-management and self-consumption” (Bhattacharyya and 
Ohiare, 2011: 679). True to this self-reliance principle, China’s small hydro portfolio is 
composed of very small hydropower plants with capacities below 500 kW (Paish, 2002). 
But beyond its technical capacity, Peng and Pan (2006) stress that China’s the social 
emphasis on small hydro led to the rural electrıfıcation campaign’s development 
component. They suggest that developing rural electrification through the use of local 
means and actors was “not just to offer electricity access to rural areas but to maximize the 
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function of electricity” in boosting agricultural production, educational development as 
well as the local economy (Ibid: 84). Inspired by the Chinese experience, the aim of ICSHP, 
which was founded under the auspices of the United Nations, was to export small hydro 
led electrification to other parts of the global South as a local development model.  
 
While the connection between small hydro and rural development is noteworthy, we should 
not overlook the fact that China is now a world leader, not only in small hydro but 
hydropower in general, and is unapologetic about it. China’s enormous Three Gorges Dam 
on the Yangtze River is a point of national pride and the world’s largest power station (with 
22,500 MW entire capacity, it is almost equal to Turkey’s total hydropower capacity). 
Importantly, its construction displaced an estimated 1.2 million people (Hemin et al., 2001: 
201). Therefore, the fact that celebrated rural electrification campaigns pioneered by small 
hydro take place simultaneously with mega development projects conducted by the central 
government at the expense of displacing and dispossessing local people. Nevertheless, the 
history of small hydro in China, once read against the Turkish case below, helps us to 
appreciate the conjunctural determinacy of energy politics by illustrating how very similar 
energy infrastructures can generate diverse outcomes when applied in different contexts 
and for different political goals. 
3.2.5 Climate Change and The Renewables Turn 
The relevance of small hydro has been further augmented in the last decade as the climate 
change agenda has gradually grown into a major policy issue. Relying on mature 
technology, hydropower is in an advantageous position compared to others options. While 
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the symbolic infrastructures of the renewables turn are wind and solar, hydropower is still 
the most attainable and affordable energy source for many countries. For instance, although 
global renewable energy capacity, excluding hydropower, grew 85 fold from 2004 to 2014, 
more MWs were added in hydropower during the same period than to any other renewable 
energy generation system (REN21, 2015: 19). This comparison is particularly remarkable 
when we consider that countries in the global North have (almost) already realized their 
hydro potentials.  
 
Although the renewables turn on paper can benefit every forms of hydro, as a minimally 
intrusive run-of-the-river technology, small-hydro projects have attracted particular 
attention.66 Hydropower projects are the largest contributors to Joint Implementation (JM) 
and Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM), and therefore, to the carbon emissions 
markets (IPCC, 2012: 457). With minimum inundation issues, small hydro projects are 
well-positioned for such mechanisms.  
 
For example, the World Bank revised its approach to hydropower and started to put more 
emphasis on small hydro. From 2003 to 2008, 48 percent of the World Bank’s hydropower 
funds were directed towards small scale run-of-the-river projects, while larger dams with 
storage accounted for 28 percent of their expenditure (World Bank, 2009). The European 
Union, which has committed to a relatively protectionist Water Framework Directive 
                                                
66 Despite large dams improved their image thanks to the renewables turn their status as a sustainable 
technology is still debated and the proponents of the large dams feel to make their case with every single 
Project and find new terminology such as sustainable hydro to carve a respectable space fort he technology. 
(Frey and Linke, 2002; Vucijak et al., 2013) 
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(2013) to protect water quality across the continent, has recently begun to recognize small 
hydro as a separate entity:   
Small hydropower schemes are mainly run-of-river with no need to create 
a reservoir. Because of this fact, small hydropower systems can be 
considered an environmentally friendly energy conversion option, since 
they do not interfere significantly with river flows and fit in well with the 
surroundings. The advantages of small hydropower plants are numerous 
and include grid stability, reduced land requirements, local and regional 
development and good opportunities for technologies export.67  
While the climate change mitigation goals make renewables, including small hydro 
projects, much more desirable, it is an empirical question if interest in renewables stems 
from climate change or the financial and technological opportunities offered and 
conditioned by these goal. While, at macro level answering this question maybe of 
secondary importance, success of renewable technologies depends on their implementation 
on local scale. Turkey’s discovery of small hydro attest to this dilemma.  
3.3 TURKEY’S SILENT DISCOVERY OF SMALL HYDRO 
Small hydro is the most ubiquitous energy infrastructure in contemporary Turkey; it is the 
locomotive of its energy market and the central pillar of its hydropower renaissance. In 
2002 there were 71 small hydropower plants with capacities under 10 MW in the country 
(Balat, 2009: 2157). In May 2016, the number of licensed small hydropower plants, 
including those under construction and past the planning stage, numbered 451. When 
current plans are completed in 2023, the centennial of the Republic and the deadline for all 
official investments and projects, Turkey is expected to have increased its small hydro 
                                                
67 European Commission, research and innovation web page, energy section, 11 August 2015 URL. 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/eu/index_en.cfm?pg=research-hydropower (accessed 30 June 2016). 
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portfolio by almost sevenfold in two decades. However, like Turkey does not categorize 
hydropower plants by size, it also does not have a dedicated small hydro program. What’s 
more, there is no special initiative for small hydro. Turkey’s Renewable Energy Law, 
which was passed in 2005, includes hydropower indiscriminately, and hydropower of all 
sizes enjoy the same feed-in tariffs. On the other hand, carbon trading is not a motivation 
for Turkish small hydro, as the country is only eligible to engage in voluntary markets. 
Despite the global reputation of small hydro as a renewable technology, it is not easy to 
suggest that small hydro is a central pillar of a well thought out renewables campaign in 
Turkey. To its credit, the government has committed to increasing the share of renewable 
sources in the country’s installed capacity to 30 percent by 2023. However, it is unclear 
how and to what extend this target informs actual policy preferences, given that there are 
80 new coal power plant projects to be constructed in the next decade (Carrington, 2015) 
while the distribution of solar farm licenses has just begun.  
 
Moreover, unlike many countries in the global South, Turkey’s interest in small hydro is 
not for rural electrification. Small hydropower plants are connected to the central grid and 
thus do not provide off-grid advantages for the local communities that inhabit the area 
where they are built. Access to electricity is not a primary issue in Turkey; the 
electrification ratio has been at 100 percent at least for two decades. We must ask, then, 
what explains the small hydro phenomenon in Turkey? I argue that interest in small hydro 
as a form of infrastructure not only defines Turkey’s energy frenzy in many aspects, but 
can only be understood within the constraints of that frenzy. The proliferation of small 
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hydro in Turkey is directly related to its construction as well as to the needs and capacities 
of the private energy market and the politics of infrastructure in the Turkish economy.  
3.3.1 Quantifying Turkey’s Small Hydro Boom 
I begin by location the small hydro boom within the boundaries of Turkey’s hydropower 
renaissance. By adding 21.85 GW of new capacity, Turkey became the fourth fastest 
growing nation in power capacity in 2014 behind China, Brazil, and Canada–three of the 
top five largest countries on earth (REN21, 2015: 20). Following the energy industry’s 
liberalization, which succeeded a series of laws and regulations passed in the 2000s (see 
Chapter 2 for details), hydropower has begun an unprecedented growth trend with the 
involvement of new private actors. Between 2003 and 2015, Turkey’s installed capacity in 
hydropower jumped from 12,000 MW to 24,000 MW. In other words, the installed capacity 
operationalized within twelve years exceeded the total amount operationalized before the 
reign of AKP. According to the projections made for the Republic’s centennial—with the 
completion of those that are in planning phase—Turkey’s total hydropower installed 
capacity is expected to double once again, almost to the level of 48,000 MW. This means 
the number of total hydropower plants, which numbered 531 in August 2015, will hit 
almost 1,400 by 2023, with the completion of 133 projects currently under construction 
and another 721 projects that are at the planning stage (see Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1: Development of Turkey’s Hydropower Potential (August 2015) 
Projects Ownershıp Number of PLANTS 
Capacıty 
(MW) 
 
In operatıon 
 
SHW 65 12,369 
%54.8 
Private 396 10,599 
Other 76 2,333 
Total 537 25,301 
under constructıon 
SHW 4 1,940 
%14,8 Private 129 4,901 
Total 133 6,841 
Planded 
SHW 82 1,582 
%30,4 Private 639 12,429 
Total 721 14,011 
       
Total Projected 
(2023 Targets) 
SHW 151 15,891 
%73,2 Private  1,164 27,929 
Other  76 2,333 
TOTAL 1,391 46,153  
   Source: State Hydraulic Works (SHW) Department of Hydroelectric Energy Data 
The most pronounced characteristic of Turkey’s hydropower renaissance is the ownership 
structure of the power plants, which is changing rapidly from public to private. Not only 
are an overwhelming majority of new power plants are private enterprises, SHW have 
privatized most of its portfolio, with the exception of the largest, most strategic ones.  In 
2003, for example, well before the transition to the licensed distribution system in 
hydroelectricity, only one tenth of the country’s hydropower capacity was owned and 
operated by private companies. The private sector-state ratio for the installed capacity 
skyrocketed from its 2003 1:10 level to 1:1 in 2014. It is projected that this ratio will be 
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updated in 2023 as 3:2 in favor of the private sector. When we repeat the same comparison 
by number of plants instead of capacity, the juxtaposition only becomes more striking. By 
2013, 83 percent of hydropower plants will be private. According to SHW, private 
entrepreneurs spent approximately 16 billion dollars for the 362 new SHPs that went into 
operation in the 11 years since 2003. The magnitude of the investment currently planned 
by the private sector for the completion of the SHPs that will go into operation from now 
through 2023 is expected to be around 60 billion dollars. In early 2015, the number of 
HEPPs being built by the private sector was 139, while for SHW the number was only 4. 
 
If privatization is the bread of Turkey’s hydropower renaissance, small hydro is its butter. 
Almost half of the hydropower licenses (451 of 913) approved by EMRA are composed of 
projects with capacities smaller than 10 MW (see Table 3.2). However, because of their 
size, their contribution in terms of power is not proportional to their number. In other 
words, there are too many plants with too little cumulative contribution to the country’s 
electric production potential; 49 percent of the plants make up a mere 6 percent of country’s 
the capacity.  
Table 3.2: Hydropower Plants in Turkey by Installed Capacity 
 
 
Number of 
Plants 
   % in Total 
Number 
Plants 
 
Capacity 
(MW) 
 
% in Total 
Capacity 
< 9.9 MW 451 49.40 % 2,162   6.42 % 
10-24.9 MW 227 24.86 % 3,620 10.75 % 
25-49.9 MW 115 12.60 % 4,005 11.90 % 
50-99.9 MW 55 6.02 % 3,852 11.44 % 
100-499.9 MW 54 5.91 % 9,844 29.24 % 
500-999.9 MW 8 0.88 % 4,644 13.80 % 
1000 < MW 3 0.33 % 5,535 16.44 % 
TOTAL 913 100 % 33661 100 % 
             Source: Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) – Electricity License Data 
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The smallest 451 SHPs combined are not worth one Atatürk Dam (the largest hydropower 
plant in the country) in terms of capacity of generated electricity. Given that most future 
projects–there are around 500 projects in line for EMRA licenses–are small in installed 
capacity, it is fair to suggest that Turkey’s hydropower portfolio will be dominated (in 
terms of number of facilities) by small hydro once 2023 targets are met.     
3.4 PRIVATIZATION AND SPACE: MAKING ROOM FOR 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Small hydro may contribute little in terms of power; however, they have had a sizable 
spatial impact on the Turkish countryside. With few exceptions, the geography of the 
hydropower renaissance is different from Turkey’s traditional hydropower geography. 
Large dams are more suitable for old powerful rivers with huge discharge capabilities; high 
heads are not attainable in short distances. These old Turkish rivers, and thus large dams, 
are located in the northern and southern ends of Central Anatolia (along the Kızılırmak-
Yesilırmak Basin in the North or Seyhan-Ceyhan Basin in the South), most notably in 
Turkish Kurdistan along the Tigris and Euphrates watershed. Until the mid-2000s, 
hydropower and dams were associated with the Tigris and Euphrates, the Kurdish 
geography and the Southeastern Anatolia Project (see Chapter-2). With the advent of small 
hydro, however, the geography of hydropower in Turkey has completely changed. Small 
hydro is ideal for mountainous regions where young seasonal streams with relatively 
moderate discharges flow with large heads (Paish, 2002). Small hydro requires river head 
rather than water volume, and thus penetrates into new geographies that have never been 
dammed before. The distribution of hydropower plants across Turkey’s provinces attests 
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to this fact. Figure 3.1 illustrates how Turkey’s hydropower projects are scattered across 
the country’s 81 provinces.68 Small hydro projects are concentrated in a number of 
provinces (particularly those in the Eastern Black Sea Region) which had close to no 
energy infrastructures until the mid 2000s. Trabzon, Rize, Artvin, Ordu, Giresun in the 
Eastern Black Sea Region (EBSR), and Maraş and Antalya in the Mediterranean Region 
have become the ultimate hydropower centers of the country in a few years thanks to the 
number of projects they have hosted, even though the power generated by those projects 
may not be very significant.69 What these provinces have in common are high precipitation 
rates, mountainous topography and sizable altitude differences in short distances that 
would enable high head stream formation.   
                                                
68 The data used for the map is from 2010 when the 2023 projections were more optimistic (1800+ instead 
of current estimation of 1400+) in terms of the number of hydropower plants. Despite the fact that many 
projects have been canceled, the distribution of the plants has not changed. The reasons underlying this 
shrinkage will be discussed later in the chapter.    
69 Artvin, where the dialog between Müjdat and I took place, is an exception in the sense that the province 
hosts both large and small components of the hydropower renaissance.   
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Figure 3.2: Hydropower Plant Intensity of Province 
 
                                         DATA: TMMOB, 2010. Hydropower plant projections decreased by 20 percent since 2010 
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The spatial footprint of small hydro is not limited to opening up new geographies to the 
infiltration of energy generation infrastructures. In many cases, it is the intensity of small 
hydro and the sudden inflation of energy infrastructures in valleys with sizable rural 
populations that explains the curious case of anti-small hydro activism in Turkey. Because 
the small hydro boom in Turkey is not driven by rural electrification and the electricity 
produced by the plants is transmitted to the central grid, the projects are not constrained by 
local needs and demands. As a result, the streams suitable for small hydro are exploited by 
multiple back-to-back projects in which one plant channels the stream into a new diversion 
system at the point where a previous plant discharges.  
 
There are several ways to explain the proliferation of small hydro. The first is as simple as 
arguing that “it is now their turn.”  As a strategic choice, “SHW understandably,” as a 
senior SHW bureaucrat told me, “preferred to complete the most ambitious, the largest 
projects” in the 1970s, and 1980s. Therefore, “it should not be surprising that what [was] 
left behind, with some notable exceptions, are smaller projects” (personal interview, 
January 2015). From the perspective of energy supply security, it makes sense to complete 
the most ambitious projects first to assure maximum energy per investment. That is why 
today we have more small hydro projects than large ones. However, jaw-dropping volume 
and speed of the small hydro boom is still in need of further explanation. How could, for 
example, a 55 km deep valley (Solaklı, Trabzon) be planned to host a total of 36 small 
hydropower plants? What is the logic behind approving more than a hundred small hydro 
projects in Rize, a province that is much smaller than Delaware in area?70 According to 
                                                
70 Rize is 1513 square miles while Delaware, the second smallest state of the USA, is 1954 square miles. 
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which master plan were hydropower licenses distributed? To what extent was Turkey’s 
small hydro boom envisioned and monitored by state authorities?   
 
I have directed these questions to current and past SHW personnel to get an idea of how 
the boom is perceived by the experts and architects of the water-energy nexus in Turkey, 
at least prior to its eventual liberalization. Although most bureaucrats were torn between 
the record-breaking expansion of hydropower capacity and the diminishing control of 
SHW over the quality of energy infrastructure, only a few went so far as to challenge the 
industry’s liberalization. Trained in SHW in 1990s, when the institution was underinvested 
with the expectation that liberalization was imminent, most water-energy bureaucrats 
whom I spoke with were pleased to see that hydropower plants are blossoming across the 
country. A limited number of opponents either revised their positions or, as a mid-ranking 
officer cynically told me, retired to start careers in the private sector. This does not mean 
that SHW personnel approved of the private sector altogether. They often complained 
about the built-quality of some plants and certainly did not approve of how the plants that 
are recklessly constructed with no respect to the social and natural environment. Their 
apologetic complains, however, stem from professional competition rather than a systemic 
critique. They disparage, and rightfully so, some of the new actors and ambitious bosses in 
the field and point to rookiness and greed as the root factors underlying some of the 
shortcomings the sector has been experiencing. Even the most progressive SHW 
bureaucrats rarely question privatization, “not because [they] are in love with companies, 
but because there is no other way” to reduce the energy deficit as one retired SHW 
bureaucrat put it (Personal interview, April).   
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Despite the cynical TINA attitude of water-energy bureaucrats, a closer look at the way the 
hydropower sector has opened up for investors is definitive proof that some alternatives 
are more business-friendly than others. The following anecdote narrated by a former SHW 
Director General, for example, reveals much about how market formation under 
neoliberalisation and the privatization of public goods and services could unfold 
unexpectedly at the intersection of infrastructures and nature: 
Ok, I understand your frustration. But, let me answer your questions 
through personal memory from my SHW year. It was before the 2000s; I 
was still directing the organization. We are going over the long-term 
investment plans with one of my branch managers. He wanted to go over 
the Rize Province plans and projections and asked me when we should 
start building some of them. Given the topography of Rize, they were all 
small projects ranging between 3 to 30 MW ın ınstalled capacity. I told 
him, ‘look, why would we take precious SHW resources and time to bother 
with these small projects?’ We knew that privatization was imminent. ‘Let 
the private sector deal with it,’ I said. But do you know how many projects 
SHW had planned for Rize back then? SHW, the great, with all its 
resources and expertise, had planned to build 32 plants in Rize. And it did 
not mean that we would be interested in building all of them even if we 
had time and resources. The private sector is not like the state of course, 
they are far more creative and ambitious than the state. Do you know how 
many total projects Rize has right now? 136! Now calculate the amount 
of money and energy we saved for the country! (personal interview, April 
2013)   
 
What the former SHW General Director was proud of, and fascinated by, was this: with 
minimum prior experience in energy, private enterprises have been much more effective in 
making the most out of Turkey’s streams and rivers than SHW, with their decades of 
experience. This was achieved by not only building faster and operating more efficiently, 
but by discovering potential in the weakest river and having the audacity to grab the stream 
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flowing between two villages or two steep cliffs at 2,000 meters. The private sector has 
been ‘creative’ and ‘ambitious’ enough to find 136 potential projects for small hydro where 
SHW was only able to imagine a mere 32.  
 
What the Rize anecdote acutely reveals is that the liberalization of the energy industry has 
been, in actuality, more than a basic privatization of energy infrastructures. What was 
opened up for bidding was not only existing infrastructure or projected infrastructures but 
an unspecified, unconstrained space to build infrastructures. In this sense, the liberalization 
of the energy sector, conducted without constraints and proper regulation, is qualitatively 
different than more familiar forms of privatization of, say a state enterprise or a public 
service. Driven by the urgency to secure energy supply, the unencumbered liberalization 
of the energy sector renders spatial units, not just publically owned institutions, enterprises 
and services, subject to privatization. In the absence (or in some cases, in disregard) of 
master plans, watershed planning, grid integration projections and adequate environmental 
regulation, private actors from all walks of the business world have scrambled to find an 
unclaimed river section to draw a small hydro project on.  
 
The relationship between energy infrastructures and space is not merely a theoretical 
abstraction, nor it is a bureaucratic phenomenon to only be realized in the corridors of 
SHW. How local activists in the Eastern Black Sea Region (EBSR) talk about the valleys 
that are and are not occupied by hydropower speaks directly to the spatial character of 
energy liberalization. Opposition in EBSR (and in many other parts of Turkey) is organized 
at the valley level rather than at the level of individual villages or project-by-project. While 
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there are topographic and historical reasons behind this choice, the way private 
infrastructure penetrates the countryside certainly plays a role in the overlap between space 
and privatization. A valley, for the locals of EBSR, is neither completely free from private 
intruders or is tainted as the entry of the smallest hydropower plants believed to pave the 
way a series of other power plants, stone pits and different types of mining ventures. 
Valleys with no small hydro are considered temiz (clear), while others are understood as 
kayıp (a lost case) or satılmış (sold out)—those that can not be saved despite the strongest 
struggle. While all or nothing approach of the opposition renders some struggles sectarian 
and reactionary, their rejection of evaluating projects independent from each other 
illustrates a certain awareness regarding the spatial repercussions of the scramble for 
hydropower. 
3.4.1 A New Place for SHW in the Expanding Space of Hydropower 
SHW occupies a unique position in this scramble as a public institution responsible for 
executing a variety of duties that may or may not reinforce each other. These duties include 
protecting the integrity of water basins and wetlands, securing clean water supply for 
consumption as well as realizing an area’s hydropower potential. While the SHW mission 
statement give the former two duties priority over the last, individual and group goals may 
be imbricated with primacy of daily routine, particularly after the sector’s liberalization. 
The Department of Hydropower at SHW’s headquarters in Ankara experiences a heavy 
workload, which provides us with some understanding as to how water-energy bureaucrats’ 
job descriptions might have changed in the last decade. During my visits to the department, 
I was surprised to see the amount of phone calls my interviewee and his two senior engineer 
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colleagues had to answer. Our conversation was interrupted countless times by these calls, 
which were often the inquiries of hydropower investors, energy consultants, construction 
companies or someone higher-up in SHW calling on their behalf. When I carefully probed 
into the content of the inquiries, I was surprised to hear that few pertained to the technical 
details of hydropower construction. They either focused on clarifying the detailed 
bureaucratic steps of the application procedure or sought extensions, temporary 
exemptions and were made to test the exploitability of rumored loopholes. The 
department’s SHW personnel were expected to provide an overview of the water usage 
right agreement application drafts to interested investors before they are approved and 
passed them to EMRA for licensing. While they were overwhelmed by the volume of the 
inquiries and complained about the quality of some questions, the engineers were not 
necessary bothered by the process.  
 
When I implied that SHW does not allocate the same energy to local protestors, one 
engineer replied in fury from the far corner of the office: “Who would not wish that these 
projects were all in-house? Do they think the state have all these resources? After all, we 
are developing the milli servet (national wealth) here. It is not like we are assisting them 
[the investors] for our own interest.” “But what about the complaints about the reckless 
construction practices and the can suyu [lifeline water] violations?” I insisted. “That is not 
on us! What can we do if our people are greedy?” replied the engineer as he left the office 
grumbling. A few minutes later, probably embarrassed by his colleague’s behavior, my 
interviewee shared a more nuanced explanation: “we are aware that some complaints are 
sincere after the lost years of the 1990s–and, you know, there is the strong will of the 
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government–SHW did not have much intention to check these project to see whether they 
add up. Honestly, if it had some calculation on it, we authorized, never checked if it adds 
up” (personal interview, March 2013). Later in our conversation, I was also told that, 
particularly the in the first a few years of the boom, SHW did not expect the department to 
verify if MW project forecasts matched the discharge and velocity data available for 
proposed sites. Neither were they asked to analyze how multiple small hydro projects 
would interact with each other in a single basin. It was clear that they did not have the 
personnel for such an undertaking anymore, regardless. Buoyed by the hype of the boom, 
SHW, despite its geographical reach with 26 regional directorates across the country, had 
contributed to the scramble forj the Turkish countryside. While the energy policies and the 
halters of the energy boom are controlled by the central government, SHW has played a 
critical role in the scramble of the Turkish countryside for infrastructural purposes. Not 
only the expertise of SHW was given in the service of the capital, but also its regulatory 
position was hampered.      
 
What the eulogies of Turkey’s hydropower renaissance and the celebration of the private 
sector’s creativity and boldness obfuscate is the legal, political and infrastructural 
background that made the boom possible. The failed experience of early attempts at 
liberalization is clear evidence that the private sector is not always ready for energy 
investment when circumstances are not entirely convenient (see Chapter-2). When I asked 
Mr. Barkan, the chair of the Turkish National Committee to the World Energy Council 
(WEC-TNC), how he explains the unprecedented number of small hydro projects, HE 
reminded me about the private sector’s hesitance in the 1990s. Mr. Barkan, who also is 
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CEO of one of the biggest and most well-established energy companies in Ankara, 
complained about the timidity (not the boldness) of the private sector, saying: 
Our private sector is a little bit coward[ly] to be honest with you. They 
hate to jump into the water which they cannot see the bottom of. You must 
have heard the stories of the 1990s...I was on the state side of the affair 
back then. The state literally begged the private sector for investment; they 
provided myriad initiatives and unmatched guarantees. The result was a 
disappointment. [The private sector] used this and that issue as an excuse 
and preferred living off interest for a decade rather than putting one stone 
over the other. Now, they have to invest, and small projects are best for 
many to test the waters. I do not think anyone cares much about green 
energy, although I truly believe in it. But, eventually, it is because [small 
hydro] is almost risk-free, and can be undertaken by any investor 
(personal interview, April 2013). 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduced the curious case of Turkey’s small hydropower boom, the central 
object of the hydropower renaissance and most developed domestic aspect of the country’s 
energy security. Drawing attention to the surprising contrast in the perception of large dams 
and small hydro, I proposed to take the technical, material and geographic qualities of the 
boom seriously. I conceptualized small hydro as a form of infrastructure that holds diverse 
ideas, actors, locations and trends together around the notion of energy independence. By 
examining the general characteristics of the small hydro explosion in Turkey in comparison 
with global examples, I emphasized the unique conjuncture in which the boom took place. 
I have argued that despite its reputation as a renewable, low-impact local-friendly 
infrastructure, the popularization of small hydro in Turkey has been first and foremost key 
to its energy liberalization efforts. I also asserted that as space-making, landscape forming 
infrastructures, small hydro projects have been instrumental in the spread of neoliberalism 
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across a vast territory while contributing a particular restructuring in state, society, and 
markets relations. 
 
The highly deregulated shortcomings of the energy liberalization and problems with the 
sudden inflation of private hydropower plants are now acknowledged by many—including 
energy bureaucrats and entrepreneurs—to varying degrees. Officials tend to blame 
entrepreneurs’ greed; on the other hand, investors complain about red tape. My objective 
in this chapter, however, was not to provide yet another apologetic explanation that 
‘privatization could have done better’ or to point to some legislative areas that could have 
been regulated for an equitable energy policy. Rather, I am interested in illustrating how 
capital, state and society are intertwined not only through legislation, but also through 
nature and infrastructures, as a new market is constructed and experimented.  
 
I have also argued that SHW, one of the pioneer public institutions for development, has 
undergone significant transformations parallel to the liberalization of the energy industry. 
As SHW loses personnel and a monopoly over hydropower, its expertise has been reduced 
to a consultant position, catering to the needs of the newly emerging private energy sector. 
Public interest and the institution’s regulatory roles have been downplayed, if not 
completely neglected. This transformation, however, should not be read as the ultimate 
triumph of the private sector over the state, or more precisely, government authority. By 
providing an overview of the birth and growth of the private hydropower market in Turkey, 
my next chapter not only introduces new actors, but also attests to its unorthodox and 
irregular development, defying economic projections, plans and regulations. Continuing 
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the focus on the infrastructural qualities of small hydro, the next chapter will illustrate the 
vulnerabilities of the private hydropower sector and the growing role of governmental 
authority, despite the liberalizing industry.   
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C H A P T E R – F O U R 
4 ENERGIZING LEGALITY: ENERGY 
INFRASTRUCTURES, LAW AND 
TEMPORALITY 
It was raining heavily in Fındıklı, one of the many small coastal towns 
squeezed on a narrow strip of flat land between the Black Sea and the 
mighty Pontic Mountains. Mr. Tufan, a retired primary school teacher, 
and I were sitting on the porch of a small tea-house at the heart of the 
town that afternoon, idly watching the rain overwhelm the almost deserted 
town square. “You,” sighed Mr. Tufan, “arrived the wrong time this time 
around. There is not much to see!” He was contrasting that fall day with 
my previous visit a summer ago. Then, the small town was bustling as 
migrants returned home from big metropoles during the summer holiday 
season. More importantly, I had arrived that summer during a massive 
demonstration against hydropower that resulted in the people of Fındıklı 
successfully chasing an Ankara committee out of their towns. Composed 
of an investor, an engineer and three bureaucrats from Ministry of 
Environment and Urbanization, the committee’s intention was to hold a 
so-called “public information meeting” regarding a series of small 
hydropower plants planned to be built in two deep valleys stretching from 
both sides of Fındıklı to the pinnacles of the Pontics. Unlike this gloomy 
fall afternoon, the summer of 2012 was a time of constant unrest, 
mobilization, and fun.  
“But now, it must be nerve-wrecking,” I reacted, “to wait in uncertainty 
like this.” I was referring to the current situation: the projects threatening 
the area immediately surrounding Fındıklı were neither under 
construction nor definitively canceled. Two separate administrative 
lawsuits were tried in local courts in this case. One was related to the 
environmental impact assessment of a small hydro project, and the other 
focused on a revision of the Fındıklı countryside’s protection status as it 
appears on master plans. Both lawsuits were approved by the Ministry of 
Environment and Urbanization and were initiated by local activists. 
Concerned about the dishearteningly long litigation processes—which 
often ultimately favors activists but almost always fails to permanently 
cancel projects—I was curious about the morale and motivation of the 
local movement. Mr. Tufan disagreed with my assessment. “Nerve-
wrecking?” he replied in disbelief. “Look around son!” he was pointing 
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at others (mostly men) sitting and chatting in the tea-house. “Do you see 
anyone around here who would mind waiting? We have all the time in the 
world, but does the company? That, I don’t know.”  
Timely progress is a crucial factor for the project cycle of energy infrastructures. 
Bureaucratic procedures, loan repayments, laying the groundwork for construction, 
operationalizing the facility in the right season, and gaining the consent (and land) of local 
residents are critical, time-constrained steps in building state-mandated infrastructure. 
More than a simple project input however, as the case of Fındıklı illustrates, time interacts 
with the capitalist temporality and intermingles with political action in spaces of 
contention. While growing academic interest in infrastructures has primarily focused on 
the new spaces they produce, the kind of desires they instigate and the ways people interact 
with them on a daily basis, particularly through a temporal lens, has been significantly 
understudied.71  
 
Departing from the judicial command over time and the act of waiting in uncertainty 
(Ayujero, 2011; 2012; Conlon, 2011; Squire and Bagelman, 2012; Erdem, 2015), this 
chapter examines how energy infrastructures interact with the law to comprehend the 
critical role temporality plays in energy disputes. My conversation with Mr. Tufan is a 
reminder of two critical dimensions of the legal struggles connected to many energy 
infrastructures in Turkey: the temporalities of the administrative law (1) plays as major a 
role in energy infrastructure disputes as the content of the law, (2) does not equally affect 
every party involved in a given dispute. Eventually, the time spent in uncertainty during 
                                                
71 For recent studies that call for attention to infrastructural temporalities see Hetherington, 2014; Braun, 
2016; and Bosworth, 2016.  
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the legal proceedings becomes a source of anxiety in which both the resistance the 
companies need act upon. To tilt this politics of temporality in favor of the energy 
infrastructures, government deems energy worthy of urgent treatment and offers fast track 
solutions for the legal processes of infrastructural projects.  At this juncture, the chapter 
closely examines emergence and implementation of two particular legal mechanisms: 
Urgent expropriation (UE) procedure and urgent judicial proceedings (UJP). While UE 
eases land-grabs, accelerates expropriation processes and inhibits rural residents whose 
lands have been appropriated from appealing, (UJP) speeds up the judicial proceedings of 
permits, actions and licenses prepared for infrastructural projects. These legal shortcuts are 
to circumvent the law’s capacity to regulate—and limit, where necessary—energy 
infrastructures and the sector’s privatization. 
 
While these legal interventions aim to speed up administrative law with the goal of securing 
a healthy energy supply for the nation and the seamless accumulation of capital, I also 
argue that they benefit from other sources of political struggle. The chapter includes a 
section on the political repercussions of the urgency imposed upon certain aspects of the 
administrative law. I argue that, at the background of this interventions to the 
administrative law also lies a strong critique that of the judiciary as a source of oversight 
(aka tutelege) over democratic politics and liberal economy. In this logic, cancellation by 
the courts of privatization decisions in general and decisions pertaining to the privatization 
of energy are the manifestation of a bureaucratic rationality that undercut the elected 
executive and development of the country. In this line of thinking, legal bureaucracies have 
been portrayed as the representatives of the old Turkey to the extent that they put up legal 
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obstacles against the AKP’s desires and intervention to administrative law emerged as a 
requirement of a larger political transformation. As such, the seepage of energorationality 
into judiciary, I insist, among other outcomes, strengthens AKP hegemony at the expense 
of a weak judiciary thanks to the newly designed legal tools of urgency. 
 
On the other hand, despite interventions the administrative law still constitutes a significant 
tool of resistance for local movements, too. As private energy infrastructures spread across 
the Turkish countryside, so did the administrative lawsuits filed against them. It would not 
be an exaggeration to suggest that it is unlikely for a project to be operationalized without 
facing any form of legal litigation.72 From the perspective of investors, however, the 
problem with being sued is less the outcome of the court decision than the time lost in the 
process. Projects often make a comeback, since the best a court can usually do is cancel an 
administrative action that permits a project, but not the project itself. Yet as Mr. Tufan 
adeptly summarizes, waiting in uncertainty is not easy for companies as one might expect. 
Faced with uncertainty, it is not easy to keep local resistance movements motivated and 
ready for the next cycle of struggle either. Trapped between engineering priorities, green 
energy loans repayments, endless court cases, and a series of local entanglements, time 
becomes, on the one hand, a challenge in energy infrastructure disputes and on the other, a 
strategic tool for those who can afford to take advantage of waiting. Politics of temporality 
in this case is defined by the parties’ struggle with waiting and uncertainty.  
                                                
72 Unfortunately, I lack proper data on the number of cases filed against energy infrastructures. The most 
useful information available is a parliamentary question addressed to the then-Minister of Urbanization and 
Environment regarding the number of Administrative lawsuits filed against the Ministry regarding the 
cancellation of EIA permits for small hydro projects. Written in December 2013, the answer of the Minister 
lists 65 project EIA permits of which taken to the courts. Although suing a project on the basis of a faulty 
EIA is the most common form of lawsuit one could file against an energy infrastructure it is not the only 
one.     
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It is possible that the sense of emergency called for the completion of energy infrastructures 
have solved all the problems in the energy sector. Nonetheless, I believe that the impact of 
the regime of urgency lies elsewhere. I argue that the emergence of private energy market 
in Turkey not only created its legal reasoning and framework but also that this reasoning 
has seeped into other domains of regulation to facilitate myriad forms of socio-spatial 
interventions, such as large-scale infrastructure projects, urban renewal programs, 
earthquake preparedness, environmental governance, and national security in relation to 
the Kurdish problem. While I admit that legal tools and arguments that were designed to 
assure fast and secure private energy production has become the new legal standard that 
came to redefine the relations between nature and society, productive and idle, urgent and 
mundane alongside private and public property, they bestow on the executive a judicial 
authority that it lacked otherwise.  
 
The chapter has three sections. The first section summarizes how the judiciary came to be 
seen as an obstacle to neoliberal transition in 1990s through the cancellation of a series of 
high-profile energy projects. I trace the critique of the so-called “bureaucratic oversight” 
thesis as it travelled through the 2000s and has become one of the founding pillars of the 
AKP’s hegemony and Turkey’s energy infrastructure boom. Section two introduces the 
urgent expropriation procedure that, while aiming to expedite the completion of private 
energy infrastructures, also contributes to invigoration of the state’s central authority. The 
third section examines another urgency measure, urgent judicial proceedings, which were 
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designed to accelerate the pace of land-use (mostly infrastructural) disputes, but triggered 
unforeseeable outcomes. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion on law and waiting.    
4.1 A USEFUL DISCOURSE: BUREAUCRATIC OVERSIGHT 
Confrontation of energy infrastructures with law did not started with the AKP reign. Nor 
did the attempts to accelerate the pace of the administrative law to match urgency of energy 
infrastructures. In the eyes of the capital and governing elite, the judiciary emerged as an 
obstacle to the neoliberal agenda way before AKP made it to the political scene. Energy 
lays at the epicenter of the conflict over neoliberal transition due to the number of projects 
struck down by high courts. The early efforts to open up the energy industry to private 
sector, which started in 1983, did not maturate partially due to the absence of 
comprehensive legal (de)regulation up for the task (see chapter 2). Particularly in 1990s, 
the judiciary became a battlefield in which many large-scale private energy investments 
were halted for violating existing protectionist legal framework and several energy related 
laws and bylaws were annulled on the grounds of unconstitutionality (Gülen, 1998, Atiyas 
and Oder, 2008, Atiyas et al. 2012). Delays in the completion of private power plant 
coupled with disinvestment in the public sector with the prospect of eventual privatization 
of the industry (Hepbaşlı, 2005). As a result, capacity development in energy sector 
significantly lagged behind and the country’s energy supply shortfall further deteriorated.  
 
The failure of the early energy liberalization was explained by many scholars as a 
consequence of a strong opposition within the bureaucracy (e.g Erdoğdu, 2007: 989). Some 
complained that the tardiness of bureaucratic processes scared energy investors off , while 
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others read the so-called bureaucratic resistance as an attempt to protect status quo 
disguised in a nationalist reflex (eg. Gülen, 1998).73 Many blamed the judiciary as the main 
reason underneath the failure of early liberalization efforts and accused the entire branch 
of government of having an ideological bias that limits the will of the executive. The 
problem of bureaucratic resistance grew into a convincing argument as one of the crucial 
outcomes of the energo-legal battles of 1990s. The resistance, the logic followed, had to be 
broken and bureaucratic processes must be simplified for the advancement of Turkish 
economy and its integration with the world markets. 
 
Embracing the neoliberal agenda from very outset, AKP did not hesitate to adopt the 
bureaucratic resistance argument. More critically, however, the complaints about 
bureaucratic resistance and the business unfriendly pace of judiciary has become an 
important pillar of a much stronger discourse under AKP. Coming from the tradition of 
Islamism, AKP had reasons to keep an eye on the bureaucracy, particularly the judiciary 
and military. For one, in 1997, before his carrier in the parliamentary politics Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan served four months imprisonment for “inciting hatred based on religious 
difference”.74 All three Islamist parties prior to AKP were banned; one by the 1980 Junta, 
                                                
73 By providing a close reading of the energo-legal battles of 1990 Atiyas and his colleagues offers a much 
more nuanced explanation to accounts for the high court decisions that hindered the liberalization of the 
energy markets (Atiyas and Oder, 2008, Atiyas et al. 2012). They, first of all, emphasize that the 
liberalization and privatization efforts lacked constitutional support. The concept of privatization was 
introduced to the constitution only in 1999 (see chapter 2). Second of all, the issue of public interest, which 
lied at the hearth of judicial interventions, was a debate that was not concluded in the absence of relevant 
legislation. As energy was seen as a public service and private energy production was subject to public, not 
private, law. High courts did not have much choice but to review every single step of private energy 
enterprises which slowed the pace of the investments and scare investors off. Finally, usually it was labor 
and professional unions that filed the lawsuits against these investment, suggesting (although Atiyas his 
colleagues neglect to mention) a strong class motive behind what is seen as a bureaucratic resistance.     
74 The reason of the conviction was a poem Erdogan recited that included verses “the mosques are our 
barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers...." “Turkey’s 
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two by the Constitutional Court in 1999 and 2001. Moreover, the last time the political 
Islam was in power in 1998, the coalition government collapsed following a chain of events 
precipitated by a military memorandum. Against this backdrop, AKP has been in search 
for a fine line – a political language – that would keep the party out of trouble, but at the 
same time sustain a critique of Judicial authority. The emerging critiques of the early 
neoliberal era that depicted the legal system as slow, old-school, ideological and biased 
provided a fertile ground for the task.    
 
AKP espoused the bureaucratic resistance thesis but enhanced its political-economical 
content to criticize the role of military and bureaucracy in Turkish politics. Accordingly, 
the intuitional culture of Turkish bureaucratic tradition, the critique suggests, is such that 
the unelected public officials are indoctrinated to perceive themselves as the true guardians 
of the Republic. Consequently, the argument goes, Turkish democracy and especially the 
executive branch is under constant supervision of bureaucracy elites who do not hesitate to 
intervene once perceive the status que is in danger. The argument, eventually, becomes a 
populist systemic critique in which a variety of grievances assembled to call for a strong 
unchecked executive rule. On a regular basis, Erdoğan artfully bring the different, and 
potentially conflicting, components of the critique together as he did on December 17th, 
2012 at an award ceremony in Konya. 
The system is rigged and he have (the problem of) bureaucratic oligarchy 
and the judiciary… This is where we stick at. Outsiders say “You have 326 
PMs, so who cares?” Yet this thing called separation of powers stands in 
front of you as an obstacle. It says “you have a playing field…” You come 
across the judiciary where you expect the least. Legislative-Executive-
                                                
charismatic pro-Islamic leader”, BBC, 4 November 2002. URL. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
2270642.stm (accessed 15 July 2002). 
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Judiciary must primarily be concerned with the interest of the nation and 
then the interest of the state. Yet, if you delay my investment for three or 
sic months, and if it becomes one or two years, you can not account for 
this loss neither to the history, nor to the people you are buried to this 
soil… In the past decade, we have strived to maintain harmony within 
different branches of government. Because otherwise, we know by 
experience, that economic growth is not possible. 24 April e-
memorandum75, for example, was an unsuccessful attempt thanks to our 
determination. (Konya Business Awards Ceremony, 17 December 2012)76  
This anti-establishment discourse, which revolves around a central thesis askeri ve 
bürokratik vesayet (military and bureaucratic oversight - MBS), has been the centerpiece 
of the AKP hegemony for a decade helping the party to form and maintain a broad based 
coalition. In addition to the traditional constituency of Islamism and right wing 
conservativism, the AKP’s grand coalition for a long while included big business as well 
as small and medium size capital owners, young professionals and liberal intellectuals.77 
The permeability between democratic/populist aspirations, desires for an unchecked 
executive power and the dreams of an unregulated market was maintained thanks to the 
military and bureaucratic oversight thesis in which restriction and acceleration of judicial 
authority played a pivotal role.  
  
One of the critical turning points in the AKP’s struggle against military and bureaucratic 
oversight was the 2010 Constitutional Referendum that was held for the ratification of a 
                                                
75 E-memorandum is a short statement released the general staff in April 2007 that reminded the 
government Turkish Armed forces is the guardian of secularism days before the upcoming presidential 
elections. Since the wife of Abdullah Gül, AKP’s presidential nominee wore headscarf, the statement was 
understood as a memorandum advising AKP to reconsider its candidate. 
76 “Bürokrasi ve yargı karşımıza dikiliyor” [Bureaucracy and judiciary stands against us] Milliyet, 17 
December 2012. URL. http://www.milliyet.com.tr/burokrasi-ve-yargi-karsimiza-dikiliyor/siyaset/ 
siyasetdetay/18.12.2012/1643111/default.htm (accessed 15 July 2016). 
77 The discourse that hold the coalition together was also supported by a particular reading of Turkish 
politics and society that has been quite influential in social sciences starting from late 1980s.  
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series of constitutional amendments. While the referendum package included amendments 
on a variety of topic including individual liberties, social and economic right (as well as 
abolition of Article 15 that provides protection to the perpetrators of 1980 military coup), 
its center of gravity was a comprehensive judicial reform.78 These amendments either 
limited the authority of the judiciary or enabled government to redesign the judicial cadres. 
The amendment that was most directly pertinent to energy infrastructures offered a new 
sentence to the judicial review section of the constitution that reads “Judicial power is 
limited to the review of the legality of administrative actions and acts, and in no case may 
it be used as a review of expediency”.79 The change sparked controversy amongst the urban 
and environmental activists who accurately interpreted the change as the elimination of the 
ability of the judiciary to strike down investments on the basis of public interest doctrine.80  
 
The impact of the referendum on the judiciary was significant. The campaign contributed 
to further strengthen the reach and attractiveness of the bureaucratic oversight thesis, while 
the results were read as the last nail on the coffin. Most consequentially the judicial cadres 
underwent a major staffing. Thanks to the new positions created by the amendments AKP 
managed to position favorable cadres in high-courts who appointed more AKP friendly 
                                                
78 The referendum, which was supported by 58 percent of the popular vote, approved several changes in the 
judicial system most of which enhanced the authority of the executive. By increasing the number of seats in 
the Constitutional Court and The Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (from 11 to 17 and from 7 to 
22, respectively) the referendum aimed at reaching balance of power in the high courts that is more 
favorable to AKP politics. 
79 Article 125, as amended on September 12, 2010; Act No. 5982 
80 Ilgın Özyaka Özlüer (2010) provides a more nuance argument as to the logic of the amendment. Özyaka 
Özlüer reminds that a similar statement is already presence in the administrative law. However, while 
review of expediency is a concern for every legal system, it is impossible to demarcate review of 
expediency from legality. Therefore, the amendment, she argues, is not to eliminate the public interest 
doctrine (because it is the heart of administrative justice). It is rather a strong signal to towards a 
redefinition of public interest which, for her, tilted in favor of the urban and and environmental movements 
up until the referendum. 
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judges and public prosecutors in lower regional courts.81 During this period, the judicial 
oversight thesis was also embraced by the judiciary itself thanks to the influx of AKP 
friendly cadres to top positions. The quote below from the Hüseyin Karakullukçu, 
President of Danıştay (Council of State), the nightmare institutions of investors in 1990s, 
illustrate the sharp institutional transformation and the shortening gap between the 
executive and the judiciary: “we halt everything (investments). No more halting! From now 
on there is progress… whatever beneficial to the nation and state will be constructed. There 
is no other way! Stop this (project), stop that (project). What good is it?” (cited in Yeşilyurt, 
2015: 408). 
4.2 ENERGY AT FULL THROLLE-1: URGENT EXPROPRIATION  
4.2.1 Hurry in the Valley: The Case of Loç 
I first heard about the immediate appropriation procedure in the summer of 2010 during an 
early phase of my research. I was in the Loç Valley—an early inculcator of the anti-small 
hydro struggle located in Kastamonu Province of the Western Black Sea Region—to attend 
a river watch.82 I was part of a convoy of activists there to attend a weekend-long event 
                                                
81 Lacked necessary support to fill the new positions in the Judiciary, at this critical juncture AKP 
strengthened its untold coalition with the Gülenist (religious) movement. Gülenists, who emphasize 
education and public service, had already many sympathizers in the judiciary and the police who helped 
enormously to the consolidation of AKP hegemony until a nasty break-up in 2013. While AKP did its best 
to uproot the Gülenists from the bureaucracy, Gülenist, in desperation, are believed to perpetrate the bloody 
failed coup attempt of June 15th 2016. AKP-Gülenists coalition in the judiciary, and its break up, some 
argue was also left by the urban and environmental movements. I was told by environmental lawyers that 
with the advent of the coalition it became much harder for local movements to even communicate with the 
judicial bureaucracy. Over the course of 2007-2013, “the judicial bloc was impenetrable unlike late 1990s 
when we always had an open phone line to Ankara” told me a senior lawyer. With the fall of the coalition, 
same lawyer admitted “it feels like we are back in 1990s again, we enjoy sympathy and are kept informed”. 
82 River watch is a commonly observed resistance method in which the local movement sets up a 
permanent encampment by the river where a hydropower station is zoned to be built. Strategically located 
to control traffic, the river-watch primarily deters construction activity while legal processes have yet to be 
finalized. However, they also act as the headquarters of the resistance and attract national attention as locals 
organize communal dinners and entertainment around the site of future hydropower.   
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organized by valley residents hoping to draw national awareness to their cause. The convoy 
was composed mostly of Karadeniz İsyandadır (Black Sea Uprising) activists and families 
from the Loç Valley who lived in Istanbul; the event was also attended by three members 
of an off-road biking club, wild-life enthusiasts, university students, an intern lawyer, and 
a freelance journalist. Although motivations varied, we were there to show solidarity with 
the resistance and learn more about the dispute. 
 
During a delicious dinner prepared for the large group in huge caldrons, we sat around the 
campfire by the river-watch to hear locals’ account of the struggle. The hydropower plant 
targeting the Derekani River that runs through the valley was a 21 MW capacity run-off-
the river structure owned by Orya Energy, a subsidiary of Orya Holding, a well-established 
steal-pipe manufacturer cum real estate developer. In tears, Loç Valley residents narrated 
their experience with Orya and how their everyday lives turned upside down within a year 
and a half.83 The valley, which is home to roughly 800 year-round and 2,000 summer 
residents in four villages, was divided from the beginning of the project’s planning phase 
and was further torn apart by Orya’s aggressive one-on-one persuasion strategies.  
 
To divide locals, Orya used a strip of land belong to the villagers along the embankments 
of Derekani River as a persuasion tactic.  Tellingly, the project did not require a large plot 
                                                
83 Six years after my initial visit, Loç Valley’s battle with Orya and its hydropower project was still 
underway. The two EIA reports Orya provided from the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization were 
both annulled by higher courts. In the meanwhile, both the resistance and Orya tried to utilize the time 
between court proceedings. While Loç Valley residents organized a month-long sit-in in front of Orya 
headquarters in İstanbul, the company attempted to initiate construction several times. Each of theses 
attempts instigated clashes between Loç residents, subcontractors and the project’s security personnel. As 
of 2016, Orya still holds the license for the hydropower project and advertises it on its website. As of May 
2016 there was no Orya presence in Loç, while 117 Loç residents faced criminal charges for allegedly 
“violating private property.” 
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of land. If we liken the Loç Valley to a spoon, the project’s water intake was planned on 
the handle, at a higher altitude where the valley is more narrow and rugged. The upper 
section of the valley was zoned as forest in cadastral records, and thus belonged to the state. 
Orya did not have an issue to lease out the necessary plots for the construction of the intake 
in the upstream from the Prime Ministry,84 as the project was already permitted and EIA 
approved. The pipe system that would carry the river’s water to the plant along the 
diversion reach was designed as a tunnel system and did not required extra land. However, 
the downstream, where the valley resembles the bowl of a spoon surrounded by villages 
on the hillsides, was a different matter. The company desperately needed downstream to 
build the plant, the worksite and a road access to reach the upstream construction.  
 
While measuring less than two acres, the land parcels on which Orya set its sights were 
critical to the project’s completion, and became the source of a heated, emotional feud 
among villagers. The parcel where we sat around the campfire, for example, was owned 
by the village legal entity; it was used as a recreational area where collective gatherings 
and bayram (Eid) celebrations often take place. Those who wanted the parcel to be leased 
to Orya argued that the hydropower would benefıt the entire valley, citing the company’s 
social responsibility commitments.85 Those opposing the project were anxious, believing 
the plant would trigger an overall decline in the valley’s livability and accused proponents 
of being on Orya’s payroll. While the fate of this collectively owned village parcel was the 
                                                
84 Since 2013, permits for the sale and lease of state lands are handled by the Ministry of Water and 
Forestry.  
85 ORYA’s commitments are still available on its official website and includes items such as improvement 
of the loose gravel roads connecting four villages to each other, restoration of the village infirmary and 
mosque, providing scholarship for the students from the valley, and distribution of wood purchased form 
the regional forestry bureau. URL. http://www.oryaenerji.com.tr/hakkimizda.aspx (accessed 10 May 2016)  
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source of immense local disagreement and distress, Orya had already begun taking other 
small parcels along the river for the plant’s construction. I asked one owner of a parcel 
targeted by Orya, a 65-year-old man who went by “Uncle Halim,” if the company ever 
coerced him into selling his lot. Uncle Halim, who lived in the valley his entire life, was 
surprised by my question and replied in anger:  
Uncle Halim: What company? I lost my land before I was even able to 
have a word with them.  
Sinan: What do you mean lost? Did they trick you? 
Uncle Halim: No! It is the state that tricked me. They seized my land and 
rent[ed] it out to Orya before I found out. 
Sinan: Oh? Ok, but uncle, how could they do such a thing without your 
knowledge? 
Uncle Halim: Yes, without my knowledge!...I found the money in my bank 
account. Muhtar (the headman) dropped by one day. “Uncle Halim”, he 
said “how lucky you are!” “Why?” I asked. “Check your bank account” 
he replied smiling. When I did, I could not believe my eyes. How would I 
know? They had deposited money to my account. Then we checked and 
found out that the state confiscated my property. I said I did not want it. I 
did not touch the money; I have no land for sale. Then we met our lawyer, 
thankfully. Now the case is [being] seen by the courts. I knew no HES, son 
(he meant the hydropower plant). They had approached my son initially. 
I had no idea. He told me that someone is interested in the land, but he 
declined. I said to myself ‘who would bother to buy that lot?’ but forgot 
about it later. That’s how I learned about the HES. I still cannot wrap my 
head around how this could be legal.  
4.2.2 Reframing Urgency Through Energy 
While its legality is still disputed, when used for cases like the one in the Loç Valley, the 
practice that enabled the confiscation of Uncle Halim’s land has a legal basis, called Urgent 
Expropriation (UE). With origins dating back to 1940, UE is an exceptional expropriation 
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procedure designed to speed up regular expropriation procedures in the case of 
extraordinary circumstances that require immediate administrative action. While the 
procedure was rarely implemented prior to 2000, UE has become a routine mechanism 
under AKP, utilized for appropriating land for a variety infrastructural projects, particularly 
for energy investments.  
 
Uncle Halim found out his land was expropriated after the fact because a land transfer must 
be finalized within seven days of the cabinet approving a UE decision. The property owner 
must to be compensated at fair market value before the transfer takes place, yet all other 
procedures, which would take months under regular expropriation, are dealt with after the 
fact. Those whose properties are confiscated only learn of the seizure once they find a lump 
sum deposited in a bank account opened in their name in the state-owned Ziraat Bank.86 
Meanwhile, the state becomes the owner of the property and can then rent it to private 
entities. While the regular expropriation procedure progresses incrementally in a series of 
legal proceedings (akin to imminent domain in the U.S.), UE is an administrative action 
and as such, a case is only tried if the payee opens an administrative lawsuit against the 
expropriation. Yet, more often than not, the company that applied for a UE decision takes 
advantage of their legal head start and initiates construction. If there is no resistance on the 
ground–for example, the river-watch in the Loç Valley–the company proceeds with 
construction as quickly as possible until court makes a suspension of action decision. The 
courts, as many lawyers warn activists, tend to comply with UE decisions once construction 
                                                
86  Due to the urgency of the matter (expropriation has to be completed in seven days) there is not enough 
time for the administration to attain payee’s existing bank account. A new account is opened on his behalf 
to save time and energy. 
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is near complete and local resistance is absent. As one lawyer who has been involved in 
many hydropower plant cases put it “judges really feel the weight of halting a million-
dollar development investment once there is more than a foundation on the ground” 
(personal interview, May 2014).  
 
Although the main beneficiary of UE is small hydro, it was not originally designed with 
energy projects in mind. When it was first forwarded in 1940 in the midst of the World 
War II and then more concertedly spelled out in 1956,  UE was intended to give the cabinet 
an exceptional measure with which to confiscate private land and property for military 
purposes in case of a war.87 Some concrete examples mentioned in the article include real 
and personal properties (such as bakeries, factories, medical tools and facilities) that could 
be directly utilized by military forces. Thanks to UE, the cabinet was given the authority 
to by-pass the detailed confiscation procedures that would otherwise hinder the abilities of 
an active army. 
 
Despite its extraordinary power, the UE had only been used a handful of times up until the 
early 2000s. Its rediscovery by the AKP was thanks to a loophole in article 27 of 
Expropriation Law No. 6208 (or rather, its being interpreted as a loophole). The condition 
for the cabinet to make UE decision is stipulated in the article as “in case of homeland 
defense” but is followed by the phrase “or circumstances urgency of which would be 
determined by the cabinet.” By tapping into this loophole and understanding “urgency” as 
                                                
87 UE first appears in legal codes as such in 1956 with the enactment of Confiscation Law No. 6830. 
However, its roots can be traced back to 1940 and the Law for Confiscations for the Needs for National 
Security (Law No. 3387) in which the definition and procedures of UE appears without a proper name 
(Karaman, 2015). 
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broadly as possible, AKP devised a highly potent legal mechanism and used it to accelerate 
a large swathe of mostly private investments. 
 
     Table 4.1: Urgent Expropriation Decisions by Industry 
SECTOR # % 
Hydropower Plant 216 30.6 % 
Power Line Transmission & Distribution 118 16.7 % 
Highway, Railway, Road Construction 81 11.5 % 
Wind Farms 57 8.1 % 
Urban Renewal 48 6.8 % 
River & Stream Restoration 46 6.5 % 
Irrigation & Wastewater Treatment 40 5.7 % 
Natural Gas and Petroleum Distribution & Transmission 18 2.6 % 
Coal Power Plant 11 1.4 % 
Geothermal Power Plant 9 1.6 % 
Other 60 8.5 % 
Grand Total 704 100 % 
    Source: Yeşilyurt, 2015 
AKP cabinets began to sign UE decisions from the mid-2000s onwards and by the early 
2010, UE procedure had almost entirely replaced ordinary expropriation procedure, 
particularly regarding energy related investments. While there had been only nine UE cases 
approved by the cabinets in 1990, and six in the 1990s as a whole, according to one 
calculation, UE decisions skyrocketed under AKP rule, reaching a whopping 834 decisions 
between 2002 and 2014 (Kaya, 2016: 81). Out of 704 UE decision signed by the cabinet 
from 1983 to 2015, hydropower plants tops the charts, corresponding to 30.6 percent of 
total EU decisions (Karaman, 2015: 160). The cumulative share of all energy related EU 
decisions amount to 61 percent (see Table 4.1).  
 
UE decisions signed by the cabinet are only the tip of the larger UE iceberg, however. 
Overwhelmed with the sheer volume of UE decisions, the cabinet had to share its authority 
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over of permitting UE cases with other public and regulatory bodies. The list of institutions 
that could make UE decisions includes but not limited to the Energy Markets Regulatory 
Authority (EMRA), the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKI), the 
Turkish Electricity Distribution Corporation (TEDAŞ), and the General Directory of 
Highways and Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ). These entities were thus 
authorized to make appropriation decisions not easily appealable on courts. Unfortunately, 
the data on the expropriations conducted by these institutions are not publicly available, 
with the exception of EMRA. Nor is it possible to reach healthy figures regarding the size 
of land confiscated by UE decisions. The EMRA made around 957 UE decisions between 
2004 and 2015 (Kaya, 2016: 81). Significantly, the fact that 60 individual UE appeal cases 
were taken to European Court of Human Rights in 2011 provides clues about the scope and 
aggressiveness of expropriation processes in contemporary Turkey, and the growing 
contention against them (Karaman, 2015: 70). 
4.2.3 The Invisible Hand of What? 
The absence of data regarding UE decisions made by non-EMRA institutions suggests an 
inclination to keep confiscation procedures not only swift, but most importantly, under the 
radar. On the other hand, Danıştay has cancelled many UE appeals on the grounds that the 
cases at hand do not explicitly call for urgent administrative action. Despite the deficiency 
of data, the populations targeted by the UE procedures is not a mystery. Given the 
dominance of energy infrastructures in UE decisions, as well as their rural locations, we 
could safely guess that property transfer travels from petty-commodity producers towards 
small/medium/big capital owners (Kaya, 2011; 2016; Karaman, 2016; Erensü, 2016).  
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In reference to the dubious character of these procedures, Kaya (2016) has given UE the 
nickname “the invisible hand of the market.” While I agree that the rediscovery of UE is 
directly linked to capital accumulation—particularly in terms of project financing and the 
need to circumvent and suppress public discontent—I also want to draw attention to UE as 
a form governmental technology.88 The reason UE, once an unknown niche procedure, is 
used today for a variety of governmental purposes is that it is a useful tool to discipline 
citizens while incorporating them into the speculative authoritarian neoliberalism to which 
AKP owes its very existence. UE not only secures land and time for capitalist accumulation 
but also creates new networks of relationships and subject positions. UE decisions are 
never made in a vacuum, nor are they purely technocratic procedures. They function in a 
highly uncertain and speculative climate in which capital owners, engineers, bureaucrats, 
local representatives and rural residents all find themselves vulnerable to the processes of 
waiting at the contours of executive power. While those who invest in infrastructures that 
call for UE are more likely to emerge triumphant, the waiting that undergirds the will of 
the central government and its bureaucratic apparatus consolidates its power and authority 
both over a variety of subject positions and across uncharted territories. 
 
                                                
88 I understand the term governmental technology to mean “more or less systematized, regulated and 
reflected modes of power… that go beyond the spontaneous exercise of power over others, following a 
specific form of reasoning (a “rationality”) which defines the telos of action or the adequate means to 
achieve it” (Lemke, 2002: 53). In the most basic terms, technologies of government mediate different forms 
of power and translate traditional forms of domination to governmental power that prioritize conduct of a 
conduct. Foucault contends that “we must distinguish the relationships of power as strategic games between 
liberties–strategic games that result in the fact that some people try to determine the conduct of others–and 
the states of domination, which are what we ordinarily call power. And, between the two, between the 
games of power and the states of domination, you have governmental technologies” (Foucault, 1988: 19).  
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It is rather challenging to account for speculation within the context of an expropriation 
procedure that is designed to be completed in just seven days. After all, UE is an emergency 
procedure and, in theory, leaves no room or time for speculation. Despite the theoretical 
pace of the process, in actuality, the window of uncertainty that is cracked open by 
expropriation is rarely limited to seven days. Although taken by the government The UE 
is initiated by private entities. They apply to the administration for an UE decision and 
guarantee to cover the compensation costs. Before trying the UE option, however, 
companies first investigate if the local residents are inclined to sell the property at stake. 
Importantly, UE is the last resort for companies that seek a stable working environment. 
While public land is the ideal site for companies that get along well with the administration, 
land purchase is the second best alternative. Companies use the UE card to purchase land 
by scaring local owners, telling them that expropriation will not offer the same 
compensation as they could. This process particularly harms the fabric of local 
communities in a project site, as individual land bargains pit residents against each other. 
Companies opt for an UE request when residents resist selling their property or the land 
needed for a project is composed of multiple plots owed by different families (which is 
usually the case in the Eastern Black Sea Region).  
 
Ahmet Zerkoğlu, a fifty-two-year-old senior engineer working for an Ankara-based 
infrastructure and energy company was one of my key informants regarding the small 
hydro project cycle. An engineer who worked on four different small hydro projects (one 
of which was halted by an annulled UE decision) summarized company preferences 
regarding land purchases as follows:  
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You would not lose sleep over a land purchase that is double or triple the 
market value, or even more. For several reasons…Thanks to the purchase, 
you establish relationships in the village. You never know when you will 
need them next…Also, why would you want to deal with the bureaucracy 
and a possible litigation process…The government is very welcoming for 
UE requests. Yet, a boss prefers to take care of his own business rather 
then owing a favor to someone when there is no need…well, it is a whole 
different story if you need to owe…And of course, the prospect of [the] 
constant flow of money from a complete hydropower plant outweighs the 
initial expenditure…particularly if you just acquired the bank loan for the 
project (personal interview, February 2014). 
4.2.4 Urgency Meets Security: Expropriating the Kurdish Question 
The government recently utilized UE in a completely new context, revealing more about 
the scope and usefulness of this particular appropriation procedure. On March 23th, 2016, 
the cabinet signed a UE decision that confiscated 6,300 parcels in historic Sur District of 
Diyarbakır, the political and cultural heartland of the Kurdish region.  Home to 
approximately 1200,000 residents and encircled by 40-feet high stone fortification, Sur is 
a thousand-year-old settlement and was declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO in 
2015 thanks to over 250 civil and monumental architectural structures. However, the 
narrow streets of Sur swarmed by a ferocious urban warfare between the Turkish security 
forces and Kurdish PKK fighters as the so-called peace process relapsed into a new wave 
of violence by summer 2015.89 Sur remained under 24-hour curfew for three months during 
which it was shelled by tanks and raked by armed vehicles and machine guns to uproot the 
young PKK militia and their barricades. At least 48 civilians died and thousands had to flee 
leaving their home, shops and livelihoods behind.  
                                                
89 In March 2016, International Crisis Group estimated that the recent wave of aggression sparked by July 
2015 displaced more than 350,000 people, killed 250 civilians along 350 police and soldiers as “security 
forces deploy tanks and other heavy weaponry to urban centers and the PKK engages in asymmetric urban 
warfare to prevent the government from retaking full control.” URL. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/ 
regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/b080-the-human-cost-of-the-pkk-conflict-in-turkey-the-case-of-
sur.aspx (Accessed 10 June 2016). Number of PKK casualties are unknown.  
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When the curfew was finally lifted mid-March 2016 and the last standing resistance was 
broken, one third of the district was completely decimated and the rest was in shambles. 
The UE decision confiscates 60 percent of the district and evicts around 50,000 to 70,000 
predominately Kurdish citizens (Arslan, 2016). The government, however, assures that no 
Sur resident will be harmed as then-Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu promised “Sur will 
be build like Toledo90 (Spain). Everyone will want to visit and appreciate its architectural 
texture” (Lepeska, 2016). Upon the completion of the TOKI project, Davutoğlu pledged, 
“all Sur residents—including the squatters and renters—will have a modern unit” 
(Konuksever, 2016). Yet, it was unknown how and when this challenging task could be 
accomplished (especially now that the district is completely bulldozed) and whether new 
units would be offered free of charge. Following the example of Sur, the cabinet take UE 
decisions regarding a handful of other districts in Kurdish cities of Southeast Turkey that 
were destroyed by the armed conflict.91 The lawyers, who sued all of these expropriation 
attempts, insisted that the decisions could be characterized as occupation rather than a 
confiscation as the projects neither included public participation not appeared to be 
transparent. Moreover, urban regeneration projects subject to UE decisions all include 
heavily fortified police stations inside the contested districts.    
 
                                                
90 Like Diyarbakır, Toledo is an ancient city, also a popular tourist destination. The city was sieged, 
occupied and partially destructed by the Nationalist forces after two months long clashes against 
Republican forces in the early stages of Spanish Civil War.  
91  “Turkish gov’t takes ‘urgent expropriation’ decision for properties in southeast”, Hurriyet Daily News, 
11 April 2016, URL. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-govt-takes-urgent-expropriation-decision-
for-properties-in-southeast.aspx?pageID=238&nID=97619&NewsCatID=341 (accessed 15 July 2016). 
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UE’s utilization as a militarized instrument in Turkey’s chronic Kurdish problem validates 
its prowess and usefulness as a governmental technology. Rediscovered as a procedure to 
facilitate and accelerate energy infrastructure construction projects; UE soon became an 
indispensable instrument to address a variety of socio-spatial conflicts. Although it was 
transferred to a variety of governmental fields and used in different types of land-use 
disputes, reshaping UE as a new political instrument was only possible through the 
legitimacy and urgency of Turkey’s rush to energy. UE not only enabled the transfer of 
land and property from petty-commodity owners to big capital owners (as well as 
commodification of commons) but also incorporated citizens into a speculative economy. 
It also enhanced the government’s central authority and maneuverability across time and 
space. 
4.3 ENERGY AT FULL THROLLE-2: URGENT JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDING  
 
Once an UE decision or an EIA permit is taken to the court, a tense waiting process begins 
for all parties. The litigation process, which takes place in local courts and then Danıştay 
(Council of State) in case of an appeal, takes months, sometimes, years to finalize. Waiting 
in uncertainty, however, does not necessarily mean waiting idly. Judicial proceedings 
include multiple hearings, arguments of the defendants sometimes including testimonies 
of the local residents, defense of the administration, expert field exploration and opinion 
etc. All parties, the administration, the company, and the local resistance prepare for each 
component of the judicial proceedings. The culmination of this process is the suspension 
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of execution decision (SED).92 Defendants, almost always, request for a SED of whatever 
administrative action they are sueing.  A court takes a SED if administrative action in 
question is believed to cause irreparable harm when implemented before the final 
judgement is made. Once taken, the project’s field operation come to a complete halt.93 A 
SED not only signals a final outcome that may be favorable for the resistance, but also buy 
some precious time for them. For companies, particularly those lack alternative revenue 
flows, SEDs are worrisome, as Ahmet Zerkoğlu explains:  
SEDs are major upsets for projects. They mess with the project and 
repayment cycle and make the company look bad in the eyes of the of the 
banks for future projects. It is spring time, the weather is improving, you 
have plans to start the construction hoping to complete it in a year to 
harvest the melting snow of next spring and the rain of summer, boom, 
they drop the SED! You definitely lose a spring and possibly two… Also, 
imagine that you struck a deal with several subcontractors. Now, how are 
you supposed to keep your word? You lay some of them off. Huge 
headache!... (For example), we have a (small hydro) license located in a 
very challenging location (later turns out it is in Fındıklı where Mr. Tufan 
is from). The license sits somewhere in the cabinet. Currently we are 
sleeping over it. No need to lose time and money on it. There is another 
company pushing hard for the same valley. We will wait and see (how they 
will fare). (personal interview, February 2015). 
Revelations provided by Mr. Zerkoğlu shed light on the politics of temporality that the 
energy infrastructures operate within. First of all, they illustrate that energy companies are 
highly vulnerable to waiting prompted by local resistance and court decisions. The reason 
is that waiting put the loan and accumulation cycle into disarray which in return harms the 
company’s balance of payments and credibility. Secondly, delays mess up with the fragile 
                                                
92 Also known as ‘stay of execution’, suspension of execution is a court order that temporarily halts a 
governmental action, decision, ordinance or a lower court decision until a final verdict is given. A 
suspension of execution decision of a decision or an act is taken when its execution is considered to cause 
irrecoverable harm. 
93 Although I have witnessed project that continue construction under the disguise of neatening of the 
worksite especially in the absence of a watchful opposition 
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project completion timeline which is organized around seasons. Small hydro electricity 
production, which is sensitive to seasonal changes in stream flows, is particularly impacted 
by waiting as the delay stipulated by the courts may have a longer shadow on the actual 
construction. Thirdly, given the spatial character of infrastructural penetration in the 
countryside through which a valley with prior investment becomes an easier target (see 
chapter 3), politics of temporality is not only a battle between the investor and the locals. 
While companies feel the pressure to start construction immediately after securing a 
license, they also shy away from being the first infrastructure investor in a valley with a 
strong resistance.  
 
Leading energy companies have long lobbied to speed up the pace of the administrative 
proceedings. Some have gone far enough to insinuate that EIA and SED must be 
annihilated for a healthy investment environment, I have witnessed one such lobbying 
attempts first hand in Energy Market Summit held in Ankara in February 2015. The 
summit, which was organized by EMRA in the luxurious JW Marriot, hosted President 
Erdogan and then-Minister of Energy and Natural Resources. Their opening addresses 
followed by four keynote speakers each representing four leading players in the energy 
sector: Mustafa Koç from Koç Group, Güler Sabancı from Sabancı Holdings, Mehmet 
Nafiz Zorlu from Zorlu Group, and Nihat Özdermir form Limak. First three bosses, who 
are considered as the traditional Turkish Bourgeoisie, underlined the importance of 
competition and liberalism in energy industry in rather congenial manner. Nihat Özdemir 
of Limak, an infrastructure conglomerate owes its wealth to AKP era (Buğra and Savaşkan, 
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2014) on the other hand, aggressively targeted the SED and EIA procedures and called for 
their elimination by utilizing a patriotic/corporatist discourse:  
…the state needed us, called us and we replied without questioning started 
to invest… But someone who know with what intention comes along and 
manage to stop billion-dollar worth investments easily by using ridiculous 
excuses (referring to SEDs) … and the courts of the state let this happen. 
We should prevent this from happening… Mr. Minister, I respectfully utter 
this: don’t make us rich overnight, but don’t make us poor overnight 
either. (Energy Markets Summit, 20 January 2015, Ankara) 
Özdemir’s remarks are noteworthy not only because he unequivocally declares the 
keystone application of the administrative law as obstacles to capital accumulation, more 
specifically the infrastructure boom. He also cunningly reminds the audience, including 
President Erdoğan, that the construction lead economy is a national project in which the 
state (read the government) and the capital are partners that are in need of each other.  
 
Özdemir and his colleagues are not the only group of people who complain about the slow 
pace of the judiciary in Turkey. Citizens, politicians as well as public prosecutors and 
judges, who are expected to review four time what their counterparts in the EU do, all 
complain about that even the simplest case takes months to finalize. To speed up the legal 
processes in the administrative law the government resorted to another acceleratory 
measure titled as the Urgent Judicial Proceeding (UJP). Added to the Administrative 
Jurisdiction Procedure Law (No. 2577) as an amendment (article 20/A) on June 18th, 2014, 
UJP expose what is understood as urgent and what slows judiciary down in its justification 
presented to the parliament. 
Litigations under the administrative procedure are all subject to the same 
proceeding methods. However, some administrative litigations are qualitatively 
different than others. These cases must be concluded without any delay… Legal 
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uncertainties occur when judicial proceedings that require immediate attention, 
such as tenders, privatizations and urgent expropriation disputes, are not attended 
immediately. The amendment contributes to the administrative jurisdiction by 
introducing urgent judicial proceeding similar to the examples found in Europe.94  
 
While the justification of the laws points to tenders, expropriations and privatizations as 
the source of legal uncertainty, by looking at its scope it is understood that UIP directly 
and exclusively targets urban and environmental land use disputes (Özlüer, 2014). The law 
is applied to lawsuits filed against four types of administrative action: (a) UE decisions, (b) 
EIA approvals, (c) sale and rent of land under Tourism Promotion Law (Law No. 5761) 
and (d) cabinet decisions taken under the scope of Renewal of Law on the Transformation 
of the Areas under Disaster Risk (Law No. 6306). UJP aims to accelerate the judicial 
proceedings of administrative actions listed above by primarily shortening the time limits 
allowed for the components of the proceedings. While citizens are expected to file a lawsuit 
against an administrative decision within 60 days, for cases fall under UJP the time allowed 
is limited to 30 days. Similarly, in UJP cases the courts must begin the review process 
within 7 days after the lawsuit submitted, and appeals must be submitted in 15 days once 
the verdict is notified. Under UJP, citizens cannot request for an SED prior to filing a 
lawsuit as a precaution against harms that occur very rapidly. Also, in UJP cases SEDs are 
final, they cannot be appealed in a higher court. 
 
Given the claim that UJP was designed after similar European jurisdictions, Yeşilyurt 
(2015) offers a comparison by reading UJP against its French equivalent 2001 référé 
                                                
94 Turkish Parliament, 24th Period, 4. Legislative Year, No. 592, 15 November 2014. URL. 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem24/yil01/ss592.pdf (accessed 15 July 2016) 
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reform introduced to Code de Justice Administrative.95 Although both reforms aim at 
expediting the review of administrative litigations, Yeşilyurt argues that the way in which 
UJP hopes to achieve this goal differs significantly from référé. The reform in France, 
which is to a large extend orchestrated by the Administrative Judiciary itself, tries to solve 
the tardiness by strengthening judicial review and reinforcing the powers of the judges. 
Référé consolidates the court’s ability to annul administrative action (in other words SED) 
by providing it a self-standing proceeding. UJP, in contrast, purposes to attain an efficient 
judiciary by shortening the application, review and appeal periods. Moreover, by 
subjecting SED to UJP, the reform in Turkey downplays the annulment institutions. Rather 
than empowering the judges, UJP seek to centralize dispute resolution by transferring some 
of the responsibilities of lower courts to Danıştay.  
 
Yeşilyurt concludes the comparison by suggesting that what UJP intends to accelerate is 
accumulation cycles of the capital, although elimination of the legal workload is the surface 
cause. It is hard to debunk this assertion once the politics of infrastructure temporalities are 
studied and continuing investor pressure on legislature for simplification of the legal 
procedures is observed. However, the intention to render administrative law 
business/investment/infrastructure friendly is one thing, actually achieving that goal is 
another. In a focus group interview I asked five environmental lawyers96 how UJP has 
impacted unfolding of urban/environmental lawsuits. They all agreed that upon the 
                                                
95 The comparison makes particular sense as the Turkish legal system has drawn much from the French 
civil law tradition since its inception.  
96 All of the lawyers attended to the focus group are members of Environmental and Ecology Movement 
Lawyers Association. The age of the participants ranges between 27 and 40. The group was composed of 2 
women and 3 men. The focus group was conducted in January 2015. I contacted the participants in 2016 
for follow up questions.   
 144 
enactment of UJP, lawyers and activists have to be more alert to flow administrative 
decisions that could be easily overlooked in a headman’s office or on announcement board 
in the governorship building. The lawyers concurred that with its strict deadlines, UJP has 
impaired citizens’ ability to open a lawsuit against the administration, particularly for 
certain administrative actions (such as an UE decision) that has the tendency to stay under 
the radar, and for particular geographies (the countryside) whose access to knowledge is 
more irregular.   
 
Despite the consensus over that UJP has narrowed the operational capacity of the 
administrative law, the lawyers hesitated to jump into conclusions suggesting that UJP have 
been an outright disaster for the urban and environmental struggles. The reason was that 
the administration, too, struggle much to meet the challenging deadlines under UJP, the 
defense texts the administration prepared for each case all look alike and lack vigor. “In 
fact, we (the lawyers of the movement) fared much better” a junior lawyer advocated, 
“because we are better equipped to keep up with the new pace thanks to our organic 
connection to the field. After all, we are the ones working with the locals”. A senior lawyer 
replied “well, that’s right but we are also hearing that the lawyers of the Ministry (of 
Urbanization and Environment) are asking for help now… from the companies that wrote 
the EIA reports, the very object of many litigations”. A third lawyer wanted to reach a 
broader conclusion:  
It is true that UJP did not produce the outcomes we thought it would. It is 
evident for them too; they are planning to amend the law again. Yet, the 
power of such changes lies somewhere else. UJP signals a certain 
expectation that is so clear: “do not stand in front of these investments!”. 
And the judges will eventually absorb this massage given the highly 
politicized climate of the country and the judiciary.  
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the impact of the emergent rationality of energy infrastructures 
(energorationality) on the judicial realm. As energy investments delay and stagnate due to 
legal battles fought against local resistances, the government intervened in the legal process 
to help the smooth the completion of energy investments. By novel forms of expropriation 
and judicial proceedings, energy production was embellished with a coat of urgency and 
provided with a fast track option to circumvent legal procedures. The urgency emphasis 
that raised these procedures to prominence has a powerful potential for the government 
that goes beyond accelerating the pace of the investments.  Therefore, I argued that the 
urgency attributed to energy infrastructures not only eroded the role of judiciary but also 
enhanced the authority of the central government. I also posited that the transformative 
impact of energy infrastructures on the judicial system has become a benchmark for 
governance by seeping into other fields, such as the Kurdish Question. Despite their 
powerful mandate, I also suggested that there are limits to manipulating the pace of the 
judiciary, and attempts to circumvent legal procedures often backfire.   
 
While the chapter revolves around the intersection of law, infrastructure and political 
power, it could also be read from the perspective of waiting. The literature on temporality 
in state-society power dynamics suggests that waiting has a disciplinary impact on 
disadvantaged people. As, for example, sociologist Javier Ayuero’s work (2011, 2012) on 
environmental conflicts and bureaucratic processes suggest, delays produce conforming 
subjects as waiting triggers uncertainty and anxiety. Those who cannot afford the prospect 
of uncertainty tend to abandon resentment and comply with authority. 
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Anthropologist Erdem Evren’s recent study on Yusufeli Dam provides some significant 
insights on the power dynamics that are at play in state-led large infrastructure projects. 
Unlike others (Adaman et. al, 2014) who explain the absence of substantial anti-large dam 
opposition in Turkey on the basis of the unyielding societal consent for the idea of 
development, Erdem examines the consent from the perspective of waiting. He reminds us 
that there was initially a strong resistance in Yusufeli (the town that will be inundated by 
the dam named after her), yet it died out during the ten-year-long process. Waiting in 
uncertainty first transformed the resistance of the people of Yusufeli into a tough 
negotiation with the state over the terms of compensation, and then to all-out surrender. 
However, not all infrastructures are the same, some may be more prone to delays while 
others not. The case of small hydro, however, is surprisingly different as Mr. Tufan, the 
retired teacher, suggests above. Resistance is stronger, longer lasting and much more 
adamant to pursue long legal battles when it comes to small hydro projects. Particularly in 
Eastern Black Sea Coast, with the exception of a few early starters many projects were 
taken to the courthouses. The next chapter explores what lies underneath the dynamism of 
anti-small hydro activism.  
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C H A P T E R -  F I V E 
5 AN UNEXPECTED OBJECTION: ON THE SCOPE 
OF ANTI-ENERGY POLITICS  
On December 5, 2010, almost two and a half years before the Gezi revolt, 
Istanbul witnessed a series of colorful protests that brought a variety of 
urban and environmental causes together. Led by the leading anti-small 
hydro group, the Black Sea Uprising Platform (Karadeniz İsyandadır 
Platformu – KIP), the protest program had three components. The first 
part consisted of the reading of a press release at Galatasaray Square – a 
popular activism hot spot – in the presence of some 40-strong KIP 
members along with groups in attendance for support, who had gathered 
behind a canvas banner that read “No to the Unnatural Law”. The press 
release was a quite agitative statement against a draft legislation titled as 
Protection of Nature and Biodiversity Law. “This draft law”, a KIP 
member read out loud from a print-out letter sent out to all main 
newspapers, “aims at lifting the obstacles in front of those projects that 
degrade nature and destroy life in the name of the need for energy!” Her 
diatribe was interrupted repeatedly by uplifting slogans: “Don’t be silent, 
cry it out loud, Black Sea is Uprising!”, “Streams are roaring, Black Sea 
is free!”, “Down with all dams, stand up right now, us from cities, you 
from villages!” The next stop was Borusan Center for Arts and Culture, 
which was only a few hundred steps away from the square. The crowd 
walked up to the Center on Istanbul’s world-famous Istiklal pedestrian 
street by signing chants and regional songs from the Black Sea and 
accepting approving claps from the passers-by.  The agitation of the 
crowd and the sharpness of the slogans intensified as the crowd reached 
the Center, since the intention was not to make use of the Center but the 
protest its benefactor, Borusan Group. Founded in 1944 as a steel 
company Borusan Group grew into an industrial conglomerate in 1970s 
and most recently ventured into energy following the liberalization of the 
sector.  Its first investments in the sector were two small hydro projects 
undertaken in collaboration with German EnBW in Ispir, one of the 
southern valleys of the Pontics. The projects were highly contested; the 
discontent not only led to an administrative litigation but also clashes 
between the locals and the subcontractor, its private security and later the 
gendarmerie.  KIP was in touch with the resistance in Ispir and there were 
a couple of Ispir-born participants accompanying the protest that day. The 
demonstration outside the Center lasted around 20 minutes during which 
the most repeated slogan was “Borusan’s art is killing life!” Following 
this second protest, the group crossed over to Istanbul’s Asian side and 
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joined a larger group of urban activists (urban platforms, neighborhood 
associations and the Chamber of Architects) to hold another 
demonstration by the historic stairs of waterfront Haydarpaşa Train 
Station. Active since 1909 as the busiest train station of the nation, 
Haydarpaşa was subject to a lot of controversy due to the government’s 
plan to privatize it, along with the adjacent port, to be turned into a 
luxurious residence/shopping complex. The demonstration lasted for an 
hour, the activists demanded that the station remain in public use, shared 
testimonies and memories about the space and exchanged old photos of 
the building. The demonstration was marked by two slogans: ‘Hands off 
My Living Space!’ and ‘No to Urban and Rural Transformation’. The 
event ended in peace as the KIP activists encouraged all to take part in an 
impromptu folk dance while Black Sea music was aired through a 
megaphone.  
Since late 2000s Turkey has been experiencing an unprecedented upsurge in environmental 
mobilization. On one hand grassroots groups are popping across the countryside as new 
rural protests make the headlines every other week. Turkey’s infrastructure boom, 
particularly energy infrastructures, is turning pristine villages into busy construction sites, 
triggering land and water grabs, disrupting local livelihoods.   Ordinary villagers turn into 
environmental activists overnight, new environmental platforms such as KIP gain salience 
as more established environmental NGOs lose their monopoly in the field. Many provincial 
towns and cities hold first-ever protest rallies, often organized against an investment with 
possible environmental harm while administrative litigations challenging environmental 
impact assessments are flooding courthouses.  
 
On the other hand, there is a growing urban demand to follow and take part in the 
environmental upsurge reverberating from the countryside to the metropoles. Newspapers 
employ reporters specialized to cover environmental disputes. Ecology collectives are 
formed in big cities to work for fair, affordable and sustainable trade of produce. Urban 
activists travel to the countryside to show solidarity with the grassroots environmental 
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struggles. Bookstores now have dedicated environment sections which constantly expand 
thanks to new manuscripts and translations of a great range of classics from Murray 
Bookchin’s the Ecology of Freedom (1982) to WorldWatch Institute’s Annual Reports 
(2015), from Rachel Carlson’s Silent Spring (1962) to John Belamy Foster’s Marx’s 
Ecology (2000).97 Political parties – the ones positioned on the left of the spectrum at least 
– organize panels and establish environmental commissions to comprehend the growing 
environmentalist momentum and, if possible, benefit from it. Urban movements resort to 
the notion of urban commons as much as they utilize more conventional discourses of the 
right to shelter. As a result, urban forests, municipal parks and underutilized public parks 
are the political causes that attract a new breed of young activists, Gezi Revolt being the 
most spectacular of all.  
 
While there has been much interest in theorizing the Gezi Revolt as a spectacular and 
impromptu event (Tuğal, 2013; Arat, 2013; Kuymulu, 2013; Özkırımlı, 2014; Yörük, 2014; 
Öncü 2014; Eken, 2014; Öğütle and Göker, 2014; Yörük and Yüksel, 2014; Wacquant, 
2014; İnceoğlu, 2015), only some have attempted to document and conceptualize Turkey’s 
bourgeoning environmental movement (Harris, 2014; Arsel et al., 2015), which was, in 
fact, a major inspiration for the Gezi Revolt itself (Erensü, 2013; also Akbulut 2015; 
Özkaynak, 2015). The aim of this chapter is to fill this gap. By examining this bourgeoning 
movement in tandem with the country’s aggressive infrastructure economy, this chapter 
seeks to elaborate on the underlying motivations and the political potential and limits of 
Turkey’s environmental upsurge. By highlighting the role of opposition against energy 
                                                
97 All four books (and many others on environmental matters) have been translated in to Turkish and 
published over the course of 2011-2015. 
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infrastructures—particularly anti-small hydro mobilization—in the upsurge, I discuss how 
the leakage of energorationality into other domains of governance (such as the economy, 
bureaucracy, judiciary, development and environmental management) is countered by its 
opponents and has led to the emergence of an alternative political language. I argue that 
this new oppositional language not only made visible the vulnerabilities of 
energorationality and infrastructure-led developmentalism, but also pointed to a political 
horizon that could challenge the unbreakable AKP hegemony as the Gezi riot so sharply 
illustrated.  
 
How can we account for “the emancipatory potential of the environmental imaginary” that 
so unexpectedly came into being in contemporary Turkey (Peets and Watts, 2004)? What 
lies underneath the emergence of Turkey’s grassroots environmental awakening? What is 
it that makes the small pockets of resistance so politically relevant and impactful beyond 
their scale? To answer these questions, I will read Turkey’s grassroots environmental 
movement in the making against the body of work that seeks to discuss the unique 
conditions and prospects of environmental struggles in the global South. I will benefit from, 
and contribute to, the discussions that revolve around the concept of environmentalism of 
the poor. I will particularly engage with a newly developed theoretical framework, 
“environmentalism of the malcontent”, that explains the mobilization in Turkey as a 
political channel through which long-lasting dissatisfactions with the country can be 
articulated (Arsel et al., 2015). While I agree with the authors that the Turkish case does 
not squarely fit to the rather limited definition of “environmentalism of the poor”—and 
thus it fruitfully extends that theory—I argue that “environmentalism of the malcontent”, 
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too, suffers from a reductionism that renders environment secondary to the realm of 
politics. Instead of examining political backgrounds of activists and bringing their 
malcontent to the forefront, I rather highlight the spatial characteristics of the movement 
that constantly oscillates between urban centers and rural periphery, establishing 
unexpected coalitions and setting alternative ideas and practices into motion.  Inspired by 
the occasions such as KIP’s multi-actor, multi-focus demonstration narrated above, I seek 
to do justice to environmental imaginaries and practices in triggering social change by 
forming coalitions that are across class, ethnicity, region and scale.  
 
The chapter consists of four sections. The first one will review the literature on the form of 
environmentalism mobilizations organized by marginalized and disadvantaged 
communities. I will also elaborate on the possibilities how the recent wave of 
environmentalism in Turkey can speak to the existing literature, particularly the 
environmentalism of the poor. The second section introduces the Eastern Black Sea 
Region, Turkey’s new hydropower geography and heartland of grassroots environmental 
activism. The third section breaks down the elements of anti-small hydro activism field 
and dwells upon its unique spatial characteristics. The last section dwells upon the political 
implications of Turkey’s new environmentalism by tracing circulation of certain ideas, 
practices, and a political lexicon across the urban-rural continuum.  
 152 
5.1 Environmentalism of What? 
5.1.1 Revising Liberation Ecologies? 
To be sure, popularization of environmentalism, its embrace by the poor as well as racially, 
ethnically and regionally discriminated populations, and the advance of grassroots activism 
as an alternative to more organized forms of urban-based NGO environmentalism can 
hardly be considered a new phenomenon both in the global South and North. In the last 
decades of the twentieth century, bourgeoning grassroots environmental mobilization was 
a major political development in the global South while environmental justice movements 
were changing the meaning, language, and demographics of US environmental movement. 
From late 1990s onwards mobilizations on both fronts have been widely discussed as 
variants of a new environmental current and defined through different conceptualizations 
such as liberation ecology (Peet and Watts, 1996), environmentalism of the poor (Guha 
and Martinez-Alier, 1997; Guha, 2000; Martínez-Alier, 2002), livelihood ecology (Gari, 
2000), global environmentalism (Greenough and Tsing, 2003), global political ecology 
(Peet et al., 2011) and global environmental justice (Pellow, 2007; Sikor and Newell, 2014; 
Martinez-Alier et al., 2014; Martinez-Alier et al., 2016) and more recently global climate 
justice (Timmons and Parks, 2006).  
 
To be sure, not all of these conceptualizations overlap seamlessly and there some variations 
in how each understand environmentalism of the disadvantaged communities. The 
variations predominately stem from the academic traditions and political movements each 
one of them are rooted in. For example, the environmental justice literature is inspired by 
the civil right movement in the USA and for a long while exclusively interested in racial 
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inequalities underneath the distribution of environmental harms and benefits. It focuses on 
an aspect of the American society that bears the legacy of institutional racism in the 
country. Environmentalism of the poor and livelihood ecologies approaches, on the other 
hand, were developed by scholars who were working on rural movements and the post-
colonial condition in the global South. The literature these scholars produce, is built upon 
a particular reading of environmentalism that is shaped by the survival and sustenance of 
the local populations and, unsurprisingly, do not show much interested in the urban poor 
in the global North. Despite these difference they have much in common especially in the 
way they challenge that environmentalism is a post-material engagement for upper-classes 
of industrialized nations as it put forward by the post-materialism thesis of Ronald Inglehart 
(1997). Studying the Southern forms of engagement with the environmental problems 
proves that there are varieties of forms of engagement with the nature (some material some 
not) as there is more than one way of being environmentalist—although many activists do 
not embrace the term wholeheartedly. It also demonstrates that access to environmental 
services and exposure to environmental harms are highly stratified by race, class, gender, 
ethnicity and one position in global and national division of labor. While there are several 
recent attempts to bring different variants of this literature together, revise its components 
and point to new directions for the research agenda (Sikor and Newell, 2014; Anguelovski 
and Martinez-Alier, 2014; Baviskar, 2003; 2010; Mohai et al.. 2009; Pellow and Brulle, 
2005), it is not the aim of this chapter to provide yet another synthesis. However, by 
examining an aberrant case of environmentalism in which activists are neither neither 
subsistence level farmers nor affluent urban classes I hope to point to a possible direction 
in which theories of environmentalism that reads ecology and liberation next to each other 
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of the can be revised. The chapter’s contribution in that sense is its insistence to recognize 
a form of environmentalism that is being nourished not by the rural or urban conditions per 
se, but a dynamism between the two. I believe that conceptualized as such, the Turkish 
case can expand the literature at a time when the boundaries between the urban and rural 
are becoming blurrier and agriculture as we know it is transforming rapidly in the global 
South.  
 
Given the history of the movements defined as environmentalism of the poor and the 
maturity of the literature, Turkey is quite a late-comer to the field. In fact, it is odd that the 
country did not have any sizable grassroots environmental justice momentum until recently 
with the notable exception of the struggle fought by Bergama villagers against a gold-
mining development in late 1990s (Çoban, 2004; Arsel, 2005; Özen, 2009). 
Environmentalism in Turkey, to a large extent, remained a top-down upper-class activity 
pioneered either by local branches of international NGOs such as WWF, Greenpeace-
Mediterranean and Birdlife International, or elite-sponsored projects such as TEMA 
Foundation.98 Despite running several successful issue-based conservation campaigns, 
public outreach of these organizations has been haphazard, limited and inorganic.99 
Therefore, while the emergence of a grassroots environmental opposition is a critical 
development for Turkey, it may well be considered a peculiar or, even a parochial, delay 
from the perspective of “third world political ecology” (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). 
                                                
98 Established in 1992, TEMA (The Turkish Foundation for Combating Soil Erosion, for Reforestation and 
the Protection of Natural Habitats) had leading industrialist and retired bureaucrats in its founding have 
been in good terms with the state for a long time and collaborated with the government agencies over 
multiple large-scale preservation and regeneration projects. 
99 For a critical evaluation on the capabilities and shortcomings of Turkish environmental organizations, see 
Paker et al. 2003 
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However, I believe that Turkey’s environmental upsurge is not an insular case and the 
analytical value of discussing it is not limited to a conversation on the limits of 
energorationality and counter-hegemonic politics. The delayed grassroots environmental 
awakening has the potential to expand the literature on the environmentalism of the poor. 
I argue that precisely through its peculiarities, Turkey’s emergent environmental 
mobilization can help us to address the literature’s silences and challenge several crude 
binaries that it is built upon.  
5.1.2 Environmentalism of the Malcontent? 
In a recent article Arsel et al. attempt to grapple with the peculiarities of the delayed wave 
of grassroots environmentalism in Turkey (2005, also see Adaman et al. 2016). They aim 
at defining the variety of environmentalism in the making in Turkey by focusing on a 
particular anti-energy infrastructure struggle in small town called Gerze of Sinop Province 
located in mid-Black Sea Region. Sparked off in 2008, Gerze ran a successful campaign 
against a coal power plant project that was planned to be built in Yaykıl, one of the villages 
attached to Gerze. The permit of the project which was held by the Anadolu Group—the 
producer and distributor of Coca-Cola products and owner of the most popular beer brand 
Efes—was eventually canceled by the Danıştay (Council of State) in June 2015 after seven-
year-long hard fought struggle. Pioneered by Green Gerze Platform (Yeşil Gerze Platformu 
- YEGEP), which was formed in 2009, Gerze’s struggle against Anadolu Group was 
exposed to symbolic and physical violence by the state several times and was named by 
the Sierra Club as one of the ten victory cases in 2012 (Ibid.: 378).  
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What was the motivation underneath the noteworthy success of Gerze’s anti-coal power 
struggle? Based on 40 interviews conducted with the key actors of the resistance in Gerze 
Arsel et al. defines at least two core groups that lead the movement: the villagers of Yaykıl 
who are petty-commodity farmers and a group of Gerze residents who are educated with 
an history in left-wing politics. This coalition, the authors argues, defies both the analytical 
frames of environmentalism of the poor and environmentalism of the rich. The farmer, 
although ‘asset poor’ and concerned with the future of farming in the region does not 
necessary experience as deprıvation and destitute (Ibid.: 374). In fact, while they are not in 
a position to “negotiate the terms of integration into capitalist markets”, in terms of daily 
life standard they are comparatively better off in average Turkish farmer. The urban group, 
in the other hand, can not be squarely defined as middle class in terms of living standards 
and consumption patterns although they had certain social and political capital at their 
disposal. Upon these complexities in activist demographics, rather than categorizing the 
case of Gerze along the environmentalism of the poor, environmentalism of the rich axis, 
Arsel et al. turns to political motivations of the participants for an explanation. One 
commonality that the core Gerze activists share is their past involvement in left-wing 
politics. This is reflected in how they make sense of the struggle in Gerze and at times 
giving the impression “that environmental issues were not so much on their agenda prior 
to coal power plant proposal” (Ibid.: 385). Therefore, in a sense, the activists’ concern 
regarding the environmental wellbeing of Gerze is overwhelmed by their revolutionary 
worldview resentments about the general affair of things. In fact, the core activist groups’ 
political assumptions are so pronounced suggesting that their motivation “went beyond 
livelihoods, health concerns or feeling of belonging” to a point to possibly see 
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environmentalism as a “convenient vehicle” for other agendas (Ibid.: 391-92 citing Cribb, 
1988: 2). The authors define the kind of activism in Gerze as environmentalism of the 
malcontent, which 
describes the way in which long-lasting dissatisfaction with broader 
processes marking the development trajectory of the country combined 
with personal experience in radical political action enabled a group of 
urban, mostly retired residents of Gerze to successfully collaborate with 
peasant activists against the construction of the power plant by deploying 
arguments regarding its potential negative impacts. (Ibid.: 371) 
The reason why I allocated a rather extended space to elaborate on the environmentalism 
of the malcontent framework is that what Arsel et al. observe in Gerze is quite comparable 
to type of activism that I observed in my dissertation fieldwork. The demographics of the 
anti-hydro struggles in the Eastern Black Sea Region is complex and not reducible to 
environmentalism of rich vs. poor dichotomy. There are resourceful villagers as well as 
those who are not, both active in a form of agriculture that is rather recreational thanks to 
its diminishing economic worth. There are the retired ex-socialists living in the neighboring 
town and good at organizing. There is second and third generation Black Sea diaspora 
determined to bring the struggle to the metropole to increase its visibility. There are those 
who yearn to migrate to the city and there are urban dwellers waiting to return back to the 
village. Therefore, I agree with Arsel et al. that such complexity is hard to be captured by 
the existing frameworks of environmentalism. However, I am not convinced that 
environmentalism of the malcontent captures the bourgeoning grassroots 
environmentalism in Turkey either. First of all, it fails to account for the villagers of Yaykıl; 
they are not the one who are malcontent. Secondly, it does not give credit to the possibility 
of emergence of a “genuine” environmentalism out of the initial motivation of discontent. 
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Thirdly, and most importantly, it reduces environmentalism to politics and thus dismisses 
the political potential that ecological struggles could generate no matter what the initial 
motivation are. By paying attention to spatial qualities of grassroots mobilizations and their 
mobility across the urban-rural continuum I aim to provide an alternative account for the 
Turkey’s emergent environmentalism that arisen against the land-use disputes triggered by 
an (energy) infrastructure boom in the countryside 
5.2 EASTERN BLACK SEA REGION 
In a mountain village not long ago, I was balancing on a tiny stool in the 
grass, savoring delicious lunch goodies that were spread before me on a 
communal tray… With cowbells tinkling in the background, tractors 
hauled hay in the meadows above. A waterfall plunged down the slopes 
across a steep valley. I could have sworn that I was in the Alps. Except 
that the sweet little towhead girl running around us wasn’t named 
Heidi. (John Osied, 2015 – Luxury Section, Forbes) 
5.2.1 Location, Location, Location 
Turkey resembles a horizontal rectangle located between the Balkans and the Aegean Sea 
on the one hand, the Caucuses and the Middle East on the other. The northern edge of this 
rectangle is the Black Sea coast that stretches between the Bulgarian border in the West 
and Georgian border in the East. The bulk of northern territories to the East of Istanbul 
comprises the Black Sea Region, a belt that is roughly 1,400 miles longitudinally, 100 
miles latitudinally. The six easternmost provinces out of the nineteen provinces of the 
entire region make up the Eastern Black Sea Region (EBSR).100     
                                                
100 Regional classification in Turkey suffer from serious inconsistencies. 81 provinces do not neatly fall 
under the seven regions; some provinces stretch over more than one region. On top of this complication, as 
a EU candidate country Turkey adopted NUT (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) system 
which divided Turkey in twelve regions (NUT1) instead of existing seven and introduced 26 sub-regions 
(NUT2). The conventional regional categorization is still in use, while the NUT system is also recognized 
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The most distinctive geographical feature of the Black Sea Region is the Pontic Mountain 
Range, which runs through the east-west axis isolating the tiny strip of seashore from the 
rest of the Anatolia plains almost like an uninterrupted wall. Pontics are particularly high, 
steep and impassable in the eastern part of the region reaching 4,000-meter altitude. Shaped 
by the Pontics, the EBSR can be divided into four lateral geographical zones from north to 
south: the shoreline, the valleys, the highlands and the mountaintops. Majority of cities and 
towns are lined up along the shoreline by the mouths of the rivers and streams that cascades 
through the valleys of the Pontics. The valleys hosts hundreds of villages scattered 
disorderly across the hillsides covered with tea or hazelnut gardens at low altitudes and 
dense conifer forests at high. Where valleys converge starting at 1,200 meters lies patches 
of Apline meadows, locally known as yayla, that traditionally serve as pasture for the 
livestock and summer resort for the local population. At above 2,500 meters rises the 
summits of the Pontics, a popular destination for outdoor enthusiasts and climbers.  
 
For those who traverse the Black Sea Region along the east-west axis all four zones are not 
visible. For a first time traveler it is hard to believe that the region is one of the most rural 
regions in the country. The only highway101 of the region, which connects the city of 
Samsun to the Georgian Border along the shoreline, passes by an almost continuous urban 
                                                
as a statistical classification. For example, recently established development agencies are organized at the 
level of new NUT system, while the concept of sub-regions are still unknown to the general public. 
Throughout the dissertation I stick to the common parlance and name the territory that is composed of six 
easternmost provinces (Ordu, Giresun, Gümüşhane, Trabzon, Rize, Artvin) as the Eastern Black Sea 
Region. I have been to all six but Gümüşhane as part of my fieldwork, yet majority of my data is based on 
Trabzon, Rize and Artvin provinces.  
101 D010 aka Black Sea Coastal Road is often referred to as the Tayyip Highway, after the first name of the 
President as its construction was finally operationalize under his term in 2007 following 19-year long 
controversial construction period.  
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fabric for many miles and rural settings remain mostly out of sight, hidden in valleys and 
mountain meadows. However, EBSR ranks third among 26 sub-regions countrywide in 
terms its rural population, which was 42.3 percent in 2011.102 
 
Pontics determine the climate of the Black Sea as much as it shapes its geography. The 
moist low-pressure systems condense above the Black Sea and gain altitude as winds carry 
them towards northern slopes of the Pontic. Air masses quickly cool down with elevation, 
raising the relative humidity and causing precipitation. Particularly the eastern portion of 
Turkish Black Sea receives record levels of precipitation and is considered to have a humid 
subtropical climate according to Köppen Climate Classification (see map 5.1).103 Year-
round high precipitation rates nourish tea and hazelnut cultivation, the lush forests and 
yaylas, as well as hundreds of fast running rivers, streams, and tributaries stimulating the 
appetite of the hydropower industry. 
  
                                                
102 Compare this with Turkey’s average which was 77.2 percent urban to 22.7 percent rural. TUIK – 
Turkısh Statistical Institute.  
103 Yearly precipitation averages of Trabzon, Rize and Artvin provinces are 929 mm, 1,458 mm, and 1007 
mm respectively while the country’s yearly average is around 574 mm. Averages for the towns and cities 
are much higher, reaching for Rize, for example, 2,400 mm. Turkish State Meteorological Service Data, 
available at URL. http://www.mgm.gov.tr/veridegerlendirme/yillik-toplam-yagis-verileri.aspx (accessed 10 
August 2016) 
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Figure 5.1: Annual Precipitation in Turkey 
 
5.2.2 Destiny of a Region: Emigration 
If the Pontics characterize the Black Sea topography, it is immigration that epitomizes its 
demographics. Due to the lack of arable (and flat) land, geographic and climatic hardship, 
people of the Black Sea Regions (Eastern Black Sears for convenience), particularly men, 
have sought employment opportunities elsewhere since late 19th century (McCarthy, 1973). 
While many migrated to metropoles of the then-Ottoman Empire, a sizable portion 
travelled to Russian, Ukrainian and Polish cities because a northbound voyage across the 
Black Sea was simply more convenient than traversing the Pontics to reach Istanbul or 
Izmir (Biryol, 2010; 2012). The emigration trend in the region continued after the 
foundation of the Republic yet turned domestic after the Bolshevik Revolution and reached 
its peak over the course of mid-1960s to mid-1990s, the core decades of Turkey’s rural-to-
urban migration. In 1960, Black Sea shoreline population constituted 14 percent of 
Turkey’s total population. This ratio first plummeted to 11 percent in 1990, then to 8 
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percent in 2003 (Güvenç, 2008). Although the pace of domestic migration has abated, 
Eastern Black Sea still struggles to keep its young, educated population in the region, 
competing with the violence-stricken Kurdish cities in terms of emigration trends. Net 
migration ratio of the region is minus 9 percent, one of the highest negatives in the country 
(Doka, 2014: 37). As a result of youth emigration the ratio of 60+ population to general 
population is 11.6 percent in the region while Turkey average is 7.5 percent (Ibid.: 30). 
More than half of the Black Sears reside in a city different from the one they are registered 
in (in most cases meaning the city where they and/or their parents were born) (See table 
5.1).  
Table 5.1: Registry vs Out of Province Residency 
 Province  Registry 
Out of Province 
Residency  
Province 
Residency / 
Province Registry 
Most Resided 
Out of Province 
Cities 
Trabzon 1,418,361 723,529 48.4 % 
Istanbul, Kocaeli, 
Ankara 
Rize 717,570 439,158 38.8 % 
Istanbul, Ankara, 
Izmir 
Artvin 412,411 271,319 35.7 % 
Istanbul, Bursa, 
Ankara 
   Data: TUIK - Turkish Statistics Institute 
The history and volume of domestic Black Sear emigration dwindled the population of the 
region yet created pockets of Black Sea neighborhoods in many cities, particularly in 
Istanbul. Although migrants from the Black Sea—or as I call it the first domestic diaspora 
of Turkey—were discriminated against and made fun of due to “their rural manners and 
unusual accents”, within decades Black Sears came to prominent positions in business, 
politics, arts and intellectual life leaving long-lasting marks in the metropole (Yüksel and 
Biryol, 2014; Solmaz and Morgül, 2014, Heyyamola, 2016, Kolivar and Çelik, 2007). In 
fact, as one activist told me, with its Trabzon, Rize and Artvin born citizens Istanbul is, in 
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a sense, a Black Sea city because “after all there would be no bread for the Istanbulite if it 
was not for the Black Sear.”104  
5.2.3 Cash Cropping, Single Cropping, Share Cropping… 
Lack of proper employment opportunities is the fundamental reason underneath the chronic 
emigration problem that EBSR has been facing. The first reason is that the economy of the 
region is still heavily dependent on agricultural production. EBSR is, in fact, the region in 
which the share of agriculture in employment is the highest. (see Table 5.2).   One must 
carefully qualify the type of agricultural activity in the region, which, for the last 60 years 
predominantly depends on types of cash-crops, tea and hazelnut, state being the main 
buyer.  
Table 5.2: Employment by Sector 
	 Agriculture Industry Services 
	 2011	 2012	 2011	 2012	 2011	 2012	
Turkey	 %25,5	 %24,6	 %26,5	 %26,0	 %48,1	 %49,4	
Eastern	Black	Sea	
Region	(EBSR)	 %53,6	 %55,2	 %14,8	 %13,4	 %31,8	 %31,4	
EBSR	Ranking	
(2012)	
	
1/26	
	
24/26	
	
26/26	
                      Data: TUIK - Turkish Statistics Institute 
 
Although they are still the motors of the region’s economy, in the last twenty years both 
crops (hazelnut more than tea) have significantly lost their economical value as the state 
                                                
104 The activist, who is a mid-aged male a retired engineer, refers to the fact that an overwhelming majority 
of Istanbul’s bakeries are owned and run by the migrants of the Black Sea Region, an occupational tradition 
that goes back to the early Black Sea migrants’ experiences in the patisseries of Moscow, Kiev and Warsaw 
in late nineteenth century. (See Biryol, 2009)   
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gradually diminished its support and lowered the subsidies as part of liberalization efforts. 
Although the cultivation of both cash crops provide employment opportunity for millions, 
their value added to the economic activity is limited, as expected from an agricultural 
activity (see Table 5.3).   
     Table 5.3: Added Value by Sector 
 Agriculture Industry Services 
Turkey 9 % 27.5 % 64.2 % 
Eastern Black Sea Region 12.7 % 27.5 % 63.5 % 
             Data: TUIK – Turkish Statistical Institute 
 
It is ironic that, both crops were introduced and promoted by state planners and 
agriculturalists to remedy the region’s underdevelopment problem in the aftermath of 
WWII (Zihnioğlu, 2008). For decades, tea and hazelnut channeled government cash to the 
region, brought the villagers in the valleys down to the shoreline to invest in the towns and 
marked the republic’s most successful regional development achievement. Yet, the very 
same project that brought prosperity to the region is now considered as a ‘curse’ by many 
locals, a form of dependency that, perhaps, prevented other forms of socio-economic 
activity to take root in the region. Now that the government subsidy is minimized and 
tea/hazelnut gardens per family are much smaller after a generation or two of inheritance 
division, agricultural income is a bonus rather than a stable income for many families.  
 
Many families are ambivalent about their tea/hazelnut gardens. Most agree that the income 
from agriculture is not worth the labor that goes into picking the tea and hazelnut and 
waiting in line for hours to sell it to the state. Despite diminishing revenues and enthusiasm, 
however, few consider to give up and withdraw from agriculture. Fikret, a thirty-year-old, 
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recently married customer representative I met in a local anti-hydro demonstration in 
Artvin’s Arhavi district helped me to understand the ambivalence around the tea gardens. 
I had travelled to Arhavi from Istanbul for the demonstration and I had assumed that Fikret, 
a Arhavi local, would stay little more before he returns to his job at a bank branch in 
Istanbul: 
Sinan: Do you have a garden? It is almost picking time, isn’t it? 
Fikret: Yes, we all have it here. Is it that time of the year already? 
Sinan: So, you don’t pick, I suppose? 
Fikret: Only for the guests from Istanbul… Between you and me, it is a 
burden than anything else. I am almost thirty-two, thus far I haven’t seen 
anyone picking up tea leaves in joy. TV shows bring celebrities here and 
take their picture in the tea gardens as they pick a few and then people 
think that is easy. No, it is boring and not worth it anymore. We have an 
average garden, around four, five hectares (approximately 10 acres). 
Throughout the season there are three rounds of yields; with each yield 
we make little more than 1,500 liras (around 500 dollars). Sometimes 
government pays it months after. What is the point really? No one can live 
off of it. 
Sinan: So why not sell it? Why would you care if the small hydro would 
have a negative impact on your yield or not? 
Fikret: No, you simply don’t sell your tea garden. It is next to our village 
home, it is what I will leave to my children. And after all, you need to have 
something to come back to.      
  
The most tangible manifestation of the local population’s growing ambivalence towards 
tea/hazelnut cultivation is the growing salience of sharecropping (yarıcılık). Sharecropper 
is an ideal solution for those who want to continue to be a producer yet cannot bother with 
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the tedious work of picking the product. A sharecropper picks the yield on behalf of the 
patron of the land in return for half or one third of the income depending on the agreement. 
Sharecroppers are rarely the local poor as one might expect. They are often seasonal 
workers from neighboring Georgia or Turkish Kurdistan who travel to the Eastern Black 
Sea coast during summer precisely for this reason. As many of my informants insisted, 
hiring a sharecropper cannot be dismissed merely as laziness; it shows a desire (and luxury) 
to keep the village life going despite the decreasing economic value of the products.  
 
Sharecropping is not something every family could afford. Those who are connected to 
close kin networks prefer picking products collectively. Others take annual turns within the 
larger family. In any case, with or without a sharecropper, what tea/hazelnut in the EBSR 
uniquely bestow to their producers is a great degree of mobility few farmers could enjoy. 
Both tea and hazelnut require minimum attention beyond the harvest time. Thanks to the 
generous precipitation rates in the region, neither tea nor hazelnut requires irrigation. While 
harvest time necessitates too much labor, it is often a few days of intense work for an 
average size family with an average size garden. A tea producer does not need to attend to 
his tea garden more than twenty days a year including the upkeep, picking, and waiting for 
the delivery processes; it is even less for the case of hazelnut. Combined with the special 
geographical features in which each valley cascades down to a town or city by the 
shoreline, agriculture in the Eastern Black Sea Region is an activity that can be undertaken 
from a distance. With the improvement of transportation infrastructures many tea and 
hazelnut producers have chosen to migrate to the cities and towns of the region (or to 
metropoles like Istanbul and Ankara) instead of enduring the rough winter conditions of 
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rural life. Therefore, tea and hazelnut cash crops in Turkish Black Sea generates a unique 
form of producer who has both rural and urban residency, someone who could be a farmer 
and a, say, high-school teacher at the same time.  
 
In a recent article that discusses the changing character of rural settlements and settlement 
patterns in Turkey, Öztürk et al. draw attention to the understudied rural-directed 
movements in a country that is rapidly urbanizing.105 By looking at a variety of permanent, 
temporary, cyclical and seasonal movement patterns of urban-to-rural movements they 
describe different forms of village settlements in the making. While some of these forms 
resemble the so-called counterurbanization examples in the global North in which urban 
upper/upper-middle classes gradually gravitate away from the urban core (Halcafree, 2008; 
2012), the rural-directed movements in Turkey show more diversity. Other than traditional 
agricultural villages, Öztürk et al. outline, for example, suburban villages, a new commuter 
belt settlement around metropolitan centers, or retirement/summer villages in which the 
new ex-urban residents do not engage with commercial farming, or semi-agricultural 
villages where residents are integrated to labor markets beyond agriculture (2014: 382-
383). The villages that resist small-hydropower structures in the EBSR may be considered 
under what they name as semi-seasonal semi-agricultural villages that are often deserted 
in the winter and used as summer resorts for many while some commercial agriculture still 
persists. Öztürk et al. define these new forms of mobilities, which escape the conventional 
                                                
105 According to the official figures ın 1970 only 38 percent of Turkey resided in urban settings. This 
number grew to 43.9 percent in 1980 and thus skyrocketed to 59 percent in 1990, 64.9 percent in 2000 and 
76.3 percent in 2010. Following a legislation passed in 2013 administrative borders of metropolitan 
municipalities were expanded to overlap with the provincial border. Since there are 30 metropolitan 
municipalities in Turkey, the change—which was passed for electoral politics standpoint— effectively 
raised urbanization to 92.1 percent over night. Data: TUIK Turkish Statistical Institute. 
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definitions of migration and urban studies, as “dual settlement” or “multiplace hybrid life” 
and argue that: 
Lived spaces are thus created that span geographically distant places and 
are made into multivalent living structures through human relationship 
and (other) socio-economic networks. Eschewing considerations of 
threshold (minimal criteria for what counts as migration), we combine 
these with the more localized hamlet/village-to-town/city and rural 
farming oriented migrations/mobilities outlined, as well as the movement 
practices linked to the development of urbanite retirement/summer and 
commuter villages (above), to develop an overarching conception of 
rural-urban connectedness, a dialectic generalised as dual settlement or 
multiplace hybrid life (Ibid. 382). 
The social, cultural, and historical meaning of the emergent multiplace hybrid lives Öztürk 
et al. conceptualize is best understood and appreciated in reference to the dichotomous 
terms sıla and gurbet, which lack direct translations in English (Zirh, 2012: 1760). Sıla is 
where the natal home is, often at the scale of village. Gurbet, in contrast is any place other 
than sıla or, “the non-homey” (Ibid.). The one who lives in gurbet is gurbetçi and is 
believed to yearn for sıla. Gurbet and garip—which means poor, lonely or subaltern—
comes from the same Arabic root which means to be estranged, to fall apart, to be alienated 
(ibid.). Alienation of gurbetçi is by default and it cannot really be remedied by the gurbet’s 
employment and secure income opportunities, the very reason of being in gurbet in the first 
place. Despite the years spent and financial security acquired in gurbet, many dream of 
returning back to sıla.  
Therefore, the journey towards gurbet was never thought of as being one 
way nor was the duration of separation conceived as being permanent. 
The simple aim is to earn enough in order to improve living conditions in 
sıla. In this sense, the act of leaving becomes a kind of mission. Those who 
are able to do so should sacrifice a certain period of their lives for the 
sake of their families. Those who have stayed at home expect the 
immigrants to return to where they belong. (Ibid.) 
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A mutliplace hybrid life renders the sıla vs. gurbet tension bearable and sustainable.106 In 
today’s transportation technologies gurbetçi can visit sıla on a regular basis. Although the 
phrase bizim buralarin gurbetçisi çoktur (we have too many gurbetçis) is often said to 
complain about the fact that the region is not self-reliant, gurbetçi is no longer garip thanks 
to the new airports and Tayyip Highway, which cut the bus ride from Istanbul to the region 
by half. While retired-returnees make up a significant portion of the summer population of 
the EBSR villages, one does not need to wait for retirement to establish a sustained 
relationship with sıla. While it was a luxury for a gurbetçi to go back to the EBSR to 
observe religious holidays twice a year, now families from Ankara, Istanbul and Bursa are 
flying to the EBSR for extended holiday excursions in the motherland. There is only one 
condition to sustain such dual settlement arrangement: to have a şenlikli (well-looked after, 
populated, prosperous) house in the village. Unlike central and eastern Anatolia, where 
withdrawal from agriculture is sharp and irreversible (Keyder ve Yenal, 2013), tea and 
hazelnut help to keep the households şenlikli, keep the connection to sıla alive and well. 
To keep the ancestral village house şenlikli for the years during which the gurbetçi family 
cannot travel back to sıla, the sharecropper is asked to not only pick the products but also 
stay in the premises or do the routine maintenance.  
 
While sıla and gurbet dichotomy is helpful to explain the affective dimension of the rural-
directed movements in Turkey, return to sıla is not simply a practice of nostalgia, or 
fulfillment of a patriarchal tradition. While urban-directed migration is often to pursue a 
                                                
106 While gurbet is often used for villager making a living in a metropole or abroad multiplace hybrid live 
in the EBSR also includes families which have a village home in the valley (maybe also a cabin up in the 
meadows), yet live in big cities of the region (such as Rize and Trabzon) or one of the shoreline towns 
located where the valleys meat Black Sea (such as Arhavi, Fındıklı and Of).  
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university degree and/or to work, there are many reasons as to why families temporarily 
and permanently return to the village. Village is a safe harbor, a secure shelter one can turn 
to when worse comes to worst. I met many returnees who migrated back to the village 
following a job loss or financial hardship. During economic crises, villages of the EBSR 
serve a safety net function for families that need to scale down away from judging eyes. 
The refuge status of rural life is not limited to material aspects of the simple, low profile 
of the village. A running joke about the tranquility of the countryside amongst the locals 
suggests that if one avoids bears, village is the safest place to be. After all, even ‘if the 
atomic bomb explodes”, as a returnee told me, “we would be just fine and life would simply 
go on here, up in the mountains” (Personal interview, September 2014).  
 
Emergent forms of multiplace hybrid lives in Turkey do not simply remain as dry 
demographic categorizations, they rather trigger new socio-spatial imaginaries and lead to  
the establishment of unexpected coalitions. In the remaining part of the chapter, by 
focusing on such imaginaries and coalitions, I will further elaborate on urban-rural 
connectivity induced by dual settlement in the EBSR as a crucial factor that explains both 
the motivations underneath the contestation of energy infrastructures and the dynamism of 
anti-small hydro mobilization.    
 
Parallel to the sheer number of small hydro power plants, their geographic reach and the 
fact that they have been the pioneers of the country’s energy rush (see Chapter Three) anti-
small-hydro activism has a special role in Turkey’s environmental upsurge.  
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5.3 THE FIELD OF THE MOVEMENT 
Anti-hydro activism is a multi-actor field. It is possible to acknowledge at least five 
components of the field operating at different scales. (1) grassroots resistance, (2) anti-
hydro solidarity platforms that grassroots resistances can choose to affiliate with, (3) 
kinship (hemşehri) associations in the metropole, (4) urban-based environmental NGOs, 
(5) urban/ecology activist circles. While some of these components regularly work 
together, it is hard to claim there is a perfect harmony and collaboration among them. In 
fact, at times the anti-hydro field may seem competitive as different organizations may 
claim ownership over this struggle or that demonstration. Figure 5.2 provides a rough 
sketch of the anti-small hydro activism field. The number of shapes and connecting lines 
are not numerically accurate; yet they aim to give a rough idea about the concentration of 
struggles across the field and the overall positioning of environmental platforms and 
organizations vis-à-vis each other.  
 
There are two main axes that spatially divide the field. The horizontal axis separates the 
field along urban and rural lines, while the vertical line differentiates the struggles in the 
Black Sea Region from those taking place in other regions of the country. Individual 
struggles are obviously all located in the rural part of the field, which is why it is drawn 
relatively larger. While organizing at the local level is a must for a successful resistance, 
making a struggle visible in the urban stage is a something every struggles can do. Since 
the explosion of small-hydro business, the Black Sea Region is the new hydropower 
geography of the country (See Chapter Two). As a result, the number of struggles is higher 
and the connections between individual struggles are stronger in the region (represented in 
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the left side of the vertical axis) than the cumulative of the rest of the country (right side of 
the vertical axis).  
Figure 5.2: Anti-Hydropower Activism Field 
 
 
Individual Hydropower Struggles: The core component of the anti-hydro activism field is 
the individual anti-hydro struggles organized at the most local scale possible.107 Local 
                                                
107 The focus of the majority of the local anti-hydro mobilizations are all small-hydro projects. The most 
notable exceptions are relatively weaker mobilizations against Yusufeli (Erdem, 2015; 2016) and Ilısu Dam 
(Ilhan, 2016). Yusufeli Dam (540 MW) is located in Çoruh Valley and will inundate Yusufeli town in 
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resistance is the front line of the resistance. While information regarding all future 
hydropower projects are currently available to the public now in the early years of the boom 
it was a handful of interested locals who found out about these investments and informed 
the village(s) neighboring the projects. The size of local resistance depends on the 
geographic features of the rural setting and where the hydropower plant is located. Isolated 
villages need to struggle alone while valleys with multiple villages in close proximity to 
each other organize at the valley level and these resistances tend to be stronger and longer 
lasting. That is why the EBSR, which hosts a dense rural population cascading down to a 
small town down by the shoreline that allows the only possible entrance to the valley, offers 
the ideal geographical conditions to organize and check for intruders who appear to be 
measuring the stream flow or entering into preliminary land bargains.  
 
Muhtar, the elected village headman, is a key figure for all local struggles. As the sole 
official contact of the village it is the headman who is supposed to be in touch with the 
governor’s office, local branch of Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, gendarmerie, 
and the energy company’s contractor. However, in many cases muhtars are the first to be 
compromised precisely because of their proximity to the local sources of power. While 
early mobilizations took place under the leadership of muhtars, as muhtars were bought 
and/or convinced by the energy projects, the opposition formed platforms, that is, unofficial 
                                                
Artvin while Ilısu Dam (1,200 MW), located on Tigris as a part of Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) 
will flood parts of ancient Hasankeyf.  
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entities usually named after the village, valley, or the stream that is targeted by the small-
hydro.108  
 
Establishing a platform provides the opposition with a name, a structure, a division of labor 
but does not burden the villagers with filing an application for association status, which 
may attract unwanted official attention. Platforms spread news about projects to everyone 
in the village and the village diaspora, persuade them to join the cause and most importantly 
initiate the legal process by getting in touch with a lawyer. They organize rallies and 
publish handouts to raise awareness. When the time is ripe, platform members strive hard 
to find as many plaintiffs as possible for a lawsuit to be opened against the development. 
The number of plaintiffs often provides a good estimate about the size of the resistance. 
  
In the absence of a local core set of contesters, an anti-hydro struggle cannot flourish. No 
matter how intense the outside interest, diaspora support and urban solidarity is, at the end 
of the day there needs to be active mobilization at the local level to at least keep the 
information channels open for the larger movement and the legal case.  
 
Kinship (Hemşehri) Associations: Grassroots mobilizations need outside support as 
otherwise their resistance may run the risk of remaining parochial and invisible. First stop 
to check for support is the village diaspora living in the big cities. Hemşehri (kinship) 
                                                
108 Some examples are Arhavi Doğa Koruma Platformu (Arhavi Nature Protection Platform) in Arhavi, 
Artvin; Şavşat Dereleri Koruma Platformu (Şavşat Rivers Protection Platform) in Şavşat Artvin, Fındıklı 
Dereleri Koruma Platformu (Fındıklı Rivers Protection Platform) in Fındıklı, Rize; Tonya Çevre Platformu 
(Tonya Environment Protection Platform) Tonya, Trabzon; Loç Vadisi Koruma Platformu (Loç Valley 
Protection Platform) in Cide, Kastamonu; Alakır Nehri Kardeşliği (Alakır River Fellowship) in Kumluca, 
Antalya. 
 175 
associations located in metropoles are not only a great opportunity to establish an urban 
post for the resistance, they also have the potential to serve as an institutional support 
thanks to their already existing legal status.  However, the survival of hemşehri associations 
depends on one thing: charitable donations by the successful businessmen who are from 
the same village. The very existence of the hemşehri associations is to serve as a support 
network and ease rural migrants’ transition to the life in the metropole, such as providing 
scholarships for the village students studying in the metropole. Also, more recently, 
hemşehri associations try to attract investment to the ancestral village or simply raise funds 
to improve the village infrastructure (Bayraktar, 2003). All, of these activities require the 
associations to work closely with the capital owners who have migrated from the village 
and been successful in the city. Donors of the associations are, at the same time, potential 
subcontractors for the future energy projects thanks to their local knowledge and network. 
Even if this is not an option, small-hydro investors may approach the donors to pressure 
the association to stay, at least, neutral in the conflict. As a result, the relationship between 
grassroots resistance and hemşehri associations may deteriorate rapidly after an initial 
collaborative start.  
 
In February 2014, I was on a bus from Istanbul to Artvin’s Arhavi district to attend an anti-
small hydro demonstration that was planned to be built at a location near Arhavi town 
center. Arhavi’s hemşehri association ISTAD (Istanbul Arhavians Association) covered 
the costs of the bus I was travelling by as well as the two other buses. The president of the 
association was travelling with us too and he was more enthusiastic about the 
demonstration than anyone else. The next day he was one of the five speakers who gave a 
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speech to three thousand people gathered by the future plant site. In his agitating talk he 
promised that ISTAD would be with the resistance no matter what and work as the Istanbul 
branch of the opposition. However, the more the opposition targeted the license holder of 
the small-hydro project (MNG, a logistics giant whose owner is from Arhavi) the more 
hesitant ISTAD has become to the point that the association recently completely withdrew 
from the struggle.  Later an activist informed me that through a generous donation MNG 
helped ISTAD to double the amount of scholarships they distributed monthly.  
 
Mainstream Environmental NGOs: The stance of established urban-based environmental 
NGOs on the issue of small-hydro can best be described as passive, non-institutional 
approval. With the exception of Doğa Derneği (Nature Foundation – a local partner of 
Birdlife International) all other three mainstream environmental NGOs (Greenpeace 
Mediterranean, WWF, and TEMA) preferred to keep a distance from the grassroots 
mobilization rising in opposition to small-hydro. While the personnel of these 
organizations have always been sympathetic towards the anti-small hydro struggles, the 
organizations have never actively participated in the demonstrations or worked closely with 
one of the local struggles (that is why these organizations are located in the urban part of 
the field drawn above with no real connection to rural struggles). 
 
There are at least three reasons underneath this hesitation. The small hydro activism, from 
its very first days developed independent from the mainstream urban-based 
environmentalist circles, which until recently had a monopoly over the field. They were 
caught off-guard and failed to adopt a proper line of communication with the grassroots 
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movements. The second reason is closely connected to the first one. As Turkey’s 
uncontested environmental pioneers for the last two decades, these organizations did not 
have experience in working with grassroots mobilizations as secondary partners. While 
they were experts in running protection projects, attitudinal-change campaigns and raising 
environmental awareness, lobbying and writing commentaries for draft legislations, 
partnering with a local mobilization in a contested land-use dispute was not their strong 
suit. Finally, for a long while, mainstream environmental organizations had difficulty in 
coming to terms with the fact that the strongest environmental mobilization in the nation’s 
history developed around a technology that was allegedly renewable and low-impact. They 
have been campaigning for renewable solutions for years and did not have the conceptual 
tools to make sense of the small hydro mobilizations and join their cause. Their hesitation 
to publicly support the rural mobilizations soon became a soft spot for mainstream 
environmentalism in Turkey as grassroots activists accused these organizations of being 
the mouthpiece of capital and started to question the sources of their donations.  
 
Doğa Derneği109, tried hard to engage with the anti-hydro mobilization from very early on. 
They initiated a loose umbrella structure called Water Assembly of Turkey in 2010 for a 
more efficient information exchange among the small-hydro stricken villages and valleys. 
Although the assembly was a huge success for a year or two in raising awareness and 
introducing struggles to each other, it fell apart due to a series of disagreements between 
                                                
109 Founded in 2002, Doğa Derneği (Nature Association) the one of the fourth main actor of the 
environmental NGOs in the country with WWF-Turkey, Greepeace-MED, and TEMA. Started as a bird 
observation society the association is now active in various environmental protection campaigns. Affiliated 
with BirdLife International, Doğa Derneği has 250 members and 670 volunteers mostly in Istanbul and 
Ankara. 
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Doğa Derneği and grassroots struggles (particularly those in the EBSR). While the schism 
that initiated the demise of the assembly was a dispute over the course of the movement, 
many ex-members today imply that the real reason in practice was a failure to reconcile the 
different approaches and languages of urban and rural based oppositions.  
 
Fellowship of Streams - DEKAP: One of the most authentic institutions of the anti-small 
hydro mobilization is the Fellowship of Streams Platform (Derelerin Kardeşliği Platfromu, 
DEKAP). Founded in Rize’s Fındıklı district at a quite early stage in late 2005, DEKAP 
evolved, in a sense, into a confederation for individual anti-hydro struggles, particularly in 
the EBSR. Local anti-small hydro movements can affiliate themselves with DEKAP and 
attend their regular general assemblies in which future strategies are discussed and 
determined. Being a DEKAP affiliate guarantees well-attended and loud demonstrations 
and a very beneficial informational support. Whenever an affiliate struggle faces a new 
challenge or wins a legal victory, it is DEKAP that announces it and spreads the news.  
 
Compared to the front line anti-hydro struggles, DEKAP has a pronounced left-leaning 
discourse that shapes its slogans, chants, press releases etc. The reason is that most of the 
key members of DEKAP are either current members of left/socialist political parties and/or 
have been a part of the revolutionary movement of 1970s.110 In this sense, DEKAP 
membership demographics resemble that of YEGEP, which forms the basis for the notion 
of “environmentalism of the malcontent” as described by Arsel et al. (2015). Similar to 
                                                
110 In contrast with the contemporary dominance of right wing politics (mostly AKP), socialist mobilization 
was very strong in the EBSR prior to the 1980 Coup. A series of newly published manuscripts ( ) reveal 
how radical left took root in the EBSR in the 1970s by forming unexpected coalitions with the region’s 
kinship structure.  
 179 
YEGEP activists, DEKAP activists, too, tend to conceptualize the individual struggles 
within larger socio-political analysis and do not hesitate to call their cause anti-capitalist. 
While its approach is deemed too radical by several frontline activists and regularly cause 
tensions in demonstrations, it is hard to deny the role of DEKAP in molding what Harvey 
calls militant particularisms (1995) around a common political language that helps the 
movement go beyond NIMBYism, Another critical detail that needs to be underlined is 
that DEKAP was founded by the individual initiative taken by its founding members while 
their political parties had no interest in environmental disputes for a long time.  Therefore, 
despite DEKAP members’ disposition to impose a particular political program on the rural 
struggles, it was their efforts that finally opened the eyes of the socialist groups to 
environmental matters and rural counter-mobilizations.  
 
Despite their undisputable contribution to the evolution of individual land-use struggles 
into a region-wide environmental mobilization, DEKAP is profoundly criticized by 
younger activists and small-hydro opponents who are not subscribed to socialist politics. 
Its representation- based structure (making sure that all political parties and valleys are 
represented) is found old-school and cumbersome; the way it makes decisions is perceived 
to be hierarchical and its communication with the larger public and non-DEKAP members 
is argued to be sectarian and non-engaging. Moreover, DEKAP’s strict description of what 
constitutes local as year-round residency causes serious discontent within the larger anti-
hydro movement. While DEKAP’s emphasis on local vigilance deters companies, their 
dismissal of rural-directed interest hinders the organization’s ability to be active in urban 
settings. At the heart of this critique emerged a new Black Sea focused anti-hydro collective 
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platform called Black Sea Uprising with the hopes to make the movement accessible to a 
larger audience. 
 
Black Sea Uprising: The most dynamic and innovative form of activism that came out of 
the anti-small hydro movement is the Black Sea Uprising Platform (Karadeniz İsyandadır 
Platfromu, KIP). While as critical in discourse as DEKAP is, KIP departs from DEKAP in 
being young, performative, highly mobile, non-hierarchical, colorful and more importantly 
eager to have a presence in the urban activism scene.  
 
Founded in late 2009, KIP’s oppositional language features elements that go beyond the 
painstakingly sectarian and crude discourse of the Turkish left with its emphasis on 
locality, human-nature relationship and culture. KIP demonstrations include 
unapologetical use of local languages111, costumes, slogans, games, music and dance as 
well as the critique of the companies and the government. KIP pays attention not to depict 
the energy disputes in the Black Sea Region as conflict over resources. It rather 
conceptualizes the opposition around the notions of local identity, rural autonomy, 
importance of self-sustaining communities and human-nature harmony, some of which can 
be found in the following passage from a press release distributed in 2011:  
People of Black Sea have been docile and known as malleable thus far. 
But until recently no one destroyed the tree that he knows as sacred, 
                                                
111 There are at least four local languages spoken in the Eastern Black Sea Region along with Turkish. A 
number of mountain villages speaks a version of Ancient Greek remnant of the Kingdom of Pontus which 
was conquered by the Ottomans in the 16th century. Lazi and Hemsini (two Caucasian languages) are well 
known in a handful of districts in the east of Rize. There are villages and two towns fluent in Georgian 
along the Georgian border. Assimilation of the ethnicities these languages into Islam and Turkishness is not 
new and can be traced back to late the 18th century (Meeker, 2002; Ildiko-Hann and Hann, 2001). While the 
overlap between the advent of environmentalism and the growing interest in local languages and histories is 
certainly a noteworthy coincidence, it is beyond the scope of this chapter. For studies on the growing 
interest in the local cultures and languages of ECSR see Biryol, 2014; Taşkın, 2016.       
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appropriated its blessed water, exploited the valleys that people treated as 
home. This is why the people of Black Sea never rose up before despite 
conditions of abject poverty. They have always been known as a joyful 
people. Yet, when the nature of Black Sea is unlawfully interfered with, 
when its environment is loutishly exploited, then it is time for Black Sea to 
rise up. (KIP, 2011)    
Although KIP’s activism agenda predominately revolves around small hydro projects, the 
platform takes pride in having a holistic take on the political ecology of the region as such: 
Without a doubt small hydro projects, which are projects of 
commodification of water, are not the only reason of the uprising of the 
Black Sea people.  There are also, stone pits, dams, thermal power stations 
and a nuclear plant that target the region from almost every corner. Black 
Sears read these projects correctly as the cutting off of the blood veins of 
the region. This situation is perceived as a question of existence: “If my 
water is gone, my valley is gone; if my valley is gone, then I am gone too, 
my language, culture and history are gone as well.  
What makes KIP interesting is that it is a travelling political collective in the sense that 
they are both urban and rural. This is a trait that reflects the demographics of KIP members 
who are mostly second (or third) generation rural-to-urban migrants. Born to gurbetçi 
families with Black Sea ancestry, KIP members grew up in Istanbul (or other metropoles) 
yet never lost contact with sıla. Many KIP activists narrate that their teenager years were 
divided across two distinct spaces: neighborhoods of Istanbul during school time, and the 
valleys of the Black Sea Region during the winter and summer holidays that are spent with 
grandparents. As activists, they follow the same mobile settlement arrangement by touring 
the environmental dispute geographies of the region during summer months and organizing 
demonstrations, concerts and sit-ins in winter months in Istanbul.  
 
Unlike DEKAP, individual struggles need not become KIP members, but they work with 
the struggles on a campaign basis. In this arrangement KIP is responsible for organizing 
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the Black Sea diaspora in Istanbul and designing well-attended, spectacular protests that 
would increase the visibility of the rural struggle. In what KIP calls as ‘acts of disclosure’, 
KIP members, the diaspora and urban activists sit-in and picket in front of either the 
headquarters of companies or their affiliates and partners in order to reveal the urban 
connections of destructive rural infrastructure projects. The point of these acts of 
disclosures for Zeynep, a 30-year-old accountant and long-time KIP activist, is to “bring 
the everyday ordeal of the Black Sear to the city and make it a part of the everyday ordeal 
of the ordinary Istanbulite” (personal interview, November 2013). In one such occasion 
along with the Istanbul-based diaspora of Ogene village in Trabzon, KIP activists located 
a human-size pipe in front of Sekerbank, the funder and partner of a small hydro project in 
Çaykara. To enter the bank that day, Şekerbank costumers had to physically go through the 
pipe, the inner surface of which was covered with photos from the Ogene countryside and 
clashes between the villagers and the company security. The other partner of the project, 
Okan Group, was protested outside Okan University, which was founded a decade ago by 
a trust donated by the Group. The date of the protest was strategically chosen to correspond 
with the registration day on which students visit the university with their parents.  
 
On the other hand, KIP activism along the urban-rural axis is not a one-way street. In years 
KIP helped many urban activists to visit the Black Sea countryside either through 15-day-
long field trips called life travels (yaşam yolculuğu) or through extended weekend trips to 
attend emergency demonstrations when a particular struggle was in need of immediate 
public support. These urban/rural encounters, which are always open to misunderstandings 
due to mutual prejudices and cultural differences, in time led to the formation of 
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unexpected alliances and circulation of ideas, tactics, and discourses. I contend that the 
political relevance of Turkey’s emergent grassroots environmentalism should be traced in 
these encounters as well as the ideas that they give rise to. In the remaining part I will 
briefly touch upon one of the examples in which the political meaning of urban-rural 
dynamism of the movement became most visible and impactful.   
 
Although KIP’s mission was to bring the rural discontent to the urban core, it was surely 
not the only source of such encounters. The connections between the emergent grassroots 
environmentalism in the countryside and urban-based politics were intensified through 
other means and they were not limited to the Black Sea region. Also, it would be misleading 
to suggest that these encounters were all problem-free. In many occasions, cultural 
differences and mutual prejudices caused tensions causing some collaborations to fail.112 
Nevertheless, despite disappointments and the movement’s failure to grow into a nation-
wide unified front I believe that the political relevance and success of Turkey’s emergent 
grassroots environmentalism can be traced in the encounters as well as the ideas that they 
give rise to along the urban-rural continuum. In the remaining part I will briefly touch upon 
one of the many examples in which the political meaning of urban-rural dynamism of the 
movement became most visible and impactful.   
                                                
112 One such failed project is the Great Anatolian March (Büyük Anadolu Yürüyüşü), in which some twenty 
individual anti-hydro struggles simultaneously march to the capital from their region of origin in finally to 
hold a sit-in in front of the parliament in Ankara. While the march begins with high hopes in Spring 2011, 
it was broken into multiple splits upon disaggreements between urban and rural participants.  
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5.4 LIFE AS A POLITICAL METAPHOR: AFTERSHOCKS OF 
RURAL MOBILIZATIONS 
Gezi Park will remain as a park.  We will allow neither the Topçu 
Barracks [the proposed hotel+mall complex] project, nor anything else 
that would violate nature and our life spaces. (emphasis mine) 
First of the four demands of Taksim Solidarity, announced following the 
occupation of the Park and the Square. June 01, 2013 
5.4.1 The Gezi Moment 
Toward the midnight of May 27th, 2013 an email circulated within the activist circles of 
Istanbul announcing the arrival of heavy equipment vehicles in Taksim Square to initiate 
the expected demolition of Gezi Park, one of the few remaining green spaces in central 
Istanbul. That night around 50 activists heeded the call, rushed to the park, successfully 
halted the cutting-down of a dozen trees, forced the vehicles to retreat and decided to hold 
on to the park by setting up a resistance encampment. Right before the break of dawn, a 
violent police crackdown dispersed the activists and resumed the demolition. As the 
protestors grew in number so did the consecutive early morning crackdowns until the park 
and the entire Taksim square were occupied by hundreds of thousands by the noon of June 
1st following round-the-clock street clashes. In four days time, what started as a sit-in urban 
protest had turned into a full-fledged anti-governmental revolt in which myriad of 
grievances against the authoritarian, discriminatory, and neoliberal rule of then-Prime 
Minister Tayyip Erdogan were voiced by different segments of the society. Barricades were 
constructed around the square to block off possible police attacks. June 1st marked the first 
day of what was later dubbed as the “Gezi commune.” Until the big police raid of June 15, 
Taksim square, Gezi Park and its vicinities remained occupied by the protestors and the 
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very heart of Istanbul would be completely free from state apparatuses.  Meanwhile, anti-
government protests as well as excessive use of police force spread to other cities. 
According to a report by the Ministry of Interior over 2.5 million people actively 
participated in 5,000 demonstrations held across 79 provinces out of 81 in the first 20 days 
of the events113. Nine civilians were killed, at least 8,000 were heavily injured, more than 
3,000 protestors were arrested and 12 lost an eye due to tear gas capsules.114 The impact 
field of the Gezi revolt went beyond June 2013; what is referred to as Gezi spirit continues 
to mobilize opposition and dominate the cultural scenery as well as political debates.  
 
Since summer 2013 much has been written about what may have triggered an uprising of 
the scale of Gezi. While commentators and scholars pointed to the authoritarian neoliberal 
practices of the AKP economics and located the Gezi revolt within the broader impact field 
of the Arab Spring, or Occupy Movement, or the anti-austerity protests that were then 
shaking the European capitals, the government chose to dismiss it as a foreign led coup 
attempt. Within this plethora of analysis few showed genuine interest in examining the 
connections between Gezi and the type of space-based environmental mobilizations that 
preceded (and proceeded) the revolt. In fact, Gezi reverberated across the country’s 
grassroots environmentalism geography. Small towns and villages of the EBSR, 
particularly those with an active struggle held demonstrations in support of Gezi; many 
prominent activists rushed to Istanbul to take part in the events, and KIP had a dedicated 
corner in the park that overflowed with visitors throughout the days of the occupation. My 
                                                
113 http://gundem.milliyet.com.tr/2-5-milyon-insan-79-ilde-
sokaga/gundem/detay/1726600/default.htm 
114http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/022/2013/en/0ba8c4cc-b059-4b88-9c52-
8fbd652c6766/eur440222013en.pdf 
 186 
intention here is not to offer an alternative explanation for Gezi. However, I believe that 
examining the links between Gezi and Turkey’s grassroots environmental mobilization has 
the potential to illustrate the political work urban-rural encounters are capable of doing, 
although it would be reductive to explain a spontaneous event like Gezi through a simple 
cause and effect logic.  
5.4.2 Circulation of A New Lexicon 
In terms of the extent to which these highly diverse mobilizations and encounters were able 
to develop a common political lexicon, one humble yet powerful phrase stands out: yaşam 
alanı (life space). Prior to Gezi, this catchphrase had been circulating among urban activists 
against commodification, privatization, and commercialization of urban spaces, as well as 
urban renewal projects, and among rural activists against extraction and energy 
infrastructures projects. Closely associated yet different from the increasingly popular 
concept of the “commons,” yaşam alanı connotes spaces of refuge that have maintained a 
high level of autonomy from the value circuits of capital accumulation. It also has 
connotations of a safe space to breathe, enjoy and express oneself. The notion of yaşam 
alanı enabled not only articulations between myriad grievances against various spatial 
interventions but also alternative political horizons. Deniz Özgür (2013), an Istanbul-based 
activist115, elaborates on the connection and continuity between a wide-range of yaşam 
alanı struggles and the Gezi Revolt as such: 
                                                
115 Deniz was among a handful of activists who spent the night of May 27 in their tents in the middle of the 
park “on guard”, a practice that has been widely used in anti-SHP protests in rural areas (Erensu, 2013b). In 
an interview conducted right after the Gezi Revolt, Deniz admits that that prior to Gezi, urban activists used 
to envy the dynamism of the rural movements in their collective sprit and innovative tactics (Karaman and 
Erensü, 2013).   
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This pillage [of AKP rule] directed against the common wealth of the 
entire society – namely, all the richness of the cities and the countryside, 
urban and rural services, agricultural lands, creeks, valleys, forests, water 
basins, neighborhoods, schools, hospitals, historical and cultural 
monuments – has spurred especially those living in rural areas to wage 
long-running struggles to defend their life spaces [yaşam alanı]…This 
entire process including the ensuing destruction of nature has been etched 
in collective memory. Those who most ambitiously embraced the Gezi 
Park revolts and first announced solidarity were precisely those groups 
who had long been leading struggles for their life spaces.  
It was the common goal of defending yaşam alanı(s) that successfully articulated various 
political agendas during the Gezi Revolt, and enabled their delocalization (Erensü, 2013b). 
The revolt was not however simply in defense of an existing life space, but entailed the 
claim over a shared space in the making (cf. Karaman, 2013b; Erensü, 2013c). During the 
days of occupation (June 1-15), Gezi Park housed hundreds of tents, and groups from a 
variety of political causes including environmentalists, feminists, Kemalists, nationalists, 
socialists, communists, anti-capitalist Islamists, anarchists, pro-Alevi, pro-LGBTQ, and 
pro-Kurdish rights, and football fan groups. Park residents established an infirmary, a 
communal kitchen, a nursery, a library, a communication office, and a market garden. 
Monetary exchange was banished from the grounds. In short the park residents were 
impatiently rushing to produce and proliferate what had been under attack over the last 
decade: their yaşam alanı(s).  
 
While there is disagreement over which grassroots struggle was first to coin the term, the 
term yaşam alanı proved itself to be handy, disseminating across various movements and 
becoming even more popular with the Gezi events. For these activists, yaşam alanı is a 
useful definition of what they defend, as it is applicable for both urban and rural struggles; 
it embraces all activists from different walks of life (farmers, student, retiree, return and 
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cyclical migrants, housewives etc.); it rejects the dichotomy between nature and human; 
and it helps to differentiate grassroots activists from mainstream environmental 
organizations.  
5.4.3 Delocalization of Gezi and Yaşam Alanı 
The use of the term continued even after Gezi and played a part in the delocalization of the 
form of objection raised in the park. I was in the EBSR before the local elections of March 
30th, 2014, the first nation-wide election after the Gezi Revolt. By simply checking the 
billboards, attending the political rallies and reading the political programs of the 
candidates it was clear that the local environmental issues dominated the election through 
and through. Opposition candidates were eager to harness the momentum of Gezi. They, 
on the one hand, sought to secure the support of grassroots organizations, on the other, held 
forum style assemblies true to the spontaneous, non-hierarchical spirit of Gezi. In Tonya, 
Trabzon, Environment Protection Platform actively campaigned for a candidate who had 
been selected through an unprecedented democratic primary process (candidates are often 
decided by the party leaders) led by the platform. In Fındıklı, Rize the candidate 
challenging the incumbent AKP mayor was running on a campaign shaped around the 
notion yaşam alanı to appeal to the DEKAP-led environmental struggle in the district. In 
Çamlıhemşin, Rize, and Arhavi, Artvin small hydro projects were crucial topics of the race 
(see Figure 5.3).  
 
Environmentalism as the protection of yaşam alanı also strongly resonated with the 
contemporary language of Kurdish politics and People’s Democratic Party (Halkların 
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Demokrasi Partisi, HDP)116. The interest of Kurdish political movement in ecological 
matters is in fact older than that of Turkish left. Abdullah Öcalan’s—the imprisoned leader 
of the illegal Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)—Bookchin-inspired “theory for an 
ecological society” which calls for decentralization and rural communitarianism to 
revitalize the war-stricken Kurdish countryside has had huge influence on Kurdish 
intellectuals (Yarkın, 2011). One bold, but not so successful, application of this ecological 
opening was the ecologically friendly agriculture village projects in Yüksekova and 
Viranşehir, sponsored by municipalities run by Kurdish politicians (Ibid.). Some of these 
ideas are now being tested in northern Syria and rendering the Rojava revolution even more 
noteworthy.  
                                                
116 Founded in 2012, HDP is a relatively new political party that was born out of an alliance between the 
mainstream Kurdish political movement and multiple Turkish socialist fractions. 
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Figure 5.3: Election Propaganda in the EBSR  
Above: Major candidate of the major opposition party, “Let’s protect our Yaşam Alanı” – Fındıklı, Rize 
Below: Major candidate, Independent, “Fırtına River will run free” – Çamlıhemşin, Rize   
 
HDP’s recent emphasis on the environment, however, seems to be in dialogue with the 
grassroots environmental awakening in the country, the Gezi moment and the idea of 
yaşam alanı. Since its foundation in 2012, HDP kept an eye on the grassroots mobilizations 
and, on several occasions, secretly sent envoys to show solidarity with the communities, 
most of which have been, to put it mildly, notoriously skeptical towards the Kurdish cause. 
Building upon these small but sustained connections, HDP initiated a nation-wide Ecology 
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Assembly in which grassroots movements could scale up local disputes and struggles. The 
assembly may still be taking baby steps, but such initiatives nonetheless helped HDP to 
reach out and establish some new relationships. In August 2014 Presidential Elections and 
June 2015 General Elections HDP ran two successful campaigns both of which were 
designed around the notion of “new life” sharing much in common with yaşam alanı. In 
the latter election, Professor Beyza Üstün, an activist scholar known very well by the 
mobilizations in the EBSR thanks to her public lectures on environmental hazards of 
energy infrastructures, ran on the HDP ballot and was elected to the parliament. 
 
The roots of sympathy and synergy between local resistance movements and HDP politics 
in fact go deeper and are only visible to those who follow the grassroots mobilizations 
closely. The burgeoning form of ecological activism in Turkey is, at the same time, a place-
making activity as the term yaşam alanı successfully captures. Whether in the countryside 
or the city, activists protesting an undesired energy project or a mega-infrastructural 
investment on the grounds of their negative impacts to neighboring communities inevitably 
find themselves in a position to define and defend the authenticity of a place. That place is 
then invaded by construction vehicles, residents’ voices are silenced, and protestors are 
beaten up by security forces. Moreover, so many times have I come across local activists 
who, disillusioned by police/gendarmerie brutality, sympathize with Kurds and finally shed 
their sense of disbelief regarding the violence Kurds ın Turkey have been subject to all 
along. 
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This is precisely why the notion of the protection of yaşam alanı finds echoes in Kurdish 
politics, which has strived for the acknowledgement of a local culture, territory and 
economy for decades. They may currently correspond to a fraction of votes, yet the 
ecological and spatial struggles captured in the phrases new life and life space have 
immense political potential to generate unexpected alliances that go beyond election cycles 
into the long run. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter aimed at investigating the opposition raised against Turkey’s aggressive 
energy economy and spread of energy infrastructure across the Turkish countryside. Upon 
examining the anti-small hydro mobilization, its geographic and demographic features I 
suggested that the recent wave of environmentalism in Turkey is neither a manifestation of 
post-material society nor does it fall under the analytical framework of the 
environmentalism of the poor. To better appreciate its dynamism and the forms of objection 
it manifests, I suggested that the grassroots activism in Turkey must be understood in its 
spatial features rather than in its motivations which are falsely assumed to be readily 
available, decipherable and static. By highlighting the processes and structures such as 
cyclical and seasonal migrations, dual settlements, multi-place hybrid lives and domestic 
diasporas I argued that the vitality of environmental mobilizations owes much to the rich 
web of movements across Turkey’s undervalued urban-rural continuum.  
 
From a political ecology standpoint one can still wonder who the winners, somehow losers 
and real losers of these environmental disputes. Moreover, following the building on the 
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literature of primitive accumulation/accumulation by dispossession one can rightfully 
question who is being dispossessed of what in this picture (Harvey, 2003; Glassman, 2006: 
Perrault, 2013). Then again, it is valid to ask how class analysis is impacted once the 
framework of the environmentalism of the poor vs. rich is sidelined. My purpose in 
stressing on the spatial dimensions of the grassroots mobilizations is not to deny that some 
crudest forms of land grabbing are in action in certain energy disputes. Some villagers, 
particularly in regions with weak or no oppositional mobilization, are forced out of 
agriculture and rural life over night. However, in many other places, dispossession is 
limited and/or agricultural production—which is already nothing but a yearly bonus for 
seasonal villagers—is not harmed in the short run. On top of all these, I point to a spatial 
form of dispossession that actually has series class dimension especially once we 
understand the urban-rural continuum having an unreplaceable social production value (cf. 
Roberts, 2008; Sneddon, 2007; Hall, 2012).   
 
I also elaborated on the political implications and discussed the political impact field field 
of such mobilizations. By tracing the circulation of a particular lexicon, yaşam alanı I 
suggested that Turkey’s environmental awakening contributed to development of a new 
type of oppositional politics and established links between environmental grassroots 
movement on the one hand and Gezi revolt, local election and Kurdish political movement 
on the other.  
 
My intention was not to depict the grassroots environmental mobilizations in Turkey as a 
project that is complete and successful. To the contrary, despite victories in certain pockets, 
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the mobilizations are far from overturning infrastructure-based economics in and putting a 
permanent dent in Turkey’s neoliberal authoritarian turn. I neither intend to reduce the 
entire oppositional politics to grassroots mobilizations. However, I suggest the 
organizational innovation of these mobilizations, their reach across the spatial, cultural and 
class lines, and the alternative imaginaries they stipulated points to alternative trajectories 
that could challenge both energo-rationality and neoliberal authoritarian hegemony in the 
long run.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
Turkey is in constant state of turmoil at least for the last three years following the Gezi 
revolt that damaged the government’s self confidence so spectacularly. The political 
instability in the country is particularly troubling for the last twelve months. As a fellow 
citizen of the country and a Turkey researcher, during the writing process of this 
dissertation I got up every morning with the anxiety to find out, at best a new political 
scandal or an imprisonment of an opponent of governing AKP party, or worse, a new 
suicide bombing attack hitting one of the urban centers or a government-led atrocity 
targeting Kurdish cities. More recently, a new addition to the list is friends and colleagues 
losing positions in the academia for things they say and write.  
 
To many international observers these developments are shocking and surprising. How 
come a country that was shown as an example to the entire Middle East with its economic 
vitality, parliamentary democracy and moderate Islamic government go down hill into an 
authoritarian abyss? Although it was never really the driving research question for me, this 
dissertation, at one level, provides a new perspective on the rise and fall of the so-called 
Turkish model. Rather than reducing rise of authoritarianism in Turkey to the culture and 
ideology of the political Islam or personal ambitious character of its leader President 
Erdogan (like most observers do), I look at the realm of infrastructures—in both sense of 
the word—to tell a more nuanced and complex account. By both sense of the word, I refer 
to infrastructure as opposed to superstructure in Marxian sense as well as physically 
infrastructures that are designed to aid human life.  
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By tracing energy infrastructures along their spatial, environmental, legal and financial 
dimensions (particularly those of small hydropower plants) my dissertation provides an 
analysis of political power in 21st century Turkey through the lens of energy. To rephrase 
it differently, in this dissertation I examine Turkey’s aggressive energy program to 
understand how energy is (re)valued and (re)constructed at this turbulent conjuncture by 
assembling new social, economical, political and ecological meanings and relations. While 
I do not believe that the rise of authoritarianism in Turkey can be explained by a single 
logic, I centralize energy boom to gain a novel perspective through which limits and 
possibilities of political power in contemporarily Turkey can be analyzed and evaluated. 
*** 
So what is this aggressive energy boom all about? Turkey witnessed an unprecedented 
energy boom following the liberalization of its market in early 2000s. Between 2008 and 
2015 investments in the energy industry surpassed $50 billion.117 Turkish energy sector 
became one of the world’s fastest growing by reaching above 9 percent growth rate in 2010 
and 2011(Deloitte, 2013: 8). An average of $6 billion is poured into new electricity 
production infrastructures annually. Within a decade country’s total installed capacity in 
electricity more than doubled. Energy business attracted a mass migration from dying 
industries. Forbes magazine reported that 82 of 100 richest people of Turkey had active 
                                                
117 Daily Sabah, “Turkey energy import costs $50 billion on average”, 2 October 2014 URL: http://www 
.dailysabah.com/energy/2014/10/02/turkeys-energy-import-costs-50-billion-per-year-on-average (accessed 
on 5 June 2016). 
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operations in the energy sector in 2013, making the sector the country’s most profitable 
alongside real estate.118  
 
Examining bourgeoning energy infrastructures, I argue that energy has been a key to the 
establishment of an authoritarian neoliberal experience, what is being dubbed by its 
founders, new Turkey. I claim that this was due to energy’s unique qualities in bridging 
center and periphery, urban and countryside, capital and commons while connecting nature 
and civilization, resource and consumption along electrical grids and pipelines. I maintain 
that it is this bridging function that is so potent for hegemonic formations. I also discuss, 
however, the bridge is unstable and fragile as it offers cracks for counter hegemonic 
contestations. I illustrate throughout the dissertation how energy infrastructures, in 
converting uncharted rural and environmental settings into energy landscapes, cause 
unexpected cracks and disruptions as well as powerful sociopolitical alliances. 
*** 
A few caveats are in order to clarify what I intend not to do in this study. First, I do not aim 
to reduce Turkey and its experience with authoritarianism to a matter resource extraction. 
Especially in the context of the middle east the assumption is that energy abundance creates 
a democratic deficit—often referred to as oil curse. In fact, studying energy in a country 
that lacks energy, I hope, has the potential to enhance so-called resource course literature. 
What I am rather interested in the political possibilities opened up and or down by energy 
choices and their implementation not only for the government but for multiple actors. This 
                                                
118 En zenging 100 Türk’ten 82’si enerjici” [82 of riches 100 Turks are in energy] Enerji Günlüğü, 03 May 
2014 URL.  http://www.enerjigunlugu.net/icerik/7391/en-zengin-100-turkten-82si-enerjici.html#. 
V8bNm5MrKHo (accessed 10 July 2016). 
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is why the dissertation is not necessarily about AKP or its leader although they inevitably 
appear many times throughout the study. I am interested in the link between energy 
infrastructures and political power in a more diffused manner. While I argue that energy 
boom has strengthened the government’s hold over the discourse of development, the 
periphery, judiciary, and certain portion of the capital, its win is neither absolute nor goes 
uncontested. But more importantly I do not suggest that energy begets power for whoever 
controls. The power of energy, I argue, stems from somewhere else. It stems from the 
seepage of energy discourses, priorities, concerns, and solutions into other fields of 
governance as components of a useful toolkit. I illustrate that truth claims produced in the 
energy field is borrowed by other fields of action as common sense solutions. The prowess 
of this emergent rationality, which I name as energorationality, stems from energy’s 
unique qualities in bringing center and periphery, urban and countryside, capital and 
commons together, from its ability to suture a variety of unlikely actors, policies, and ideas 
to each other. 
*** 
Building upon Susan Leigh Star (1999) I call my method an energy ethnography in which 
I trace a particular form of infrastructure—namely small hydro power plants—as they 
interact with a variety of actors, institutions, political discourses, cultural norms and 
geographical settings. Spanning over five years between 2010 and 2015, my dissertation 
fieldwork is composed of three pillars extending across three geographies in Turkey in 
tracing energy traveling across scales. The first pillar includes project site ethnographies 
that I conducted in the Eastern Black Sea Region (EBSR), home to around 200 ongoing 
and future small hydropower projects. I visited the region multiple times over years for 
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stays that are 3 to 6 weeks long, I traveled across the valleys of Artvin, Rize, and Trabzon 
to observe how social and ecological frictions unfold as rural livelihoods and landscapes 
are turned into new energy geographies. Second pillar consists of the examination of the 
energy industry (both its private and public actors) to be able to illustrate the kind of 
coalitions and conflicts that a bourgeoning market produces. I have reviewed policy 
documents, attended sectoral workshops and conferences, and interviewed with 60 actors 
working in the energy industry as bureaucrats, engineers, businessmen, bankers and 
journalists; most of whom are located in Ankara and Istanbul. For the final pillar, I 
undertook participatory action research, both observing and participating in the anti-SHP 
movement. I have attended demonstrations, occupations, activist field trips, court hearings, 
expert opinion explorations and conducted in-depth interviews with lawyers working for 
the movement in order to better grasp the forms of objection, narratives, and 
representations that the anti-energy opposition has given rise to.  
*** 
The dissertation consisted of four main body chapters following an introduction that I 
discuss theoretical and methodological problems. Each chapter revolves around a field 
impacted by energomentality, namely macroeconomic, state-capital relations, judiciary 
and political opposition.  
 
The first of the four provides a genealogy for the last 100 years of Turkish energy. I trace 
the fundamental raptures ın Turkey’s energy regime and discuss how these ruptures overlap 
with the key turning points in the country’s economic orientation. I examine this history 
under 4 periods. (1) Early liberal experimentation (1908-1929) in which the country’s 
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energy start-up infrastructures were completely outsourced to the private sector, mainly the 
European capital. (2) National Planning Paradigm (1929-1982) in which state owned 
produced and plan the entire industry. (3) Early (or Proto) Neoliberalism (1983-2001) in 
which private energy production schemes were tested under state control and (4) finally 
since 2001 energy reform I have been going thru a deep neoliberalization which the 
industry was almost completely left to the private sector and state power was shared 
between the private actors and a newly formed independent regulatory body. By 
particularly focus on early and deep neo-liberal periods and the transition between the two 
I offer a neoliberalization of energy narrative that goes beyond the AKP reign. While the 
surface reason behind the energy reform of 2001 was an energy supply crisis, I argue that 
it was ın fact a fertile conjuncture in which multiple issues came together to be solved by 
the energy reform fix. Some of these problems were AKP specific, while others pointing 
to the crisis of early neoliberalism that AKP inherited. In the final section of the chapter, I 
discuss whether it is the right time to think about the arrival of a post-neoliberal period 
based on the more audible voice of the opposition in Turkey and return of an increased 
governmental control over the sector. I conclude by suggesting that post-neolibelism may 
not simply be the come-back of the welfare state as some optimists argue but rather just a 
more authoritarian-corporatist version of late neoliberalism.  
 
Next chapter introduces and examines small hydropower plants as a form of infrastructure. 
I remind that in the absence of oil and natural gas resources, a boom in hydropower 
infrastructures fueled Turkey’s energy frenzy. In terms of annual growth in hydropower 
portfolio Turkey competes with Brazil, China and Canada. I name this boom as Turkey’s 
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hydropower renaissance, a second wave of expansion of country’s hydropower structure. 
Because unlike 1970s and 1980s, the golden age of Turkish damming, the investments are 
(a) mostly private (b) predominately concentrated on small-size run-off-the river type 
projects (c) low in power yet high in number (d) stretches over a completely new geography 
that was not dammed before. I argue that despite its reputation as a renewable, low-impact 
local-friendly infrastructure, the popularization of small hydro in Turkey has been first and 
foremost key to its energy liberalization efforts. The smallness of the energy investments 
motivated a variety of entrepreneurs to jump into the energy sector and become energy 
investors overnight.  I also assert that as space-making, landscape forming infrastructures, 
small hydro projects have been instrumental in the spread of neoliberalism across a vast 
territory while contributing a particular restructuring in state, society, and markets 
relations. 
 
The third body chapter focuses on the mark that energorationality left on the judiciary, 
more specifically the administrative law and proceedings. While return to investment rates 
were 5 to 7 years, and companies used to make million dollars per MW in the early years 
of the boom, now the business leaders are quite unhappy. Many investments stagnate due 
to natural factors but mostly due to legal battles fought against local resistances and delay 
in project financing cause some companies to withdraw or worse bankrupt. Pressured by 
the capital, the government intervene to the legal process to help the smooth completion of 
energy investments. Through new legal tools energy production is now embellished with a 
coat of urgency as a fast track options are provided to circumvent legal procedures. I 
particularly draw attention to two new governmental technologies of urgency (1) the urgent 
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appropriation procedure and (2) urgent judicial proceedings. The urgency emphasis these 
procedure generate has a powerful potential for the government that goes beyond the goal 
of accelerating the pace of the energy investments. That is why the transformative impact 
of energy infrastructures on the judicial system has become a benchmark for governance 
by seeping into other fields, such as the urban renewal projects and the Kurdish Question. 
They are being used in other fields to ease urban gentrification and turning Kurdish cities 
into disciplined zones of control. Despite their powerful mandate, I reminded there are 
limits to manipulating the pace of the judiciary, and attempts to circumvent legal 
procedures often backfire.   
 
In the last body chapter, I look at the opposition emerged against the energy infrastructure’s 
aggressive land and water grabs in the countryside, particularly the Eastern Black Sea 
Region – where the investments are plenty and opposition is strongest. Upon examining 
the anti-small hydro mobilization, its geographic and demographic features I suggest that 
the recent wave of environmentalism in Turkey is neither a feature of a post-industrial/post-
material society nor does it fall under the analytical framework of the environmentalism of 
the poor. To better appreciate its dynamism and the forms of objection it manifests, I claim 
that the grassroots activism in Turkey must be understood in its spatial features rather than 
the its motivations which are falsely assumed to be readily available, decipherable and 
static. By highlighting the processes and structures such as cyclical and seasonal 
migrations, dual settlements, multi-place hybrid lives and domestic diasporas I argued that 
the vitality of environmental mobilizations owes much to the rich web of movements across 
Turkey’s undervalued urban-rural continuum. I also elaborate on the political implications 
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of such cross-class, cross-scale mobilizations. By tracing the circulation of a particular 
lexicon, yaşam alanı I suggest that Turkey’s environmental awakening contributes to 
development of a new type of oppositional politics and established links between 
environmental grassroots movement on the one hand and Gezi revolt, local election and 
Kurdish political movement on the other.  
***** 
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